A Candle For Remembering
May this memorial candle lights up the historical past of our beloved Country: Rwanda, We love U so much. If Tears could build a stairway. And memories were a lane. I would walk right up to heaven. To bring you home again. No farewell words were spoken. No time to say goodbye. You were gone before I knew it And. Only Paul Kagame knows why. My heart still aches with sadness. And secret tears still flow. What It meant to lose you. No one will ever know.
Why did Kagame this to me?
Can't forget. He murdered my mother. What should be my reaction? FYI: the number of orphans in Rwanda has skyrocketed since the 1990's Kagame's invasion. Much higher numbers of orphans had and have no other option but joining FDLR fighters who are identified as children that have Lost their Parents in Kagame's Wars inside and outside of Rwanda.If someone killed your child/spouse/parent(s) would you seek justice or revenge? Deep insight: What would you do to the person who snuffed the life of someone I love beyond reason? Forgiving would bring me no solace. If you take what really matters to me, I will show you what really matters. NITUTIRWANAHO TUZASHIRA. IGIHE KIRAGEZE.If democracy is to sell one's motherland(Africa), for some zionits support, then I prefer the person who is ready to give all his live for his motherland. Viva President Putin!!!
RPF committed the unspeakable
The perverted RPF committed the UNSPEAKABLE.Two orphans, both against the Nazi world. Point is the fact that their parents' murder Kagame & his RPF held no shock in the Western world. Up to now, the Rwandan Hitler Kagame and his death squads still enjoy impunity inside and outside of Rwanda. What goes through someone's mind as they know RPF murdered their parents? A delayed punishment is actually an encouragement to crime, In Praise of the ongoing Bloodshed in Rwanda. “I always think I am a pro-peace person but if someone harmed someone near and dear to me, I don't think I could be so peaceful. I would like to believe that to seek justice could save millions of people living the African Great Lakes Region - I would devote myself to bringing the 'perp' along to a non-happy ending but would that be enough? You'd have to be in the situation I suppose before you could actually know how you would feel or what you would do”. Jean-Christophe Nizeyimana, Libre Penseur
Hutu Children & their Mums
Look at them ! How they are scared to death. Many Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi, Foreign human rights advocates, jounalists and and lawyers are now on Death Row Waiting to be murdered by Kagame and his RPF death squads. Be the last to know.
Almighty God :Justice for US
Hutu children's daily bread: Intimidation, Slavery, Sex abuses led by RPF criminals and Kagame, DMI: Every single day, there are more assassinations, imprisonment, brainwashing & disappearances. Do they have any chance to end this awful life?
Killing Hutus on daily basis
RPF targeted killings, very often in public areas. Killing Hutus on daily basis by Kagame's murderers and the RPF infamous death squads known as the "UNKNOWN WRONGDOERS"
RPF Trade Mark: Akandoya
Rape, torture and assassination and unslaving of hutu women. Genderside: Rape has always been used by kagame's RPF as a Weapon of War, the killings of Hutu women with the help of Local Defense Forces, DMI and the RPF military
The Torture in Rwanda flourishes
How torture flourishes across Rwanda despite extensive global monitoring
Fighting For Our Freedom?
We need Freedom, Liberation of our fatherland, Human rights respect, Mutual respect between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority
Monday, June 15, 2009
I don't care! ==> Kagame says and repeat.
What do you know about President Kagame?
Rwanda genocide: What if Kagame killed Habyarimana?
Kagame responsible of more than 8 millions of Rwandan and Congolese people.
Watch the video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EVOwBMnHYDw
Paul Kagame, THE BIGGEST KILLER ALIVE
The ICTR has failed to shed light on all the crucial details one needs to understand how the genocide was all planned and how the orders for its execution were given. But much is
known about the detailed planning of the extremists in power in Kigali and their long preparation for the cruellest episode ever in African history. Enough to place guilt where it belongs.
Recently, press reports, quoting prominent experts of the Great Lakes region, raised again the issue of impunity of president Kagame, with regard to the war crimes that he committed or ordered for. The main point of this paper is to expose one of the hitherto unveiled faces of his crimes.
Indeed, some of the crimes which were indiscriminately attributed to Interahamwe were in actual facts carried out by none other than Kagame and his henchmen. In their sinister plans, they would disguise as the notorious militia Interahamwe. This should however not be misconstrued to mean that the latter did not kill.
This is not a hearsays, I am ready to produce evidence and call other people who witnessed the crimes that occurred in the following places. => 2nd Lt. Aloys RUYENZI
Mr Kagame may have the blood of President Habyarimana, his Burundian counterpart and the airplane's partly French staff at his hands. This would however make him guilty of just another coup d'état in Africa in the 1990s. And - if interpreted very widely - of a terrorist attack; if interpreted more conservatively, of a political assassination that saw civilian victims. History and today's world is full of such, and although they should not be approved of, they are not prosecuted if not being part of systematic war crimes. =>Rainer Chr. Hennig
What do you do when indicted war criminals lead a country? Paul Rusesabagina
If President Paul Kagame had any semblance of love for Her Majesty the Queen and the Brish people, he would have called for an independent international investigation into the Bwindi massacre of 1999 in Uganda where British, Australian, and New Zealander tourists were butchered by unknown assailants. Instead, using torture, his forces engaged in the blatant framing of innocent suspects who now have been cleared by American courts. Many believe that Kagame's men carried out this heinous butchery.
If President Paul Kagame were innocent and had nothing to hide, he would have called for an independent international investigation into the shooting down of President Juvenal Habyarimana's jet, the criminal act that started the genocide, and let justice exonerate him in the eyes of the world. He has decided not to.
If President Kagame had any coherence to his actions, he would have allowed such an independent investigation to validate his claims that Hutu extremists are the ones who downed Habyarimana's aircraft. He has chosen not to.
If President Kagame had any decency and humanity left in him, he would not have gone on the air and asserted with much contempt when asked who shot down Habyarimana's airplane: "I don't know and in fact to risk sounding cynical, I don't care" (Paul Kagame's interview with Reuters New Agency on November 29, 2006). After all, a Rwandan President and other Rwandan officials, a Burundian President and his collaborators, as well as French nationals, were killed on that doomed flight. From his own admission, he does not care.=> Paul Rusesabagina
© SurViVors Editions
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What do you know about President Kagame?
Rwanda genocide: What if Kagame killed Habyarimana?
Kagame responsible of more than 8 millions of Rwandan and Congolese people.
Watch the video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EVOwBMnHYDw
Paul Kagame, THE BIGGEST KILLER ALIVE
The ICTR has failed to shed light on all the crucial details one needs to understand how the genocide was all planned and how the orders for its execution were given. But much is
known about the detailed planning of the extremists in power in Kigali and their long preparation for the cruellest episode ever in African history. Enough to place guilt where it belongs.Recently, press reports, quoting prominent experts of the Great Lakes region, raised again the issue of impunity of president Kagame, with regard to the war crimes that he committed or ordered for. The main point of this paper is to expose one of the hitherto unveiled faces of his crimes.
Indeed, some of the crimes which were indiscriminately attributed to Interahamwe were in actual facts carried out by none other than Kagame and his henchmen. In their sinister plans, they would disguise as the notorious militia Interahamwe. This should however not be misconstrued to mean that the latter did not kill.
This is not a hearsays, I am ready to produce evidence and call other people who witnessed the crimes that occurred in the following places. => 2nd Lt. Aloys RUYENZI
Mr Kagame may have the blood of President Habyarimana, his Burundian counterpart and the airplane's partly French staff at his hands. This would however make him guilty of just another coup d'état in Africa in the 1990s. And - if interpreted very widely - of a terrorist attack; if interpreted more conservatively, of a political assassination that saw civilian victims. History and today's world is full of such, and although they should not be approved of, they are not prosecuted if not being part of systematic war crimes. =>Rainer Chr. Hennig
What do you do when indicted war criminals lead a country? Paul Rusesabagina
If President Paul Kagame had any semblance of love for Her Majesty the Queen and the Brish people, he would have called for an independent international investigation into the Bwindi massacre of 1999 in Uganda where British, Australian, and New Zealander tourists were butchered by unknown assailants. Instead, using torture, his forces engaged in the blatant framing of innocent suspects who now have been cleared by American courts. Many believe that Kagame's men carried out this heinous butchery.
If President Paul Kagame were innocent and had nothing to hide, he would have called for an independent international investigation into the shooting down of President Juvenal Habyarimana's jet, the criminal act that started the genocide, and let justice exonerate him in the eyes of the world. He has decided not to.
If President Kagame had any coherence to his actions, he would have allowed such an independent investigation to validate his claims that Hutu extremists are the ones who downed Habyarimana's aircraft. He has chosen not to.
If President Kagame had any decency and humanity left in him, he would not have gone on the air and asserted with much contempt when asked who shot down Habyarimana's airplane: "I don't know and in fact to risk sounding cynical, I don't care" (Paul Kagame's interview with Reuters New Agency on November 29, 2006). After all, a Rwandan President and other Rwandan officials, a Burundian President and his collaborators, as well as French nationals, were killed on that doomed flight. From his own admission, he does not care.=> Paul Rusesabagina
© SurViVors Editions
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine
Friday, June 12, 2009
Le Parti pour la Démocratie au Rwanda (PDR-Ihumure), fermement déterminé à tout mettre en oeuvre pour assurer au peuple rwandais un meilleur avenir, pertinemment convaincu que seul un régime issu d’élections démocratiques pourra non seulement garantir la paix et le développement de toute la population rwandaise, mais aussi restaurerla cohabitation pacifique entre le Rwanda avec ses pays voisins, mais constatant que les conditions minimales d’élections justes, libres et transparentes sont actuellement inexistantes au Rwanda, porte à la connaissance de toute la population rwandaise et de la communauté internationale qu’il voudrait bien participer aux prochaines élections présidentielles de 2010, mais que celles-ci doivent au préalable être conjointement préparées par le gouvernement actuel du FPR et son opposition.Le PDR-Ihumure demande donc aussi à la communauté internationale de donner la
chance à la paix dans la région des Grands Lacs Africains et à la réconciliation du peuple rwandais en contribuant à la mise en place des conditions propices à une véritabledémocratie au Rwanda.
En appui à sa position, le PDR-Ihumure soumet à l’attention du public les quelques
éléments ci-après:
1. Le gouvernement du Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) actuellement au pouvoir à
Kigali s’est jusqu’à présent montré incapable d’organiser des élections tout en
assurant la sécurité des candidats de l’opposition et de leurs supporteurs.
Comme en témoignent les observateurs indépendants et des organismes de défense des
droits de la personne, il n’hésite pas à recourir aux assassinats, aux emprisonnements et aux intimidations de toutes sortes pour réduire à néant ses opposants. Ainsi, lors des précédentes élections présidentielles du 25 août 2003, la Mission électorale de l’union Européenne s’est dite « préoccupée par les disparitions, arrestations et convocations d’opposants à la police »
Amnesty internationale a également abondé dans le même sens en déclarant que « Le FPR se livre à une stratégie d’intimidation de ses adversaires politiques, arrêtant les opposants, embrigadant les gens de force dans ses propres rangs et n’hésitant pas à recourir à la violence (menaces de mort, notamment) pour saper le soutien dont pourrait bénéficier l’opposition. La campagne électorale du candidat du FPR, l’actuel président Paul Kagamé, consiste essentiellement, depuis quelques jours, à accuser les autres prétendants à la présidence de divisionnisme ethnique».
2. Le gouvernement du FPR s’est jusqu’à présent montré incapable d’organiser des
élections honnêtes et transparentes. En 2003, les élections présidentielles et
législatives ont été marquées par des bourrages d’urnes3, et cinq ans après, le
reflexe de manipulation des résultats des urnes a encore resurgi lors des élections
législatives de 2008.
À titre illustratif, il y a lieu de mentionner les observations de l’organisme américain de défense des droits de la personne Human Rights Watch (HRW) selon lequel « Quand les élections parlementaires qui se sont déroulées en septembre dernier se sont soldées par une victoire écrasante avec 92% des votes pour le parti au pouvoir de Kagamé, les preuves collectées par les observateurs rwandais et de l'Union européenne ont suggéré que le gouvernement avait en fait gonflé le pourcentage des votes de l'opposition afin d'éviter l'impression embarrassante d'un pseudo-plébiscite de type soviétique ».
3. La presse indépendante qui constitue l’un des piliers de la démocratie est fortement réprimée, ce qui place le Rwanda parmi les 16% des pires pays au monde en matière de liberté de presse5. Le président Paul Kagame figure parmi les prédateurs de la liberté de presse et réprime systématiquement non seulement la presse nationale indépendante, mais aussi les agences de presse étrangères. La dernière de ses victimes est la BBC dont les émissions en Kinyarwanda ont été suspendues en avril dernier.
4. Les dirigeants des partis politiques non inféodés au FPR continuent d’être harcelés et privés de leurs droits, et ne peuvent pas tenir publiquement la moindre activité politique. La plus récente manifestation des violations des droits politiques des partis d’opposition s’est produite le 1er juin 2009, lorsque la police rwandaise a empêché les leaders du parti PS Imberakuri de tenir une conférence de presse et a procédé immédiatement à leur arrestation.
5. Les criminels au sein du FPR continuent de bénéficier d’une totale impunité, alors qu’ils entrent dans la catégorie des personnes qui doivent être jugées par le Tribunal Pénal International pour le Rwanda (TPIR) selon la résolution 955 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. Cette justice partiale du TPIR qui l’a transformé en « Tribunal des vaincus » et qui a déjà encouragé le FPR à commettre d’autres crimes contre l’humanité continue à faire peser un énorme risque d’extermination sur une partie de la population rwandaise.
6. Des millions de réfugiés rwandais dispersés à travers le monde ne peuvent pas exercer leurs pleins droits civiques et politiques, ni en tant que citoyens électeurs,ni en tant que citoyens candidats, étant maintenus en exil par le régime actuel qui les considère collectivement comme des « génocidaires » et va jusqu’à menacer leur progéniture. À ce sujet, les déclarations du président Paul Kagame sont sans équivoque: «Des enfants de génocidaires, élevés dans l’idéologie du génocide, sont potentiellement aussi dangereux que leurs parents….. En tout état de cause, nous avons un devoir de prévention à leur égard ».
7. Le PDR-Ihumure ne peut pas tolérer qu’une partie aussi importante de la population rwandaise soit continuellement exclue, maintenue en exil et privée de ses droits politiques. Il ne peut pas non plus supporter que le pouvoir du peuple rwandais soit continuellement usurpé par un gouvernement qui n’ose pas soumettre son bilan à l’appréciation souveraine de tous les citoyens et affronter son opposition sur un terrain véritablement démocratique.
8. Les prochaines élections présidentielles doivent être une occasion de donner un nouvel élan au peuple rwandais, de mettre fin à la guerre de pillage imposée au peuple frère de la République Démocratique du Congo et de résoudre définitivement le problème des réfugiés qui doivent d’abord rentrer dignement pour se faire prévaloir, eux-aussi, de leurs droits civiques et politiques. C’est pourquoi, le PDR-Ihumure invite le gouvernement du FPR à faire preuve, cette fois-ci, de courage politique et de s’assoir avec son opposition pour mettre sur pied les conditions gagnantes pour de véritables élections démocratiques.
9. Étant donné que le prochain gouvernement doit bénéficier de la confiance de tout le peuple rwandais, de la crédibilité et d’une autorité morale sans faille pour relever les multiples défis qui l’attendent, le PDR-Ihumure demande que tous les candidats à la magistrature suprême soient des gens irréprochables, ne faisant l’objet d’aucune poursuite judiciaire.
10. Le PDR-Ihumure demande à la communauté internationale, et plus particulièrement aux plus grandes Puissances Occidentales qui soutiennent le régime de Paul Kagame et au Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies de donner une chance à la paix dans la région des Grands Lacs Africains et de participer à la mise sur pied des conditions favorables à une véritable démocratie au Rwanda.
Aussi, il joint sa voix à celles de Human Rights Watch8, des universitaires et des défenseurs des droits de la personne9 pour réclamer que les criminels au sein du FPR soient rapidement traduits devant la justice.
Le PDR-Ihumure pose la traduction en justice des criminels au sein du FPR comme l’un des préalables à sa participation aux prochaines élections présidentielles, parce que l’impunité qui leur a été jusqu’à présent garantie par le TPIR constitue un dangereux signal selon lequel le monopole du pouvoir constitue la meilleur protection contre toute poursuite judiciaire. Ces criminels n’hésiteront donc pas à rééditer leurs tristes exploits d’extermination d’une partie de la population rwandaise pour anéantir la moindre velléité de démocratie et conserver le pouvoir.
Le PDR-Ihumure est également fermement convaincu que, tant qu’il n’y aura pas de justice pour toutes les victimes et tant que la vérité sur la tragédie rwandaise ne sera pas établie, la réconciliation du peuple rwandais ne restera qu’un rêve.
11. Les éléments ci-haut mentionnés et bien d’autres encore montrent à suffisance que
les prochaines élections présidentielles doivent être minutieusement et conjointement préparées par tous les acteurs politiques rwandais appuyés par la communauté internationale si l’on veut éviter une réédition de la mascarade électorale de 2003 ainsi que les remous sociaux et politiques graves qui risquent fortement de s’en suivre.
12. Enfin, advenant que la mise en place des conditions propices à une véritable démocratie requiert des délais qui dépassent la date préalablement fixée pour les prochaines élections, le PDR-Ihumure recommande que celles-ci soient reportées à une date ultérieure, pour l’intérêt supérieur de la nation et du peuple rwandais. Fait à Washington DC le 11 juin 2009.
Pour le PDR-Ihumure
Jérôme NAYIGIZIKI
Secrétaire Général
Sé
jnayigizik@aol.com
+1 956 337 7665
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine
Monday, June 8, 2009
Let us speak out:
By Musema Janvier
June 8, 2009
Hutu children are abused. they have no right to free education. They did not choose to be street children, they were forced to do so. The rare lucky children have arrived in Congo (DRC) and joined the FDLR.
As many of Rwandans know, detestable and abominable crimes have been committed before, during and after 1994.
Those crimes are STILL committed by RPF leadership and members against those young Hutu children. It's no secret that young Hutu children are sent to the Tutsi families for forcible adoptions. Some of them have been programmed to first hate and then kill their biological parents and relatives or any other Hutu citizens. Hutu girls were and are sold to Uganda by Rwandan Tutsi women, RPF members, a neighbouring and ally country involved in the Rwanda Genocide.
From 1994 up to 1998, most of Hutu survivors, women and their daughters were taken for slavery and sex abuse in Banyamurenge hills in south Kivu. Many of Hutu women are forced to work for Tutsi farmers in Thee and Coffee plantations. We got witnesses who, in very difficult condtions, could escape those criminals and now are refugees here in Europe. This abominable practice is engaged in by RPF Terrorists, criminals, RPF proxy armies in congo, Tutsi pedophiles and neo-Nazis.
We urge whoever is reading my current writing to denounce the shameful and criminal practice. At the same time We urge the international community to take swift and decisive action to end impunity enjoyed by RPF leadership who continue to abuse Hutu children through the so called "genocidal ideology" without further delay.
Let us not divert responsibility. What about the Security Council Resolution 1612? Does not this resolution concern the Rwandan bloody dictatorship?
Paul Kagame and his bloody government are subjected to international treaty regimes, which include the Convention on the Rights of the Child, its protocols and core human rights covenants. Let us not fail to the Rwandan Suvivors Quest to ensure a safe and secure Rwanda for Hutu children.
© SurViVors Editions
By Musema Janvier
June 8, 2009
Hutu children are abused. they have no right to free education. They did not choose to be street children, they were forced to do so. The rare lucky children have arrived in Congo (DRC) and joined the FDLR.
As many of Rwandans know, detestable and abominable crimes have been committed before, during and after 1994.
Those crimes are STILL committed by RPF leadership and members against those young Hutu children. It's no secret that young Hutu children are sent to the Tutsi families for forcible adoptions. Some of them have been programmed to first hate and then kill their biological parents and relatives or any other Hutu citizens. Hutu girls were and are sold to Uganda by Rwandan Tutsi women, RPF members, a neighbouring and ally country involved in the Rwanda Genocide.
From 1994 up to 1998, most of Hutu survivors, women and their daughters were taken for slavery and sex abuse in Banyamurenge hills in south Kivu. Many of Hutu women are forced to work for Tutsi farmers in Thee and Coffee plantations. We got witnesses who, in very difficult condtions, could escape those criminals and now are refugees here in Europe. This abominable practice is engaged in by RPF Terrorists, criminals, RPF proxy armies in congo, Tutsi pedophiles and neo-Nazis.
We urge whoever is reading my current writing to denounce the shameful and criminal practice. At the same time We urge the international community to take swift and decisive action to end impunity enjoyed by RPF leadership who continue to abuse Hutu children through the so called "genocidal ideology" without further delay.
Let us not divert responsibility. What about the Security Council Resolution 1612? Does not this resolution concern the Rwandan bloody dictatorship?
Paul Kagame and his bloody government are subjected to international treaty regimes, which include the Convention on the Rights of the Child, its protocols and core human rights covenants. Let us not fail to the Rwandan Suvivors Quest to ensure a safe and secure Rwanda for Hutu children.
© SurViVors Editions
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine
Sunday, June 7, 2009
Condamnation des tueries de réfugiés Hutu rwandais par la coalition militaire APR (RDF)/FARDC dans plusieurs localités des territoires de WALIKALE et MASISI en RDC.
***
Les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda ( FDLR ) condamnent avec énergie les crimes de guerre et les crimes graves contre l’humanité commis contre les réfugiés Hutu rwandais à l’Est de la RDC dont des viols collectifs et des massac
res aveugles de plusieurs centaines d
e réfugiés rwandais dans plusieurs localités du territoire de Walikale dont Shariyo, Maroke, Bunyarwanda, Bunyamwasa ainsi que dans plusieurs zones frontalières avec le territoire de Masisi.
Tous ces crimes abominables furent commis par les forces de la coalition formée de l’Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (APR/RDF) actuellement cachée sous la bannière du CNDP et des Forces Armées Congolaises (FARDC) qui étaient déployées dans les zones de BUSURUNGI et MIANGA spécialement entre début Avril 2009 et début
Mai 2009.
En effet, les réfugiés rwandais ont été soumis à des feux nourris à l’arme lourde entre Avril et début Mai 2009 dans l’opération baptisée KIMYA II de ladite coalition. Plusieurs centaines de réfugiés rwandais surtout des femmes et des enfants furent tués ou portés disparus. Les blessés se comptent par centaines.
Pendant cette période, un Major de la coalition du nom de Zikito, Commandant du 203ème Bataillon d’I
nfanterie spéciale, a été vu à BUSURUNGI entrain de brandir un bras entier d’une femme rwandaise réfugiée qu’il venait de tuer à la machette et de démembrer.
Dans la localité de SHARIYO dans le territoire de WALIKALE, plusieurs civils réfugiés Hutu rwandais ont été pendus dont un certain Uwihoreye Richard, d’autres ont été enterrés vi
vants après avoir été capturés par les militaires de la coalition du 203ème Bataillon.
Une équipe des FDLR arrivée à Shariyo le 1er Mai 2009 a découvert un immense charnier avec des corps de réfugiés rwandais fraîchement tués par les soldats de la coalition APR(RDF)/FARDC qui venaient de se retirer de cette localité. Aussi des milliers de préservatifs utilisés par les soldats de cette coalition dans les viols collectifs organisés contre les femmes et filles réfugiées étaient éparpillés partout sur le site qu’ils venaient d’abandonner le 29 avril 2009.
Les FDLR dénoncent le silence complice de la MONUC , de la Communauté Internationale , des Organisations qui se disent « des droits de l’homme », des médias et des autorités de la RDC sur ces massacres odieux de réfugiés rwandais.
Il est absolument scandaleux que, malgré les appels répétés des FDLR afin que des enquêtes indépendantes puissent être diligentées sur tous les crimes commis dans la région et que leurs auteurs soient traduits en justice, il n’y ait pas eu une seule réaction ni des dignitaires congolais, ni de la MONUC , ni de la Communauté Internationale (voir les communiqués des FDLR dont celui du 17 Avril 2009 faisant état du massacre de 67 réfugiés Hutu rwandais à Mianga). Au contraire, tous ces divers responsables n’ont montré que du mépris envers les réfugiés Hutu rwandais comme s?il ne coulait pas de sang rouge dans leurs veines.
Les FDLR mettent en garde la Communauté Internationale contre une possible répétition des désastres humanitaires de 1996, 1997 et 1998 qui ont emporté sous ses yeux complaisants plus d’un million de réfugiés rwandais et plus de 5 millions de Congolais.
Devant de tels crimes restés impunis commis contre les réfugiés rwandais sans défense et devant le mépris et le silence de ceux qui étaient censés les protéger, les FDLR répètent qu’elles défendront par tous les moyens les réfugiés rwandais attaqués, les membres de leurs familles ainsi que les populations congolaises contre tous les criminels quels qu’ils soient et d’où qu’ils viennent.
Les FDLR restent attachées à la paix et sont convaincues que la guerre ne peut pas résoudre le problème politique rwandais mais que seul un dialogue franc et direct entre le régime de Kigali et son opposition peut conduire à une solution définitive de la crise des Grands Lacs Africains.
Les FDLR appellent encore une fois l’Union Africaine en collaboration avec le Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU et de l’Union Européenne d’initier un processus de dialogue sans exclusive de tous les acteurs de la crise dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains.
Fait à Paris le 25 Mai 2009
Callixte Mbarushimana
Secrétaire Exécutif des FDLR
(Sé)
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine
***
Les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda ( FDLR ) condamnent avec énergie les crimes de guerre et les crimes graves contre l’humanité commis contre les réfugiés Hutu rwandais à l’Est de la RDC dont des viols collectifs et des massac
res aveugles de plusieurs centaines d
e réfugiés rwandais dans plusieurs localités du territoire de Walikale dont Shariyo, Maroke, Bunyarwanda, Bunyamwasa ainsi que dans plusieurs zones frontalières avec le territoire de Masisi.Tous ces crimes abominables furent commis par les forces de la coalition formée de l’Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (APR/RDF) actuellement cachée sous la bannière du CNDP et des Forces Armées Congolaises (FARDC) qui étaient déployées dans les zones de BUSURUNGI et MIANGA spécialement entre début Avril 2009 et début
Mai 2009.En effet, les réfugiés rwandais ont été soumis à des feux nourris à l’arme lourde entre Avril et début Mai 2009 dans l’opération baptisée KIMYA II de ladite coalition. Plusieurs centaines de réfugiés rwandais surtout des femmes et des enfants furent tués ou portés disparus. Les blessés se comptent par centaines.
Pendant cette période, un Major de la coalition du nom de Zikito, Commandant du 203ème Bataillon d’I
nfanterie spéciale, a été vu à BUSURUNGI entrain de brandir un bras entier d’une femme rwandaise réfugiée qu’il venait de tuer à la machette et de démembrer.Dans la localité de SHARIYO dans le territoire de WALIKALE, plusieurs civils réfugiés Hutu rwandais ont été pendus dont un certain Uwihoreye Richard, d’autres ont été enterrés vi
vants après avoir été capturés par les militaires de la coalition du 203ème Bataillon.Une équipe des FDLR arrivée à Shariyo le 1er Mai 2009 a découvert un immense charnier avec des corps de réfugiés rwandais fraîchement tués par les soldats de la coalition APR(RDF)/FARDC qui venaient de se retirer de cette localité. Aussi des milliers de préservatifs utilisés par les soldats de cette coalition dans les viols collectifs organisés contre les femmes et filles réfugiées étaient éparpillés partout sur le site qu’ils venaient d’abandonner le 29 avril 2009.
Les FDLR dénoncent le silence complice de la MONUC , de la Communauté Internationale , des Organisations qui se disent « des droits de l’homme », des médias et des autorités de la RDC sur ces massacres odieux de réfugiés rwandais.
Il est absolument scandaleux que, malgré les appels répétés des FDLR afin que des enquêtes indépendantes puissent être diligentées sur tous les crimes commis dans la région et que leurs auteurs soient traduits en justice, il n’y ait pas eu une seule réaction ni des dignitaires congolais, ni de la MONUC , ni de la Communauté Internationale (voir les communiqués des FDLR dont celui du 17 Avril 2009 faisant état du massacre de 67 réfugiés Hutu rwandais à Mianga). Au contraire, tous ces divers responsables n’ont montré que du mépris envers les réfugiés Hutu rwandais comme s?il ne coulait pas de sang rouge dans leurs veines.
Les FDLR mettent en garde la Communauté Internationale contre une possible répétition des désastres humanitaires de 1996, 1997 et 1998 qui ont emporté sous ses yeux complaisants plus d’un million de réfugiés rwandais et plus de 5 millions de Congolais.
Devant de tels crimes restés impunis commis contre les réfugiés rwandais sans défense et devant le mépris et le silence de ceux qui étaient censés les protéger, les FDLR répètent qu’elles défendront par tous les moyens les réfugiés rwandais attaqués, les membres de leurs familles ainsi que les populations congolaises contre tous les criminels quels qu’ils soient et d’où qu’ils viennent.
Les FDLR restent attachées à la paix et sont convaincues que la guerre ne peut pas résoudre le problème politique rwandais mais que seul un dialogue franc et direct entre le régime de Kigali et son opposition peut conduire à une solution définitive de la crise des Grands Lacs Africains.
Les FDLR appellent encore une fois l’Union Africaine en collaboration avec le Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU et de l’Union Européenne d’initier un processus de dialogue sans exclusive de tous les acteurs de la crise dans la Région des Grands Lacs Africains.
Fait à Paris le 25 Mai 2009
Callixte Mbarushimana
Secrétaire Exécutif des FDLR
(Sé)
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine
Friday, June 5, 2009
By June 5,2009
How was the Rwanda conflict viewed in 1994?
It's ironic, in a way, that the preoccupation at the time in that part of the continent was not Rwanda; it was Burundi. We were [told that] the meeting on April 5 and April 6 that the two presidents had attended in Dar es Salaam was convened primarily to talk about the situation in Burundi, which people were very fearful was about to explode. We had been, and continue to be engaged in activities which arguably have made a difference, in terms of at least keeping a lid on and preventing the worst kind of outbreak of violence.
So Rwanda is different. It's different because of the scale and the magnitude of the disaster. It's different because we were there; we were involved. We did have the possibility of seeing things and understanding things in a different way, and had we done so, it is conceivable that we might have been able to do something different.
The Arusha agreement-- What was your feeling about what was going on?
It was a hope there was a possibility that we could avert what I think many of us thought would otherwise be a major disaster. You had a situation where you had exiled Tutsis, who'd been mostly living in Uganda for decades, who began to develop a very serious military capability, who were determined that they were going to go back and re-take their country. They had begun launching attacks outside from Uganda as early as 1990. There was a major assault in early 1993.
The governments in the region were mightily concerned. They argued with us that [they] should be involved in this process. The French were very much concerned as well. They wanted us very much to be supportive of this process, but the signing of the peace agreement at least seemed to offer a prospect that we could avert what would otherwise have been a major military conflict, with all the attendant consequences inside Rwanda.
I think it's important to understand there were a lot of other things going on at the time; but notwithstanding all those other things, we were heavily invested in supporting the Arusha process. The day before the downing of the plane which killed the two presidents, I happened to be in Kampala meeting with [Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) General] Paul Kagame. We were trying to resolve the last remaining issues as to the participation and the proposed transitional government. We were arguing about whether one particular group, one of the extremist Hutu groups -- certainly in the eyes of the RPF -- whether it should have a place in the government.
But that's where I was on April 5. I got on a plane the next morning, and I flew from Kampala to Nairobi, and then on to Mogadishu, where we had another major disaster in the making. [I] spent the day in Mogadishu, flew back to Nairobi that evening, and got immediately on a plane to head back to Washington.
When I got off in the plane in Cairo on the morning of April 7, I was told that I had to urgently call my deputy … in Washington. She informed me of the downing of the plane, and her concerns about what might happen as a consequence. …
We were very much involved, in primarily a supportive role, in the Rwandan peace process. We did see [it] as a situation, which if not dealt with, had great potential; not only for Rwanda, but the entire region. Therefore we needed to make an effort to try to be supportive. That's what we were doing. That was our guidance. That was our instruction, not just from me, but from much more senior people in the administration. …
It is certainly true that there were concerns at the National Security Council (NSC) and certain parts of the State Department, the Defense Department and elsewhere about adding yet another major peacekeeping operation to a very long list of peacekeeping operations we had in Africa alone. At the time, we had five major peacekeeping operations in some state of array or disarray. …
There was a lot going on, and there were concerns -- certainly not only in the administration, but in the Congress -- about when and where was it all going to end. Why were we obliged to be involved in or supportive of all these missions? That was very much palpably part of the context in which we were discussing all of these things.
I think in the case of Rwanda, part of the thing reason it made a difference was the French were very insistent that we be supportive of this operation. There was -- if not directly, at least indirectly -- some bargaining going on, because we wanted them to be supportive of an operation in Liberia, which was important to us. … But yes, there were questions asked, [such as], does it need to be that large? Can it be scaled back? Can it be effective with fewer troops? That was part of the dialogue.
Were they concerned about just cost and the burden for the U.S.?
It was a burden about cost, a question about how you justify and rationalize all this to the appropriators and the committees on the Hill, many of whom didn't think we needed to be there at all. …
The Belgians [sent troops to Rwanda]. What was the concern there?
Given the history and the fact that in the eyes of many in the region -- and certainly in Rwanda -- the Belgians were viewed as being responsible, at least in part, for the Tutsi dynasty in Rwanda, [and] they were not perceived as being necessarily impartial between Tutsis and Hutus. … But there clearly was a need for a capable force to provide the peace for this operation. The Belgians, I think partly out of their sense of historical responsibility [and] desire to make this thing work, [decided] to step forward, and you certainly can't fault them for that. …
Do you recall meeting [U.N. Force Commander General Romeo] Dallaire?
do. I just don't recall exactly the circumstances, but I do recall going to New York during that period when he was preparing to go out. But I couldn't tell you exactly when we first met.
Where does the U.N. commander fit in your scope?
He would be somebody with whom I would normally have contact. In terms of that level of people, the U.N. special representative would be one, and then the force commander would be the other. I guess I would say, though, [that I] recall several other major operations going on at the same time. Pru Bushnell [said], "I'm busy doing this; can you take this one?" But she was principally responsible for that [along with] the director of our Office for Central Africa at the time. It was Pru, I recall, who did go out to Rwanda in the run-up to the events of April. Subsequently, afterwards, she went back out several times, both to Rwanda and to Burundi.
Do you recall ever talking to Kofi Annan?
No, not specifically about this. That would have been a level above my concern, the folks who normally would have been doing business with Kofi, though I know him. … It's just that that was not the normal contact.
I don't know that I remember a whole lot about it, except to say that even then there were serious concerns about whether the parties were seriously committed to this process -- on both sides -- because there was concern that the RPF was playing for time; and that eventually, if they saw an advantage, they would break out of the constraints of the peace agreement and move on Kigali.
But certainly we were also concerned about what was happening inside Rwanda, and whether President Habyarimana was seriously committed to this. You have to go back for some time, because well before I came on the scene, there had been efforts going back to the late 1980s, recognizing there was an impending problem here, to get Habyarimana to think seriously about how he was going to reconcile with the exiled Tutsis, who were becoming an increasingly strong factor. So we were concerned.
The notion was that we were going to put it to him, [and] that for us to be able to support this, he needed to assure us that he was committed to making this work and to honoring the terms of the agreement, [and that], moreover, he was going to move the process forward. Because even though there had been an agreement in principle, the steps that were to take place leading up to the installation of the transitional government hadn't been resolved -- for example, the question of who was actually going to be participating in the government -- and they remained unresolved right up until April 6.
You wanted to get a sense of his view about the peace process?
From our perspective, we were already committed. We thought we had a commitment from the administration to go ahead and support this. But we wanted some assurance that, in fact, he was equally committed to holding up his end of the bargain.
Did he give you that assurance?
My recollection is that he said the right things. He made the right noises. He assured us that he wanted this to go forward, that it was important for him to have this peace agreement. My recollection is that actually he wanted us to start moving even earlier on the deployment of the force. But in any event, what he said to us clearly indicated that at least verbally he was committed to making this thing work.
In mid-January, [what were] the signs coming out of Rwanda?
My actual direct involvement in this was somewhat episodic during that period, because I was doing other things. One of the other things we were doing during that period was trying, to the best of our ability, [to] ensure that we were supporting the transition in South Africa. So I was doing a lot of traveling on that. I know I was probably in Angola a couple of times during that period, as well, so that again, I was not involved day to day and following the actual development of events in Rwanda. That said, I think we were all concerned about a number of indications we were getting about violence or threats of violence inside Rwanda.
But I think many of us believed, first and foremost, that it was right to try to complete this negotiation, because if we didn't succeed in completing that negotiation, then what would happen is that you would have a resumption of the RPF's move towards Kigali by force. That would set in motion a whole series of events.
So there was a feeling, a belief that what we needed to do most urgently was to complete this negotiation and get the force deployed, and that once it was deployed, that would help to manage or help us manage and everybody else manage what was happening then in Kigali. That was also predicated on an assumption that indeed the government and the government forces were committed to seeing that the agreement was going to be implemented.
So I think it was not that I was unaware or that others were unaware that there were increasing problems in Kigali and elsewhere inside Rwanda. But I think many of us believed -- I think, in retrospect, somewhat erroneously -- that the solution to that was get the deal done and get the forces deployed, and that would be the way to manage the difficulties that we were finding in Kigali.
At the end of January, you had some meetings in Paris. I think the Belgians might have been there.
It's quite conceivable, because we were having tri-laterals at the time, mainly on Zaire, but obviously we were talking about all of Central Africa. So it is quite conceivable that during that period I would have been meeting with my French and Belgian counterparts.
Does anything stand out from that time?
… I don't have any recollection of that, and I think I would have remembered that. Again, much of our conversation at the time -- not that Rwanda was not important -- but much of our conversations were really about Zaire. There was a grave concern about Zaire. We had a situation in the preceding six or eight months in which more than half a million people had been displaced inside central and southern Zaire, [and] growing signs of ethnic tensions there as well, and a real concern that Zaire was going to come apart at the seams. So that was another distraction.
In terms of U.S. policy influence in Africa, where did Rwanda fit?
I have to say it was not the first order of priority in terms of our policies. It was there because, number one, the regional players, some of them very good friends of ours, were concerned -- Uganda and Tanzania in particular. It was there because the French were concerned. It was there because we also recognized that, if this situation were allowed to get out of hand, then we would have a real catastrophe. I think it was also there because there was concern about what the impact would be on Zaire. So there were a lot of other reasons that made Rwanda of interest to us, but it honestly was not [a] first-tier issue for us at the time.
Second tier?
Maybe third. There were a lot of tiers in this.
The meeting on April 5 with General Dallaire.
I do recall that one of the issues that came from President Habyarimana and his side was an insistence on including certain elements in the transitional government. … One was a committee Pour La Defence de la Revolution, and [there were other] groups [that] were [also] extremist Hutu groups. But Habyarimana was saying that if he was not able to include them, then that was going to be a problem for him.
So part of the conversation I was having with Kagame was about whether he would accept their participation in the government. It was quite clear he thought that these guys were beyond the pale -- and as it turned out, they were -- and that he was extremely resistant to countenancing their participation, their inclusion in the government. But that was one of the major sticking points on whether or not we were going to get this agreement to establish the transitional government.
Pru Bushnell said, around that time she thought, in retrospect, that the U.S. government was so invested in that peace process that it was almost unthinkable to turn back.
I think it's fair to say that we were very much invested in this, and that a lot of people had committed to it. But again, if you step back and look at it objectively and say, "What's the alternative if we don't make this peace process work?" then we go back to status quo ante, which is we've got an increasingly powerful Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Force [that has] determined that they're going to get back to Kigali one way or another.
So yes, we were heavily invested. The absence [of] some way of reconciling these two forces-- We were going to have a disaster with a different kind of a character with perhaps some of the same consequences, so I think we were right to focus on that part of it.
Where we erred seriously was not understanding better the dynamic that was taking place inside of Rwanda, and the motives and the intentions of the Hutu extremist groups. Had we understood that, I think our approach might have been very different.
But it's also interesting to speculate. Had we understood fully just how fragile that situation was and just how shallow the commitment to a peace deal was, [that] raises a serious question about whether we would have agreed to the deployment of a peacekeeping force, because the premise was not valid; there would have been no peace to keep. There were other things that we could have done, like the kinds of things we were doing in Burundi at the time, and indeed which we continue to do today. But it would have been a very different approach from deploying a peacekeeping force.
Dallaire says he was furious. He still feels now the international community, and the U.N. in particular, was falling into a trap.
I have to say when I left my meeting with Kagame in Kampala, I was having some of the same doubts. I mean, he made a very forceful case as to why [the extremist Hutus] should not be allowed in any government, and it was hard frankly to disagree with him. [But] I don't know if other things hadn't intervened when I got back to Washington [that I] would have raised this question and said, "We need to revisit this." I think I might have precisely because Kagame and his colleagues had made such a strong case as to as to why these were folks not to be trusted.
But he pressed this particular issue.
meeting precisely to say, "Why can't you do this? Because we want to get on with the peace process." Yes, in that sense, you're right -- we were very heavily invested in this, and he was quite firm in saying, "Sorry, this is not one that is in our interest to do."
You got a sense that he was not going to budge?
That's certainly the sense I came away with after our meetings in Kampala, [Uganda]. … I came away with the feeling that maybe this wasn't such a good deal and maybe we've got to revisit this. But again, there was never an opportunity to actually follow up on that thought.
Does that make you question the advice you were getting?
I think we couldn't have had a better team there, and I think all of us -- that certainly includes our U.S. team, and I think everybody else -- and a lot of folks who had a lot closer experience, more knowledge of Rwanda than we did, failed to see that lesson as well -- the French, the Belgians, the U.N. folks and others. What can I say? I can't fault them for what they were trying to do at the time.
Some Rwandans have raised questions about Ambassador [David] Rawson's objectivity. Do you want to address that?
I really have never had any reason to question his objectivity. I think what David admits to is what we all admit to. So there were things going on that we did not give due consideration and weight to; that to the extent that we interpreted or tried to analyze those events, we all saw that as an aspect of the effort we were making on the peace process; and that, if you could only get the peace process done, then you would have, number one, a U.N. presence there, [and] you'd have the wherewithal to support what we thought was a genuine government commitment to dealing with these issues. You'd have been in a very different situation. Again, in retrospect, we were wrong; a lot of other people were wrong too.
So you found out about the plane [carrying the Rwandan and Burundian presidents] being shot down while you were stopping over in Cairo? … What was going through your mind?
Well, a lot of things-- … Should I stay in the region, should I go to Paris or Brussels, or should I come home? Eventually we all agreed that it'd be better for me to come back to Washington. But she was quite aware of the potential consequences here and what might follow, and so we knew we had a serious problem, even [on] the morning of April 7.
Not genocide?
No. But clearly … with all the other forces at play in Kigali, and many which we knew were not supportive of the peace process, any number of things could happen as a result of that.
What was your gut feeling about what the RPF would do?
The concern I think was that the RPF might see [the plane crash] as an effort to sabotage the peace process and therefore say, "OK, well, we'll go back to plan A," which … [was to] get there by force.
Take Kigali by force?
[That] is what they decided to do -- and did.
The Americans' decision to evacuate [Rwanda]-- How did that come about?
I don't even know if it was a decision. It was understood that, given what had happened that day, we would be crazy to leave our people exposed in Kigali. My sense is that it was understood the first thing we were going to have to do was get folks out of there.
But U.S. embassies stay open in chaotic situations sometimes.
… We had a situation where, as Joyce Leader I'm sure described in gory detail, the prime minister lived right next door to her. [On the day she was killed, the prime minister] crossed over the wall into Leader's compound for shelter, was not able to do so, went [to] another U.N. compound somewhere in the neighborhood, and eventually was caught there and killed there. [Unidentified enemy] troops actually broke into Joyce's house and actually fired up into the ceiling, as I recall, because they thought that there might be people hiding up in there, [as in] Belgian troops.
If these guys are wandering around and have the audacity and the ruthlessness to lynch [the prime minister and] 10 Belgian troops [who were protecting the prime minister], what assurances do we have that our people are going to be safe in that situation? So I think it was a foregone conclusion for us that this was just not a situation where we had sufficient confidence. We were [not] going to leave our people exposed and on the ground, and the only question was, how do you get them out [of] there? Ultimately, as you know, they went overland to Burundi, [and] there was a lot of debate about that [and] about how to do it. But I don't think there was any question about whether to do it. …
Closing the embassy-- Would that decision be made at the secretary level?
I'm sure it was eventually signed off by the secretary. …
I'm not clear whether it was a top-down--?
No, I don't think so. I think it was understood by us that we did not wish to leave our people in that situation. We were not going to do it if we can figure out how to do it, and the only question was what's the best way to do this. One of the great debates at the time was whether or not we should pre-position U.S. forces in Burundi as part of an effort to evacuate them. The concern was that the situation in Burundi was so fragile that the mere presence of U.S. forces could trigger something there. That's how bad the situation in Burundi was. Eventually I think we did at least get the authorization to do that, but ultimately, happily it was not necessary. We didn't need to use those forces. …
So you were hearing reports from Joyce and others [once you're back in Washington.] It must have been pretty horrific.
Yes. Joyce's situation in particular, I think, got everybody's attention. …
Was it the right thing to do [for the U.S. to begin pulling out]?
I believe that it was, because I think otherwise we could well have seen-- I mean, if there is no respect for the lives of peacekeepers, there was no assurance whatsoever that, simply by virtue of the fact that we were American people, [the killers] were going to leave us alone.
Were you aware of a request by [U.S. Embassy Officer] Laura Lane and others there to stay?
Yes, I do recall there was the notion that, yes, maybe we could stay behind; maybe we could do something. But then you have to say, "With what do you create a safe haven?" If the Belgian troops could not defend and protect the prime minister from a ruthless attack, what were unarmed Americans bearing a flag going to do?
On the political level, the deadline to sort things out or else the RPF were going to start fighting again-- Was that communicated to you?
I don't know how we learned that [the RPF would fight the Interahamwe], but it was not a surprise. … Once this killing started, once there was a threat to the RPF contingent in Kigali … you had the two parts of this problem. You had the problem of the confrontation between the government and the RPF, and [you had] the internal problem [of the Interahamwe killing the Tutsis].
But they fed each other. One of the things clearly that was feeding the paranoia and the demagoguery of the Hutu extremists was the prospect that the Tutsis and the RPF were going to be in Kigali, whether by force or peacefully. So once the killings started, the RPF were bound and determined that they were going to do everything in their power to get to Kigali to try to save their people.
That is why -- and I think rightly -- we continued to talk about [brokering] a cease-fire, because [as] long as that pressure was coming from outside, the feeling was that [we] were feeding the paranoia and the totally unjustified reactions on the part of Hutu extremists inside the country. To a certain extent, that's true. But I can't fault Kagame for doing what he was doing. He was doing what he felt was absolutely necessary to try to save some of his people. …
What was the impact [of this escalating situation on the U.N. troops]?
It, more than anything else, brought home the fact that this was not the situation that we thought we were going to be dealing with. We thought this whole thing was premised on a political agreement [and] a commitment on both sides to respect that agreement. … What folks signed up [for] was a peacekeeping operation in a "permissive environment," where you had parties who were committed to working with you to maintain that peace, and that clearly was no longer the case. That event, more than anything else, illustrated it.
Now, again, the famous Dallaire message -- which I don't recall seeing -- said one of the things that the extremists intend to do is to attack the Belgians, precisely to precipitate their departure and the collapse of the whole process. But even if I'd known that, I'm not sure it would have changed anything. The fact of the matter is they attacked these guys; they killed them ruthlessly, and if they were prepared to do it once, was anybody prepared to offer an assurance that it would not happen again? The fact is that that incident changed the entire calculation about what kind of a situation we were in and what kind of forces we were up against.
That led to the position that the U.S. took about withdrawing?
Indeed.
Where did that instruction come from?
It came from Washington. I'm sure that that's the kind of thing that somebody senior had to sign off on. But, anyway, I had a very good working relationship with the Belgian Foreign Minister at the time, again because we spent a lot of time talking about [a problem in] Zaire. I recall in that period having a conversation with him [on the] telephone. It's very hard following that incident to look him in the eye in a manner of words and say, "You have an obligation to keep your forces there on the ground, notwithstanding the danger they find themselves in."
If you think back a few months about what happened to our troops in Mogadishu, I certainly was not one to argue that the Belgians should be pressed or obliged to stay in Kigali and Rwanda in a situation that they just frankly had not signed up for. So there's a different aspect to that in the question of, should there have been a suggestion or call for all the troops then to leave, or should we simply have said, "All right, fine, Belgium, if you want to go-- ." But quite clearly the Belgians wanted to have a cover of having others leave as well, and we yielded to that request. In retrospect, I wonder if that was the right thing to do.
Did they ask for that?
My recollection is that they wanted us to support a request for the complete withdrawal, so that they would not be alone in withdrawing their troops from Rwanda.
How was that requested?
The decisive conversation was probably a conversation [involving Secretary of State] Warren Christopher.
The Security Council-- There was an effort to try to do something.
There was an effort to walk it back almost immediately. Dallaire was sending in messages saying, "We can't do this. We can't abandon people who are looking to us to help protect them, and we can't just pull out and run." So eventually the compromise was that he was allowed to retain about 260, 270 troops.
But people were certainly aware of the implications both ways, the implications of pulling people out as well as the implications of leaving people there. [The] implications of leaving people there were you were leaving a bunch of very lightly armed troops exposed to God knew what. The pure implications of pulling people out were that you were leaving a whole bunch of people in the lurch, although as a practical matter people were rightly questioning, what could this force do to prevent the catastrophe that everybody, by that time, saw coming?
What were you advising [to Warren Christopher]?
We were counseling the secretary not to oppose the Belgian request to get the hell out of there. We knew what the implications of that would be. I was not the only voice in here, but I certainly didn't feel that we were in a position to demand the Belgians keep their forces there after what happened.
Once the magnitude of what was going on became clear, once Dallaire made clear his view that he could stay there, that the risks from his perspective were tolerable, and that [they had] a sense that in various ways they could make a difference, they did [stay there], although there were some terrible tragedies there where people looked to the U.N. for protection and didn't find it.
Again, it's the problem of putting people in impossible situations. But once that realization set in, there were certainly many on my team who said, "Look, we've got to figure out some kind of response to this, and we need to figure out a way to try to bolster the U.N. presence in Rwanda." … That was the voice from my bureau, although it was a difficult case to make.
An effort to hatch some kind of African force-- Some people have mentioned it was the images of bodies floating down the river.
…My wife accompanied John Shattuck when John went out to Burundi, mainly, but they also flew over the river and looked down. That was an image that got a lot of people's attention. … The Africans were rightly saying, "We don't understand why there isn't more of a reaction and more of a response to this." I think that was some of the conversation that we had in South Africa when the vice president was there. …
[But what about] this effort to get an African force?
I think the government -- as governments are -- was somewhat divided. But the fact was, we had Africans telling us that they were prepared to do this, and that there were a number of us who felt if they're prepared to do this, then let's support them. Dallaire, by that time, had shown that he could be there and do some things, and that he was not as concerned as [we] were about his security or survivability.
I recall having conversations during that period with [Ghanaian President] Jerry Rawlings, and the Ghanaians were one of the first to step forward and say they'd be prepared to send troops. Their troops are very good, and certainly were at the time. Then we got into long haggles about how we were going to prepare them and equip them and the [Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)] and a lot of other things, which was one of the most shameful moments in this whole process. But nevertheless, I think the fact that you had Africans questioning why their response was [not] more vigorous, that you had Africans wanting to step forward that in those circumstances-- It only made sense to try to do what we could to facilitate their ability to make a difference in that situation.
Vice President Gore presented -- what?
I don't recall. I'm not sure whether we initiated this conversation, or whether the South Africans initiated the conversation, or whether it was one of those things that mutually we all knew that there was this disaster going on, and [we wondered] what could we do about it. The question was, if there are African forces there willing to do this, would you support their going in? Again, the details of that conversation, I don't pretend right now to recollect.
Why wasn't there an African force?
I think the elements simply weren't there; they just hadn't come together. These were going to be decisions of every individual African government. It wasn't for the South Africans to make the decision that they were going to [put together a force for all of Africa]. …
It wasn't just the U.S. that didn't want to send troops?
… I think anybody looking at the situation would have to ask, "Is this a situation that I want to put my people in?" So there was no great rush here. Early on, there was a concern, because the Tanzanians said that they were going to go in and take care of this. Well, we all thought frankly the Tanzanians seriously overestimated their own capabilities and underestimated the situation they would be getting themselves into. So we were actively discouraging them from doing what had been a sort of unilateral intervention. …
[But] we didn't have a long list of takers for this mission. … [Then] it took an awful long time to eventually assemble the forces, African and other[wise]. … One of the things it says is many of these militaries -- not only in Africa but elsewhere -- however willing they may be, they are not equipped, trained, prepared to move into that kind of a situation. …
It was made very clear to Dallaire [that] the RPF was not going to support an intervention force?
There was the discussion about whether, if you deployed troops into Kigali, you could find ways to have them fan out and either rescue people or bring them into safe centers. Then [there was] the counterproposal, which you are well aware of -- to do it along the borders and set up safe havens -- which eventually went nowhere. The RPF concern was that, whatever the intention was, the practical effect of inserting a force into Rwanda would be to get in their way and, at the same time, not to be in a position to afford any meaningful assistance to the people who were being slaughtered. …
In May, there was a new U.N. resolution including an arms embargo on the whole country, including the RPF. What's the thinking behind that?
I think it was the same logic. We were focusing on the whole peace process here. [There was] the concern that, somehow or other, you needed to constrain the actions on both sides. There were a lot of people at the time who thought the arms embargo was kind of a meaningless thing, that it would have little, if any, impact on the ground, because the people who were carrying out [the] slaughter on the one side either had all the arms they needed, or weren't conducting the massacres in that way. Second, the RPF was not seriously going to be affected by anything we might do at the Security Council. It sort of fell into the category of, what can you do? Well, you can impose an arms embargo. …
Let me just ask you now about this term "genocide."
Let me just ask you now about this term "genocide." …
… I do recall an awful lot of debate and discussion in the department about when and under what circumstances we could say that genocide was taking place in Rwanda. I think one of the most shameful failures that certainly rises right to the top -- the fact that it took us so long to come to what should have been a fairly obvious conclusion. I understand all the concerns, and many of us are not lawyers. We don't walk around with copies of the Genocide Convention in our pockets, and most of us were coming to it for the very first time. But, nevertheless, I think the fact that we dithered and were not able to make that determination was one of the shameful features of our handling of the Rwandan situation. …
So why didn't you say it?
Because of this tortured debate, first and foremost, over the facts, and secondly, over what obligations might flow [from there]. There was concern. It is ludicrous, in retrospect, that the discussion was about how might we be viewed if we declared that there is genocide and then we are not in a position -- not ready, or willing, or able -- to do anything about it. The fact of the matter was it was there, and the fact that we didn't say so was already tarnishing our credibility and our capacity to do something about it. …
You used the word "shameful" about the APCs.
Yes, because we spent so much time wrangling about who was going to pay for them, who was going to pay for refurbishing them, who was going to transport them, who was going to pay for the transport, [and] who was going to pay for the training of the Ghanaians so that they could use them. Again, it's sort of bureaucracy at its very worst, and at our level, we couldn't break through that. Somebody else would have had to intervene to say, "This is nonsense. Get on with it. Do it."
And that was coming from -- where?
It's coming from our colleagues at the Pentagon, and it's what they are paid to do. They are paid to say, "All right, who's going to sign on the dotted line?" as to the cost of all these items. Some of us argued that we'd already paid for them, because they would have gone to Somalia in the first place, as I recall. I can't remember where they were coming from.
But the point is that it's the kind of bureaucratic gridlock that often happens. But in this situation, [it] shouldn't have been allowed to happen. Something, somebody should have stepped in to say that this issue was far too important, "We'll worry about the cost later." But we weren't in a position to do that.
You talked to the guys at the Pentagon and they said, "Look, this is what we're paid to do."
Exactly. I'm not faulting them. They were doing exactly what they were paid to do. It's not for them to say, "We're going to waive all of these conditions." They've got rules and regulations that [they] have to apply. Somebody else would have had to [make changes].
Somebody else, being--?
Somebody else higher up, either in their hierarchy or at the White House.
What was the message coming from higher up?
Well, I don't know. I think I can fault myself here and say perhaps we should have been more aggressive in making sure this issue should have got bucked up to the higher-ups, and perhaps forced a resolution or decision. But as I said, this was allowed to go on far longer than it should have or needed to before getting resolved.
… There's the working group, and I know Bushnell was deeply involved in that. … She said [they] had a lot of meetings. But I now realize that the number of meetings that [they] had, and the level at which they were being held was an indication that nothing was really--
I think I would have to agree with her. Again, certainly there were things we should have done to say that this needs to be bucked up to another level, that it needs to be considered by the so-called "deputies committee" meetings at the NSC, if not by the principals themselves. My recollection is that the occasions on which it was discussed at the deputies [committee], it was not the main event. It was done as part of discussion of other truly pressing issues. But, again, in retrospect, there were things that we, at my level, could and should have done to say, "We need help. We need some guidance, direction and decision, and somebody to break the bureaucratic logjam."
Did you discuss Rwanda with Secretary [Christopher]?
I can certainly recall a couple of conversations on the genocide issue with [the] secretary in his office, but my memories of 10 years ago are not easy to recollect. Certainly it was the subject at [Deputy Secretary of State] Strobe [Talbott's] morning meetings whenever I was there or whenever Pru was there. Almost inevitably, the subject of Rwanda would come up.
So it was there. We were constantly updating people. We were letting people know where we were, what we were dealing with, what issues we were wrestling with. It's not as though it didn't get raised or-- But I think again, there were probably ways in which we could have raised it more pointedly and more aggressively in order to say, "We really need help in resolving some of these issues."
I mean, the other truly shameful episode was the whole failure to do anything about Radio Mille Collines, [the radio station inciting the violence]. When I think back upon it, those are the three things that come to mind. It was the decision on whether to call it genocide. It was the Mille Collines radio decision, which [was] truly atrocious that we weren't able to do something because of some legal nicety about international radio conventions. Then, the APC thing [was] sort of emblematic, symptomatic of the difficulties we were having in doing what we said we wanted to do -- namely, be supportive of those countries that were prepared to commit to this operation.
Just how engaged were Talbott and Bushnell in Rwanda?
I would have to say, in honesty, not deeply engaged. I wouldn't say they were holding themselves aloof. Certainly that's not Strobe's style. It's not his inclination. I'm sure he probably said to me, and to Pru and others, "If you need my help, come and see me." Perhaps we weren't as aggressive in pursuing that invitation as we should have been.
And the secretary?
Less involved, although he certainly was involved in this whole discussion on the genocide issue, as he would be, given his legal background. …
One theory I've heard is that people at the highest levels … allowed this issue to be dealt with at [the] Pru Bushnell, [the president's adviser for Africa] Donald Steinberg level, precisely because they didn't want to get involved.
Perhaps. But again, in fairness, I think one has to sit back and look at what the landscape looked like at that time. I don't exactly know where we were on Haiti, but it wasn't a good place. I know exactly where we were in [the former Yugoslavia], but it wasn't a very good place. There were a lot of things that certainly deserved as much attention, if not more attention than Rwanda.
How about you personally? How involved were you?
Involved. Certainly involved. But I was involved in several other things, as well. I was back in South Africa in May. I was there in April as part of an observer mission in the run-up to the elections [and] back again for the inauguration. We were very heavily invested in South Africa, and I think for good reason.
Were you in Rwanda, in particular, during the genocide?
I have recollections of going to Rwanda, certainly [of] meeting with Kagame after he was there. [I] probably would have been [there in] early July. Don't hold me to that date. But certainly I was involved. But Pru, again, [and I had] an understanding we had a division of labor and a division of responsibilities. Pru had Rwanda, for better or worse.
She says one of her regrets is she didn't buck her chain of command.
Yes. I think all of us felt that one. We probably should have tried harder.
Take more risks?
And [took] more risks.
What does it tell you about the institution, in the way the U.S. government [takes] risks? …
In some senses, we were taking risks in a lot of places. We were doing some risky things in a lot of places, and we were committing the U.S. government both in its name and in its resources to a lot of things -- in Liberia, in Angola, and lots of other places. I won't say the people were jumping all over us and telling us [what] not to do. But I think by the same token, everybody was very conscious of the fact that there was serious aversion -- not only in the administration, but in the Congress -- to what they saw as our growing, uncontrolled, unrestrained involvement in all kinds of things, all over the place.
Again, we had nine peace operations, just if you count the U.N. ones, going on simultaneously in 1994. Five of them were in Africa, and two of them weren't doing too well. So I think we were all extremely conscious of that reality, and almost certainly, in consequence, curbed our own expectations. …
The lessons that you take from this, personally and officially?
One of the lessons -- and I think it's a lesson that a lot of us learned during that period, although it's a lesson as time passes [that] maybe is less poignant, salient -- the first lesson is that there's a correlation between your instruments, your tools, and your willingness and your will to use them. One of the things that severely constrained us in Rwanda is we didn't have the tools. We didn't have a collection of ready, willing and able forces that could be deployed in a relatively short period of time to respond to this kind of crisis. Hence the effort to try and figure out how we could support [and] stand up African forces to do this. …
I know that some people viewed that as a way to avoid responsibly on the part of the United States, by saying, "We'll let the Africans take care of their problems," although I frankly do believe that, if in fact you had capable African forces in whom you had some confidence, [that] increased the likelihood that we would be going to go in with them in situations such as Rwanda.
But I'm not sure we've really learned that lesson. The U.N. report, the inquiry of 1999, came out with a whole list of recommendations. I think if you went back and looked at how well and how thoroughly those recommendations had been implemented, you would find we're probably not in much better shape today than we were back in 1994.
I do recall looking at the U.N. web site to see who had actually signed up to be part of those so-called rapid reaction, rapid deployment force, and I recall there were only two countries on that list. That's not the fault of the U.N. only. It's the fault of all of us, all the member states, because only if you've got member states who are not only supporting, but are actually willing to take the lead to do this will it happen. So I don't have the sense that there's any great enthusiasm in the current administration either for the effort to build the capacities of other troops.
And it was not just African. There were other things going on at the time in Europe, and elsewhere as well, or in the capacity of the United Nations either to manage or organize these kinds of operations. I guess -- back to the other point -- I have personally been very wary of invoking that expression "Never again," because to do so implies that you have changed something; you have done something; you've created something -- a modality, a mechanism, an instrument -- that will allow you credibly to say that, "We will not allow this to happen ever again." And I don't think we're there.
But the other part of this -- and this is a more difficult one for me, and I've thought about this a lot … I'm not really sure that we have in fact learned, or internalized or acted on the lessons of what in fact we would need to do in order to at least be in a better position to deal with something like Rwanda in the future. I'm not sure that, were we confronted with a similar situation today, that we would be any better prepared to respond to it, let alone prevent it, than we were back in 1994.
But there's another part of that which I've wrestled with, and that is the other aspect of "Never again" is that you have some understanding of why what happened in Rwanda happened. I haven't read all the literature, but nothing that I've read to date has helped me to understand how it was possible for people who had lived with each other, who were neighbors, who had intermarried, to systematically go about the destruction of an entire ethnic group.
We could even debate whether in fact it is a separate ethnic group, given the history. It's not comparable to the Holocaust of Nazi Germany. It's not comparable to Cambodia, where you had governments and government instrumentalities both instigating but also actually carrying this out. In this case, you had people who, admittedly, had been manipulated and provoked into actions. But still, these were neighbors killing neighbors.
I do recall, for example, reading some of the most chilling accounts. One I recall very well [was] of a man who stood by -- had no choice but to stand by -- as his own relatives came in and killed his wife, who was a Tutsi, but he was powerless to stop that from happening. In another situation, a woman was set upon her neighbor and her neighbor's children with a machete, while she carried her own child on her back.
It's very hard to understand what kind of a psychosis there is that makes it possible for people to behave in that way. I think that until, and unless, we have some understanding of what happened, it's very hard to say that we know how to prevent it from happening it again, or even recognizing it when we see it again.
I do think one of the major problems we had in Rwanda was -- for me, certainly -- an inability to imagine that what happened was possible -- that you could actually see nearly a million people massacred, not by some military machine, but by neighbors killing neighbors, and to have it happen in the space of three months.
So that's a far more difficult lesson, I think. Again, from my own perspective, until one can better understand and explain what happened there, it's very hard to say, "We are in a position to ensure that it's not going to happen again."
Does that mean that once it began, there really there was little the outside world could do to stop it?
I think frankly that our major mistakes were the mistakes we made before it started. Had we recognized better, had we understood better, had we analyzed more correctly what was going on beforehand, we might have been able to make a difference. By April 6, I think we were severely limited in what we could have done to actually preventing this from going the way it went.
How was the Rwanda conflict viewed in 1994?
It's ironic, in a way, that the preoccupation at the time in that part of the continent was not Rwanda; it was Burundi. We were [told that] the meeting on April 5 and April 6 that the two presidents had attended in Dar es Salaam was convened primarily to talk about the situation in Burundi, which people were very fearful was about to explode. We had been, and continue to be engaged in activities which arguably have made a difference, in terms of at least keeping a lid on and preventing the worst kind of outbreak of violence.
So Rwanda is different. It's different because of the scale and the magnitude of the disaster. It's different because we were there; we were involved. We did have the possibility of seeing things and understanding things in a different way, and had we done so, it is conceivable that we might have been able to do something different.
The Arusha agreement-- What was your feeling about what was going on?
It was a hope there was a possibility that we could avert what I think many of us thought would otherwise be a major disaster. You had a situation where you had exiled Tutsis, who'd been mostly living in Uganda for decades, who began to develop a very serious military capability, who were determined that they were going to go back and re-take their country. They had begun launching attacks outside from Uganda as early as 1990. There was a major assault in early 1993.
The governments in the region were mightily concerned. They argued with us that [they] should be involved in this process. The French were very much concerned as well. They wanted us very much to be supportive of this process, but the signing of the peace agreement at least seemed to offer a prospect that we could avert what would otherwise have been a major military conflict, with all the attendant consequences inside Rwanda.
I think it's important to understand there were a lot of other things going on at the time; but notwithstanding all those other things, we were heavily invested in supporting the Arusha process. The day before the downing of the plane which killed the two presidents, I happened to be in Kampala meeting with [Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) General] Paul Kagame. We were trying to resolve the last remaining issues as to the participation and the proposed transitional government. We were arguing about whether one particular group, one of the extremist Hutu groups -- certainly in the eyes of the RPF -- whether it should have a place in the government.
But that's where I was on April 5. I got on a plane the next morning, and I flew from Kampala to Nairobi, and then on to Mogadishu, where we had another major disaster in the making. [I] spent the day in Mogadishu, flew back to Nairobi that evening, and got immediately on a plane to head back to Washington.
When I got off in the plane in Cairo on the morning of April 7, I was told that I had to urgently call my deputy … in Washington. She informed me of the downing of the plane, and her concerns about what might happen as a consequence. …
We were very much involved, in primarily a supportive role, in the Rwandan peace process. We did see [it] as a situation, which if not dealt with, had great potential; not only for Rwanda, but the entire region. Therefore we needed to make an effort to try to be supportive. That's what we were doing. That was our guidance. That was our instruction, not just from me, but from much more senior people in the administration. …
It is certainly true that there were concerns at the National Security Council (NSC) and certain parts of the State Department, the Defense Department and elsewhere about adding yet another major peacekeeping operation to a very long list of peacekeeping operations we had in Africa alone. At the time, we had five major peacekeeping operations in some state of array or disarray. …
There was a lot going on, and there were concerns -- certainly not only in the administration, but in the Congress -- about when and where was it all going to end. Why were we obliged to be involved in or supportive of all these missions? That was very much palpably part of the context in which we were discussing all of these things.
I think in the case of Rwanda, part of the thing reason it made a difference was the French were very insistent that we be supportive of this operation. There was -- if not directly, at least indirectly -- some bargaining going on, because we wanted them to be supportive of an operation in Liberia, which was important to us. … But yes, there were questions asked, [such as], does it need to be that large? Can it be scaled back? Can it be effective with fewer troops? That was part of the dialogue.
Were they concerned about just cost and the burden for the U.S.?
It was a burden about cost, a question about how you justify and rationalize all this to the appropriators and the committees on the Hill, many of whom didn't think we needed to be there at all. …
The Belgians [sent troops to Rwanda]. What was the concern there?
Given the history and the fact that in the eyes of many in the region -- and certainly in Rwanda -- the Belgians were viewed as being responsible, at least in part, for the Tutsi dynasty in Rwanda, [and] they were not perceived as being necessarily impartial between Tutsis and Hutus. … But there clearly was a need for a capable force to provide the peace for this operation. The Belgians, I think partly out of their sense of historical responsibility [and] desire to make this thing work, [decided] to step forward, and you certainly can't fault them for that. …
Do you recall meeting [U.N. Force Commander General Romeo] Dallaire?
do. I just don't recall exactly the circumstances, but I do recall going to New York during that period when he was preparing to go out. But I couldn't tell you exactly when we first met.
Where does the U.N. commander fit in your scope?
He would be somebody with whom I would normally have contact. In terms of that level of people, the U.N. special representative would be one, and then the force commander would be the other. I guess I would say, though, [that I] recall several other major operations going on at the same time. Pru Bushnell [said], "I'm busy doing this; can you take this one?" But she was principally responsible for that [along with] the director of our Office for Central Africa at the time. It was Pru, I recall, who did go out to Rwanda in the run-up to the events of April. Subsequently, afterwards, she went back out several times, both to Rwanda and to Burundi.
Do you recall ever talking to Kofi Annan?
No, not specifically about this. That would have been a level above my concern, the folks who normally would have been doing business with Kofi, though I know him. … It's just that that was not the normal contact.
I don't know that I remember a whole lot about it, except to say that even then there were serious concerns about whether the parties were seriously committed to this process -- on both sides -- because there was concern that the RPF was playing for time; and that eventually, if they saw an advantage, they would break out of the constraints of the peace agreement and move on Kigali.
But certainly we were also concerned about what was happening inside Rwanda, and whether President Habyarimana was seriously committed to this. You have to go back for some time, because well before I came on the scene, there had been efforts going back to the late 1980s, recognizing there was an impending problem here, to get Habyarimana to think seriously about how he was going to reconcile with the exiled Tutsis, who were becoming an increasingly strong factor. So we were concerned.
The notion was that we were going to put it to him, [and] that for us to be able to support this, he needed to assure us that he was committed to making this work and to honoring the terms of the agreement, [and that], moreover, he was going to move the process forward. Because even though there had been an agreement in principle, the steps that were to take place leading up to the installation of the transitional government hadn't been resolved -- for example, the question of who was actually going to be participating in the government -- and they remained unresolved right up until April 6.
You wanted to get a sense of his view about the peace process?
From our perspective, we were already committed. We thought we had a commitment from the administration to go ahead and support this. But we wanted some assurance that, in fact, he was equally committed to holding up his end of the bargain.
Did he give you that assurance?
My recollection is that he said the right things. He made the right noises. He assured us that he wanted this to go forward, that it was important for him to have this peace agreement. My recollection is that actually he wanted us to start moving even earlier on the deployment of the force. But in any event, what he said to us clearly indicated that at least verbally he was committed to making this thing work.
In mid-January, [what were] the signs coming out of Rwanda?
My actual direct involvement in this was somewhat episodic during that period, because I was doing other things. One of the other things we were doing during that period was trying, to the best of our ability, [to] ensure that we were supporting the transition in South Africa. So I was doing a lot of traveling on that. I know I was probably in Angola a couple of times during that period, as well, so that again, I was not involved day to day and following the actual development of events in Rwanda. That said, I think we were all concerned about a number of indications we were getting about violence or threats of violence inside Rwanda.
But I think many of us believed, first and foremost, that it was right to try to complete this negotiation, because if we didn't succeed in completing that negotiation, then what would happen is that you would have a resumption of the RPF's move towards Kigali by force. That would set in motion a whole series of events.
So there was a feeling, a belief that what we needed to do most urgently was to complete this negotiation and get the force deployed, and that once it was deployed, that would help to manage or help us manage and everybody else manage what was happening then in Kigali. That was also predicated on an assumption that indeed the government and the government forces were committed to seeing that the agreement was going to be implemented.
So I think it was not that I was unaware or that others were unaware that there were increasing problems in Kigali and elsewhere inside Rwanda. But I think many of us believed -- I think, in retrospect, somewhat erroneously -- that the solution to that was get the deal done and get the forces deployed, and that would be the way to manage the difficulties that we were finding in Kigali.
At the end of January, you had some meetings in Paris. I think the Belgians might have been there.
It's quite conceivable, because we were having tri-laterals at the time, mainly on Zaire, but obviously we were talking about all of Central Africa. So it is quite conceivable that during that period I would have been meeting with my French and Belgian counterparts.
Does anything stand out from that time?
… I don't have any recollection of that, and I think I would have remembered that. Again, much of our conversation at the time -- not that Rwanda was not important -- but much of our conversations were really about Zaire. There was a grave concern about Zaire. We had a situation in the preceding six or eight months in which more than half a million people had been displaced inside central and southern Zaire, [and] growing signs of ethnic tensions there as well, and a real concern that Zaire was going to come apart at the seams. So that was another distraction.
In terms of U.S. policy influence in Africa, where did Rwanda fit?
I have to say it was not the first order of priority in terms of our policies. It was there because, number one, the regional players, some of them very good friends of ours, were concerned -- Uganda and Tanzania in particular. It was there because the French were concerned. It was there because we also recognized that, if this situation were allowed to get out of hand, then we would have a real catastrophe. I think it was also there because there was concern about what the impact would be on Zaire. So there were a lot of other reasons that made Rwanda of interest to us, but it honestly was not [a] first-tier issue for us at the time.
Second tier?
Maybe third. There were a lot of tiers in this.
The meeting on April 5 with General Dallaire.
I do recall that one of the issues that came from President Habyarimana and his side was an insistence on including certain elements in the transitional government. … One was a committee Pour La Defence de la Revolution, and [there were other] groups [that] were [also] extremist Hutu groups. But Habyarimana was saying that if he was not able to include them, then that was going to be a problem for him.
So part of the conversation I was having with Kagame was about whether he would accept their participation in the government. It was quite clear he thought that these guys were beyond the pale -- and as it turned out, they were -- and that he was extremely resistant to countenancing their participation, their inclusion in the government. But that was one of the major sticking points on whether or not we were going to get this agreement to establish the transitional government.
Pru Bushnell said, around that time she thought, in retrospect, that the U.S. government was so invested in that peace process that it was almost unthinkable to turn back.
I think it's fair to say that we were very much invested in this, and that a lot of people had committed to it. But again, if you step back and look at it objectively and say, "What's the alternative if we don't make this peace process work?" then we go back to status quo ante, which is we've got an increasingly powerful Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Force [that has] determined that they're going to get back to Kigali one way or another.
So yes, we were heavily invested. The absence [of] some way of reconciling these two forces-- We were going to have a disaster with a different kind of a character with perhaps some of the same consequences, so I think we were right to focus on that part of it.
Where we erred seriously was not understanding better the dynamic that was taking place inside of Rwanda, and the motives and the intentions of the Hutu extremist groups. Had we understood that, I think our approach might have been very different.
But it's also interesting to speculate. Had we understood fully just how fragile that situation was and just how shallow the commitment to a peace deal was, [that] raises a serious question about whether we would have agreed to the deployment of a peacekeeping force, because the premise was not valid; there would have been no peace to keep. There were other things that we could have done, like the kinds of things we were doing in Burundi at the time, and indeed which we continue to do today. But it would have been a very different approach from deploying a peacekeeping force.
Dallaire says he was furious. He still feels now the international community, and the U.N. in particular, was falling into a trap.
I have to say when I left my meeting with Kagame in Kampala, I was having some of the same doubts. I mean, he made a very forceful case as to why [the extremist Hutus] should not be allowed in any government, and it was hard frankly to disagree with him. [But] I don't know if other things hadn't intervened when I got back to Washington [that I] would have raised this question and said, "We need to revisit this." I think I might have precisely because Kagame and his colleagues had made such a strong case as to as to why these were folks not to be trusted.
But he pressed this particular issue.
meeting precisely to say, "Why can't you do this? Because we want to get on with the peace process." Yes, in that sense, you're right -- we were very heavily invested in this, and he was quite firm in saying, "Sorry, this is not one that is in our interest to do."
You got a sense that he was not going to budge?
That's certainly the sense I came away with after our meetings in Kampala, [Uganda]. … I came away with the feeling that maybe this wasn't such a good deal and maybe we've got to revisit this. But again, there was never an opportunity to actually follow up on that thought.
Does that make you question the advice you were getting?
I think we couldn't have had a better team there, and I think all of us -- that certainly includes our U.S. team, and I think everybody else -- and a lot of folks who had a lot closer experience, more knowledge of Rwanda than we did, failed to see that lesson as well -- the French, the Belgians, the U.N. folks and others. What can I say? I can't fault them for what they were trying to do at the time.
Some Rwandans have raised questions about Ambassador [David] Rawson's objectivity. Do you want to address that?
I really have never had any reason to question his objectivity. I think what David admits to is what we all admit to. So there were things going on that we did not give due consideration and weight to; that to the extent that we interpreted or tried to analyze those events, we all saw that as an aspect of the effort we were making on the peace process; and that, if you could only get the peace process done, then you would have, number one, a U.N. presence there, [and] you'd have the wherewithal to support what we thought was a genuine government commitment to dealing with these issues. You'd have been in a very different situation. Again, in retrospect, we were wrong; a lot of other people were wrong too.
So you found out about the plane [carrying the Rwandan and Burundian presidents] being shot down while you were stopping over in Cairo? … What was going through your mind?
Well, a lot of things-- … Should I stay in the region, should I go to Paris or Brussels, or should I come home? Eventually we all agreed that it'd be better for me to come back to Washington. But she was quite aware of the potential consequences here and what might follow, and so we knew we had a serious problem, even [on] the morning of April 7.
Not genocide?
No. But clearly … with all the other forces at play in Kigali, and many which we knew were not supportive of the peace process, any number of things could happen as a result of that.
What was your gut feeling about what the RPF would do?
The concern I think was that the RPF might see [the plane crash] as an effort to sabotage the peace process and therefore say, "OK, well, we'll go back to plan A," which … [was to] get there by force.
Take Kigali by force?
[That] is what they decided to do -- and did.
The Americans' decision to evacuate [Rwanda]-- How did that come about?
I don't even know if it was a decision. It was understood that, given what had happened that day, we would be crazy to leave our people exposed in Kigali. My sense is that it was understood the first thing we were going to have to do was get folks out of there.
But U.S. embassies stay open in chaotic situations sometimes.
… We had a situation where, as Joyce Leader I'm sure described in gory detail, the prime minister lived right next door to her. [On the day she was killed, the prime minister] crossed over the wall into Leader's compound for shelter, was not able to do so, went [to] another U.N. compound somewhere in the neighborhood, and eventually was caught there and killed there. [Unidentified enemy] troops actually broke into Joyce's house and actually fired up into the ceiling, as I recall, because they thought that there might be people hiding up in there, [as in] Belgian troops.
If these guys are wandering around and have the audacity and the ruthlessness to lynch [the prime minister and] 10 Belgian troops [who were protecting the prime minister], what assurances do we have that our people are going to be safe in that situation? So I think it was a foregone conclusion for us that this was just not a situation where we had sufficient confidence. We were [not] going to leave our people exposed and on the ground, and the only question was, how do you get them out [of] there? Ultimately, as you know, they went overland to Burundi, [and] there was a lot of debate about that [and] about how to do it. But I don't think there was any question about whether to do it. …
Closing the embassy-- Would that decision be made at the secretary level?
I'm sure it was eventually signed off by the secretary. …
I'm not clear whether it was a top-down--?
No, I don't think so. I think it was understood by us that we did not wish to leave our people in that situation. We were not going to do it if we can figure out how to do it, and the only question was what's the best way to do this. One of the great debates at the time was whether or not we should pre-position U.S. forces in Burundi as part of an effort to evacuate them. The concern was that the situation in Burundi was so fragile that the mere presence of U.S. forces could trigger something there. That's how bad the situation in Burundi was. Eventually I think we did at least get the authorization to do that, but ultimately, happily it was not necessary. We didn't need to use those forces. …
So you were hearing reports from Joyce and others [once you're back in Washington.] It must have been pretty horrific.
Yes. Joyce's situation in particular, I think, got everybody's attention. …
Was it the right thing to do [for the U.S. to begin pulling out]?
I believe that it was, because I think otherwise we could well have seen-- I mean, if there is no respect for the lives of peacekeepers, there was no assurance whatsoever that, simply by virtue of the fact that we were American people, [the killers] were going to leave us alone.
Were you aware of a request by [U.S. Embassy Officer] Laura Lane and others there to stay?
Yes, I do recall there was the notion that, yes, maybe we could stay behind; maybe we could do something. But then you have to say, "With what do you create a safe haven?" If the Belgian troops could not defend and protect the prime minister from a ruthless attack, what were unarmed Americans bearing a flag going to do?
On the political level, the deadline to sort things out or else the RPF were going to start fighting again-- Was that communicated to you?
I don't know how we learned that [the RPF would fight the Interahamwe], but it was not a surprise. … Once this killing started, once there was a threat to the RPF contingent in Kigali … you had the two parts of this problem. You had the problem of the confrontation between the government and the RPF, and [you had] the internal problem [of the Interahamwe killing the Tutsis].
But they fed each other. One of the things clearly that was feeding the paranoia and the demagoguery of the Hutu extremists was the prospect that the Tutsis and the RPF were going to be in Kigali, whether by force or peacefully. So once the killings started, the RPF were bound and determined that they were going to do everything in their power to get to Kigali to try to save their people.
That is why -- and I think rightly -- we continued to talk about [brokering] a cease-fire, because [as] long as that pressure was coming from outside, the feeling was that [we] were feeding the paranoia and the totally unjustified reactions on the part of Hutu extremists inside the country. To a certain extent, that's true. But I can't fault Kagame for doing what he was doing. He was doing what he felt was absolutely necessary to try to save some of his people. …
What was the impact [of this escalating situation on the U.N. troops]?
It, more than anything else, brought home the fact that this was not the situation that we thought we were going to be dealing with. We thought this whole thing was premised on a political agreement [and] a commitment on both sides to respect that agreement. … What folks signed up [for] was a peacekeeping operation in a "permissive environment," where you had parties who were committed to working with you to maintain that peace, and that clearly was no longer the case. That event, more than anything else, illustrated it.
Now, again, the famous Dallaire message -- which I don't recall seeing -- said one of the things that the extremists intend to do is to attack the Belgians, precisely to precipitate their departure and the collapse of the whole process. But even if I'd known that, I'm not sure it would have changed anything. The fact of the matter is they attacked these guys; they killed them ruthlessly, and if they were prepared to do it once, was anybody prepared to offer an assurance that it would not happen again? The fact is that that incident changed the entire calculation about what kind of a situation we were in and what kind of forces we were up against.
That led to the position that the U.S. took about withdrawing?
Indeed.
Where did that instruction come from?
It came from Washington. I'm sure that that's the kind of thing that somebody senior had to sign off on. But, anyway, I had a very good working relationship with the Belgian Foreign Minister at the time, again because we spent a lot of time talking about [a problem in] Zaire. I recall in that period having a conversation with him [on the] telephone. It's very hard following that incident to look him in the eye in a manner of words and say, "You have an obligation to keep your forces there on the ground, notwithstanding the danger they find themselves in."
If you think back a few months about what happened to our troops in Mogadishu, I certainly was not one to argue that the Belgians should be pressed or obliged to stay in Kigali and Rwanda in a situation that they just frankly had not signed up for. So there's a different aspect to that in the question of, should there have been a suggestion or call for all the troops then to leave, or should we simply have said, "All right, fine, Belgium, if you want to go-- ." But quite clearly the Belgians wanted to have a cover of having others leave as well, and we yielded to that request. In retrospect, I wonder if that was the right thing to do.
Did they ask for that?
My recollection is that they wanted us to support a request for the complete withdrawal, so that they would not be alone in withdrawing their troops from Rwanda.
How was that requested?
The decisive conversation was probably a conversation [involving Secretary of State] Warren Christopher.
The Security Council-- There was an effort to try to do something.
There was an effort to walk it back almost immediately. Dallaire was sending in messages saying, "We can't do this. We can't abandon people who are looking to us to help protect them, and we can't just pull out and run." So eventually the compromise was that he was allowed to retain about 260, 270 troops.
But people were certainly aware of the implications both ways, the implications of pulling people out as well as the implications of leaving people there. [The] implications of leaving people there were you were leaving a bunch of very lightly armed troops exposed to God knew what. The pure implications of pulling people out were that you were leaving a whole bunch of people in the lurch, although as a practical matter people were rightly questioning, what could this force do to prevent the catastrophe that everybody, by that time, saw coming?
What were you advising [to Warren Christopher]?
We were counseling the secretary not to oppose the Belgian request to get the hell out of there. We knew what the implications of that would be. I was not the only voice in here, but I certainly didn't feel that we were in a position to demand the Belgians keep their forces there after what happened.
Once the magnitude of what was going on became clear, once Dallaire made clear his view that he could stay there, that the risks from his perspective were tolerable, and that [they had] a sense that in various ways they could make a difference, they did [stay there], although there were some terrible tragedies there where people looked to the U.N. for protection and didn't find it.
Again, it's the problem of putting people in impossible situations. But once that realization set in, there were certainly many on my team who said, "Look, we've got to figure out some kind of response to this, and we need to figure out a way to try to bolster the U.N. presence in Rwanda." … That was the voice from my bureau, although it was a difficult case to make.
An effort to hatch some kind of African force-- Some people have mentioned it was the images of bodies floating down the river.
…My wife accompanied John Shattuck when John went out to Burundi, mainly, but they also flew over the river and looked down. That was an image that got a lot of people's attention. … The Africans were rightly saying, "We don't understand why there isn't more of a reaction and more of a response to this." I think that was some of the conversation that we had in South Africa when the vice president was there. …
[But what about] this effort to get an African force?
I think the government -- as governments are -- was somewhat divided. But the fact was, we had Africans telling us that they were prepared to do this, and that there were a number of us who felt if they're prepared to do this, then let's support them. Dallaire, by that time, had shown that he could be there and do some things, and that he was not as concerned as [we] were about his security or survivability.
I recall having conversations during that period with [Ghanaian President] Jerry Rawlings, and the Ghanaians were one of the first to step forward and say they'd be prepared to send troops. Their troops are very good, and certainly were at the time. Then we got into long haggles about how we were going to prepare them and equip them and the [Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)] and a lot of other things, which was one of the most shameful moments in this whole process. But nevertheless, I think the fact that you had Africans questioning why their response was [not] more vigorous, that you had Africans wanting to step forward that in those circumstances-- It only made sense to try to do what we could to facilitate their ability to make a difference in that situation.
Vice President Gore presented -- what?
I don't recall. I'm not sure whether we initiated this conversation, or whether the South Africans initiated the conversation, or whether it was one of those things that mutually we all knew that there was this disaster going on, and [we wondered] what could we do about it. The question was, if there are African forces there willing to do this, would you support their going in? Again, the details of that conversation, I don't pretend right now to recollect.
Why wasn't there an African force?
I think the elements simply weren't there; they just hadn't come together. These were going to be decisions of every individual African government. It wasn't for the South Africans to make the decision that they were going to [put together a force for all of Africa]. …
It wasn't just the U.S. that didn't want to send troops?
… I think anybody looking at the situation would have to ask, "Is this a situation that I want to put my people in?" So there was no great rush here. Early on, there was a concern, because the Tanzanians said that they were going to go in and take care of this. Well, we all thought frankly the Tanzanians seriously overestimated their own capabilities and underestimated the situation they would be getting themselves into. So we were actively discouraging them from doing what had been a sort of unilateral intervention. …
[But] we didn't have a long list of takers for this mission. … [Then] it took an awful long time to eventually assemble the forces, African and other[wise]. … One of the things it says is many of these militaries -- not only in Africa but elsewhere -- however willing they may be, they are not equipped, trained, prepared to move into that kind of a situation. …
It was made very clear to Dallaire [that] the RPF was not going to support an intervention force?
There was the discussion about whether, if you deployed troops into Kigali, you could find ways to have them fan out and either rescue people or bring them into safe centers. Then [there was] the counterproposal, which you are well aware of -- to do it along the borders and set up safe havens -- which eventually went nowhere. The RPF concern was that, whatever the intention was, the practical effect of inserting a force into Rwanda would be to get in their way and, at the same time, not to be in a position to afford any meaningful assistance to the people who were being slaughtered. …
In May, there was a new U.N. resolution including an arms embargo on the whole country, including the RPF. What's the thinking behind that?
I think it was the same logic. We were focusing on the whole peace process here. [There was] the concern that, somehow or other, you needed to constrain the actions on both sides. There were a lot of people at the time who thought the arms embargo was kind of a meaningless thing, that it would have little, if any, impact on the ground, because the people who were carrying out [the] slaughter on the one side either had all the arms they needed, or weren't conducting the massacres in that way. Second, the RPF was not seriously going to be affected by anything we might do at the Security Council. It sort of fell into the category of, what can you do? Well, you can impose an arms embargo. …
Let me just ask you now about this term "genocide."
Let me just ask you now about this term "genocide." …
… I do recall an awful lot of debate and discussion in the department about when and under what circumstances we could say that genocide was taking place in Rwanda. I think one of the most shameful failures that certainly rises right to the top -- the fact that it took us so long to come to what should have been a fairly obvious conclusion. I understand all the concerns, and many of us are not lawyers. We don't walk around with copies of the Genocide Convention in our pockets, and most of us were coming to it for the very first time. But, nevertheless, I think the fact that we dithered and were not able to make that determination was one of the shameful features of our handling of the Rwandan situation. …
So why didn't you say it?
Because of this tortured debate, first and foremost, over the facts, and secondly, over what obligations might flow [from there]. There was concern. It is ludicrous, in retrospect, that the discussion was about how might we be viewed if we declared that there is genocide and then we are not in a position -- not ready, or willing, or able -- to do anything about it. The fact of the matter was it was there, and the fact that we didn't say so was already tarnishing our credibility and our capacity to do something about it. …
You used the word "shameful" about the APCs.
Yes, because we spent so much time wrangling about who was going to pay for them, who was going to pay for refurbishing them, who was going to transport them, who was going to pay for the transport, [and] who was going to pay for the training of the Ghanaians so that they could use them. Again, it's sort of bureaucracy at its very worst, and at our level, we couldn't break through that. Somebody else would have had to intervene to say, "This is nonsense. Get on with it. Do it."
And that was coming from -- where?
It's coming from our colleagues at the Pentagon, and it's what they are paid to do. They are paid to say, "All right, who's going to sign on the dotted line?" as to the cost of all these items. Some of us argued that we'd already paid for them, because they would have gone to Somalia in the first place, as I recall. I can't remember where they were coming from.
But the point is that it's the kind of bureaucratic gridlock that often happens. But in this situation, [it] shouldn't have been allowed to happen. Something, somebody should have stepped in to say that this issue was far too important, "We'll worry about the cost later." But we weren't in a position to do that.
You talked to the guys at the Pentagon and they said, "Look, this is what we're paid to do."
Exactly. I'm not faulting them. They were doing exactly what they were paid to do. It's not for them to say, "We're going to waive all of these conditions." They've got rules and regulations that [they] have to apply. Somebody else would have had to [make changes].
Somebody else, being--?
Somebody else higher up, either in their hierarchy or at the White House.
What was the message coming from higher up?
Well, I don't know. I think I can fault myself here and say perhaps we should have been more aggressive in making sure this issue should have got bucked up to the higher-ups, and perhaps forced a resolution or decision. But as I said, this was allowed to go on far longer than it should have or needed to before getting resolved.
… There's the working group, and I know Bushnell was deeply involved in that. … She said [they] had a lot of meetings. But I now realize that the number of meetings that [they] had, and the level at which they were being held was an indication that nothing was really--
I think I would have to agree with her. Again, certainly there were things we should have done to say that this needs to be bucked up to another level, that it needs to be considered by the so-called "deputies committee" meetings at the NSC, if not by the principals themselves. My recollection is that the occasions on which it was discussed at the deputies [committee], it was not the main event. It was done as part of discussion of other truly pressing issues. But, again, in retrospect, there were things that we, at my level, could and should have done to say, "We need help. We need some guidance, direction and decision, and somebody to break the bureaucratic logjam."
Did you discuss Rwanda with Secretary [Christopher]?
I can certainly recall a couple of conversations on the genocide issue with [the] secretary in his office, but my memories of 10 years ago are not easy to recollect. Certainly it was the subject at [Deputy Secretary of State] Strobe [Talbott's] morning meetings whenever I was there or whenever Pru was there. Almost inevitably, the subject of Rwanda would come up.
So it was there. We were constantly updating people. We were letting people know where we were, what we were dealing with, what issues we were wrestling with. It's not as though it didn't get raised or-- But I think again, there were probably ways in which we could have raised it more pointedly and more aggressively in order to say, "We really need help in resolving some of these issues."
I mean, the other truly shameful episode was the whole failure to do anything about Radio Mille Collines, [the radio station inciting the violence]. When I think back upon it, those are the three things that come to mind. It was the decision on whether to call it genocide. It was the Mille Collines radio decision, which [was] truly atrocious that we weren't able to do something because of some legal nicety about international radio conventions. Then, the APC thing [was] sort of emblematic, symptomatic of the difficulties we were having in doing what we said we wanted to do -- namely, be supportive of those countries that were prepared to commit to this operation.
Just how engaged were Talbott and Bushnell in Rwanda?
I would have to say, in honesty, not deeply engaged. I wouldn't say they were holding themselves aloof. Certainly that's not Strobe's style. It's not his inclination. I'm sure he probably said to me, and to Pru and others, "If you need my help, come and see me." Perhaps we weren't as aggressive in pursuing that invitation as we should have been.
And the secretary?
Less involved, although he certainly was involved in this whole discussion on the genocide issue, as he would be, given his legal background. …
One theory I've heard is that people at the highest levels … allowed this issue to be dealt with at [the] Pru Bushnell, [the president's adviser for Africa] Donald Steinberg level, precisely because they didn't want to get involved.
Perhaps. But again, in fairness, I think one has to sit back and look at what the landscape looked like at that time. I don't exactly know where we were on Haiti, but it wasn't a good place. I know exactly where we were in [the former Yugoslavia], but it wasn't a very good place. There were a lot of things that certainly deserved as much attention, if not more attention than Rwanda.
How about you personally? How involved were you?
Involved. Certainly involved. But I was involved in several other things, as well. I was back in South Africa in May. I was there in April as part of an observer mission in the run-up to the elections [and] back again for the inauguration. We were very heavily invested in South Africa, and I think for good reason.
Were you in Rwanda, in particular, during the genocide?
I have recollections of going to Rwanda, certainly [of] meeting with Kagame after he was there. [I] probably would have been [there in] early July. Don't hold me to that date. But certainly I was involved. But Pru, again, [and I had] an understanding we had a division of labor and a division of responsibilities. Pru had Rwanda, for better or worse.
She says one of her regrets is she didn't buck her chain of command.
Yes. I think all of us felt that one. We probably should have tried harder.
Take more risks?
And [took] more risks.
What does it tell you about the institution, in the way the U.S. government [takes] risks? …
In some senses, we were taking risks in a lot of places. We were doing some risky things in a lot of places, and we were committing the U.S. government both in its name and in its resources to a lot of things -- in Liberia, in Angola, and lots of other places. I won't say the people were jumping all over us and telling us [what] not to do. But I think by the same token, everybody was very conscious of the fact that there was serious aversion -- not only in the administration, but in the Congress -- to what they saw as our growing, uncontrolled, unrestrained involvement in all kinds of things, all over the place.
Again, we had nine peace operations, just if you count the U.N. ones, going on simultaneously in 1994. Five of them were in Africa, and two of them weren't doing too well. So I think we were all extremely conscious of that reality, and almost certainly, in consequence, curbed our own expectations. …
The lessons that you take from this, personally and officially?
One of the lessons -- and I think it's a lesson that a lot of us learned during that period, although it's a lesson as time passes [that] maybe is less poignant, salient -- the first lesson is that there's a correlation between your instruments, your tools, and your willingness and your will to use them. One of the things that severely constrained us in Rwanda is we didn't have the tools. We didn't have a collection of ready, willing and able forces that could be deployed in a relatively short period of time to respond to this kind of crisis. Hence the effort to try and figure out how we could support [and] stand up African forces to do this. …
I know that some people viewed that as a way to avoid responsibly on the part of the United States, by saying, "We'll let the Africans take care of their problems," although I frankly do believe that, if in fact you had capable African forces in whom you had some confidence, [that] increased the likelihood that we would be going to go in with them in situations such as Rwanda.
But I'm not sure we've really learned that lesson. The U.N. report, the inquiry of 1999, came out with a whole list of recommendations. I think if you went back and looked at how well and how thoroughly those recommendations had been implemented, you would find we're probably not in much better shape today than we were back in 1994.
I do recall looking at the U.N. web site to see who had actually signed up to be part of those so-called rapid reaction, rapid deployment force, and I recall there were only two countries on that list. That's not the fault of the U.N. only. It's the fault of all of us, all the member states, because only if you've got member states who are not only supporting, but are actually willing to take the lead to do this will it happen. So I don't have the sense that there's any great enthusiasm in the current administration either for the effort to build the capacities of other troops.
And it was not just African. There were other things going on at the time in Europe, and elsewhere as well, or in the capacity of the United Nations either to manage or organize these kinds of operations. I guess -- back to the other point -- I have personally been very wary of invoking that expression "Never again," because to do so implies that you have changed something; you have done something; you've created something -- a modality, a mechanism, an instrument -- that will allow you credibly to say that, "We will not allow this to happen ever again." And I don't think we're there.
But the other part of this -- and this is a more difficult one for me, and I've thought about this a lot … I'm not really sure that we have in fact learned, or internalized or acted on the lessons of what in fact we would need to do in order to at least be in a better position to deal with something like Rwanda in the future. I'm not sure that, were we confronted with a similar situation today, that we would be any better prepared to respond to it, let alone prevent it, than we were back in 1994.
But there's another part of that which I've wrestled with, and that is the other aspect of "Never again" is that you have some understanding of why what happened in Rwanda happened. I haven't read all the literature, but nothing that I've read to date has helped me to understand how it was possible for people who had lived with each other, who were neighbors, who had intermarried, to systematically go about the destruction of an entire ethnic group.
We could even debate whether in fact it is a separate ethnic group, given the history. It's not comparable to the Holocaust of Nazi Germany. It's not comparable to Cambodia, where you had governments and government instrumentalities both instigating but also actually carrying this out. In this case, you had people who, admittedly, had been manipulated and provoked into actions. But still, these were neighbors killing neighbors.
I do recall, for example, reading some of the most chilling accounts. One I recall very well [was] of a man who stood by -- had no choice but to stand by -- as his own relatives came in and killed his wife, who was a Tutsi, but he was powerless to stop that from happening. In another situation, a woman was set upon her neighbor and her neighbor's children with a machete, while she carried her own child on her back.
It's very hard to understand what kind of a psychosis there is that makes it possible for people to behave in that way. I think that until, and unless, we have some understanding of what happened, it's very hard to say that we know how to prevent it from happening it again, or even recognizing it when we see it again.
I do think one of the major problems we had in Rwanda was -- for me, certainly -- an inability to imagine that what happened was possible -- that you could actually see nearly a million people massacred, not by some military machine, but by neighbors killing neighbors, and to have it happen in the space of three months.
So that's a far more difficult lesson, I think. Again, from my own perspective, until one can better understand and explain what happened there, it's very hard to say, "We are in a position to ensure that it's not going to happen again."
Does that mean that once it began, there really there was little the outside world could do to stop it?
I think frankly that our major mistakes were the mistakes we made before it started. Had we recognized better, had we understood better, had we analyzed more correctly what was going on beforehand, we might have been able to make a difference. By April 6, I think we were severely limited in what we could have done to actually preventing this from going the way it went.
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine
Sunday, May 31, 2009
June 1, 2009
Mr. Ban Ki-moon
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York, NY 10017
President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500
Prime Minister Gordon Brown
10 Downing Street
London
SW1A 2AA
Dear Secretary General, President, and Prime Minister,
We the undersigned scholars and human rights defenders are writing to express our grave concern at the ongoing failure of Prosecutor Hassan Jallow to fulfil the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by bringing indictments against those soldiers of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) who committed crimes against humanity and war crimes in Rwanda in 1994.
While we commend the ICTR for vigorously prosecuting numerous perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, we are deeply concerned that the failure to indict a single RPF soldier for killing civilians causes the Tribunal to be dismissed as “victor’s justice,” sets a dangerous precedent for future international prosecutions, and undermines efforts at achieving peace, security, and reconciliation in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region as a whole.
We certainly recognize that the RPF’s crimes against humanity and war crimes are not comparable to the genocide, either in scope or intent. Yet, that is no argument for granting impunity for those crimes. As Alison Des Forges, the historian and human rights defender, eloquently wrote before her untimely death earlier this year:
To insist on the right to justice for all victims, as did the [1994] UN Commission of Experts, is not to deny the genocide, nor does such an insistence equate war crimes with genocide; it simply asserts that all victims, regardless of their affiliation, regardless of the nature of the crime committed against them, and regardless of the affiliation of the perpetrator, must have equal opportunity to seek redress for the wrongs done them.
Indeed, today’s international war crimes tribunals, unlike their predecessors at Nuremberg and Tokyo, are founded on the principle of even-handed justice for all victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
The UN has repeatedly insisted on impartial justice for all international crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994. According to experts working for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, RPF soldiers killed an estimated 25,000 to 45,000 civilians in 1994. A UN Commission of Experts, set up by the UN Security Council in 1994, “strongly recommend[ed]” prosecuting the perpetrators of those crimes. Following that recommendation, the Security Council established the ICTR with a clear mandate to prosecute not only the génocidaires, but also those responsible for “other serious violations of international humanitarian law” in order to achieve both justice and “national reconciliation.” The Security Council reaffirmed this commitment to impartial justice with Resolutions in 2003 and 2004 that called “on all States, especially Rwanda . . . to intensify cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to the ICTR, including on investigations of the Rwandan Patriotic Army . . . .”
Prosecutor Jallow’s evident reluctance to prosecute RPF crimes is clearly the result of intimidation and obstructionism by the RPF, which now rules Rwanda. Several years ago, after the Prosecutor’s predecessor announced a timetable for issuing RPF indictments, the Rwandan government brought the ICTR to a grinding halt by preventing prosecution witnesses from travelling to the Tribunal to testify in genocide trials. That action blatantly violated Rwanda’s legal obligation to cooperate with the ICTR, directly defied the Security Council, and strongly suggested that the RPF-led government puts impunity for RPF crimes ahead of justice for the genocide.
By capitulating to this continuing threat of non-cooperation, Prosecutor Jallow has severely compromised his prosecutorial independence and the Tribunal’s integrity. Indeed, the ICTR’s one-sided justice stands in sharp contrast to the impartial justice achieved by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which have resolutely prosecuted all sides of those conflicts.
Last year, Prosecutor Jallow ceded the Tribunal’s primacy over RPF crimes by striking a deal with the RPF-led government whereby they would try four RPF officers for the notorious June 5, 1994 massacre of the Catholic Archbishop of Kigali, three bishops, nine clergy, and two other civilians who had been taken into the RPF’s supposedly protective custody. Flawed proceedings resulted in five-year prison sentences for two lower-ranking officers (who confessed to the killings) and acquittals for the two commanding officers.
This domestic case was a completely inappropriate substitute for ICTR prosecutions. For the past 15 years, the RPF-led government has shown that it is neither willing nor able to deliver justice for such politically sensitive crimes. First, the RPF never prosecuted any of its soldiers for war crimes in 1994 until this 2008 case. Second, the two acquittals and two light sentences handed down in this case do not reflect the gravity of the crimes committed. Third, in the past year, several ICTR trial chambers, the ICTR appeals chamber, and England’s High Court of Justice have ruled that Rwanda cannot even provide fair trials in high-profile genocide cases. The English High Court, in particular, expressed serious concerns about the Rwandan judiciary’s independence and impartiality.
Prosecutor Jallow promised to assess the Rwandan proceedings and reassert jurisdiction over the case if they did not meet international standards. Although the appeal process concluded in late February, Prosecutor Jallow has remained silent on the integrity of Rwanda’s RPF trial. He should take back jurisdiction over that case.
In conclusion, we call on you to ensure that the ICTR prosecutes RPF crimes. This issue should be raised when Prosecutor Jallow addresses the United Nations Security Council about his completion strategy on June 4, 2009. Under the current strategy, the ICTR is supposed to complete all trials in 2009 and all appeals in 2011. Unless the Prosecutor acts swiftly, the ICTR will squander not only its last chance to provide accountability for those serious crimes, but also its legitimacy.
cc:
Patricia O’Brien, Under-Secretary-General, The Legal Counsel, Office of Legal Affairs
Judge Charles Michael Dennis Byron, President, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Prosecutor Hassan Jallow, Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State
Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa
HE Dr. Susan Rice, US Ambassador to the United Nations
HE Clint Williamson, US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues
Michelle Gavin, Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council
James B. Donovan, Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Mission to the United Nations
David Miliband, UK Foreign Secretary
Lord Malloch-Brown, Minister with responsibility for Africa in the Foreign Office
Douglas Alexander, Secretary of State for International Development
HE Sir John Sawers, UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Cathy Adams, Legal Counsellor, United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
Signatories
Professor Erin Baines, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
Elizabeth Barad
Larissa Begley, University of Sussex, UK
Professor David Black, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada
Professor Stephen Brown, University of Ottawa
Professor Anuradha Chakravarty, University of South Carolina
Professor Christina Clark-Kazak, York University, Toronto, Canada
Professor Roger Des Forges, University at Buffalo
Professor Nigel Eltringham, University of Sussex
Conor Foley, International housing, land and property rights expert
Professor Paul Gready, Centre for Applied Human Rights, University of York
Professor Sarah Freedman, University of California at Berkeley
Dr. Ann Griffiths, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada
Aloys Habimana, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Professor Rhoda Howard-Hassman, FRSC, Canada Research Chair in International Human Rights, Wilfred Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada
Chris Huggins, Specialist, Conflicts over Land and Natural Resources Rights
Catharine Jenkins, Chair, Centre for Law & Conflict, SOAS, London
Professor Emeritus René Lemarchand, University of Florida
Professor Elizabeth Levy Paluck, Princeton University
Professor Timothy Longman, Director, African Studies Center, Boston University
Dr. J. Paul Martin, Director, Human Rights Studies, Barnard College, Columbia University
Constance Morrill, Human rights advocate
Professor Rosemary Nagy, Nipissing University, Thunder Bay, Canada
Professor Catharine Newbury, Smith College
Professor David Newbury, Smith College
Dr. Scott Newton, School of Law, SOAS
Professor Victor Peskin, School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University
Tiamoyo Peterson, M.A., University of California, Irvine, USA
Professor Vern Neufeld Redekop, Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada
Dr. Luc Reydams, University of Notre Dame
Professor Filip Reyntjens, University of Antwerp, Belgium.
Samantha A. Smith, University of California, Irvine, USA
Professor Chandra Lekha Sriram, Director, Centre on Human Rights in Conflict, University of East London
Karen Stauss, Former Human Rights Watch researcher for the Democratic Republic of Congo
Professor Scott Straus, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Tony Tate, Former Human Rights Watch researcher for Burundi
Carina Tertsakian, Former Amnesty International researcher on Rwanda
Dr. Susan Thomson, University of Ottawa, Canada
Alana Tiemessen, PhD Candidate, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
Professor Kathryn Trevenen, Institute of Women's Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada
Noel Twagiramungu, Tufts University
Professor Jan Vansina, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Michele D. Wagner, former professor, University of Minnesota
Lars Waldorf, Director, Centre for International Human Rights, University of London
Peter Webster
Professor Harvey M. Weinstein, University of California at Berkeley
Professor Richard A. Wilson, Director, Human Rights Institute, University of Connecticut
Eugenia Zorbas, Former staff, UNHCR-Rwanda
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine
Mr. Ban Ki-moon
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York, NY 10017
President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500
Prime Minister Gordon Brown
10 Downing Street
London
SW1A 2AA
Dear Secretary General, President, and Prime Minister,
We the undersigned scholars and human rights defenders are writing to express our grave concern at the ongoing failure of Prosecutor Hassan Jallow to fulfil the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by bringing indictments against those soldiers of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) who committed crimes against humanity and war crimes in Rwanda in 1994.
While we commend the ICTR for vigorously prosecuting numerous perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, we are deeply concerned that the failure to indict a single RPF soldier for killing civilians causes the Tribunal to be dismissed as “victor’s justice,” sets a dangerous precedent for future international prosecutions, and undermines efforts at achieving peace, security, and reconciliation in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region as a whole.
We certainly recognize that the RPF’s crimes against humanity and war crimes are not comparable to the genocide, either in scope or intent. Yet, that is no argument for granting impunity for those crimes. As Alison Des Forges, the historian and human rights defender, eloquently wrote before her untimely death earlier this year:
To insist on the right to justice for all victims, as did the [1994] UN Commission of Experts, is not to deny the genocide, nor does such an insistence equate war crimes with genocide; it simply asserts that all victims, regardless of their affiliation, regardless of the nature of the crime committed against them, and regardless of the affiliation of the perpetrator, must have equal opportunity to seek redress for the wrongs done them.
Indeed, today’s international war crimes tribunals, unlike their predecessors at Nuremberg and Tokyo, are founded on the principle of even-handed justice for all victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
The UN has repeatedly insisted on impartial justice for all international crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994. According to experts working for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, RPF soldiers killed an estimated 25,000 to 45,000 civilians in 1994. A UN Commission of Experts, set up by the UN Security Council in 1994, “strongly recommend[ed]” prosecuting the perpetrators of those crimes. Following that recommendation, the Security Council established the ICTR with a clear mandate to prosecute not only the génocidaires, but also those responsible for “other serious violations of international humanitarian law” in order to achieve both justice and “national reconciliation.” The Security Council reaffirmed this commitment to impartial justice with Resolutions in 2003 and 2004 that called “on all States, especially Rwanda . . . to intensify cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to the ICTR, including on investigations of the Rwandan Patriotic Army . . . .”
Prosecutor Jallow’s evident reluctance to prosecute RPF crimes is clearly the result of intimidation and obstructionism by the RPF, which now rules Rwanda. Several years ago, after the Prosecutor’s predecessor announced a timetable for issuing RPF indictments, the Rwandan government brought the ICTR to a grinding halt by preventing prosecution witnesses from travelling to the Tribunal to testify in genocide trials. That action blatantly violated Rwanda’s legal obligation to cooperate with the ICTR, directly defied the Security Council, and strongly suggested that the RPF-led government puts impunity for RPF crimes ahead of justice for the genocide.
By capitulating to this continuing threat of non-cooperation, Prosecutor Jallow has severely compromised his prosecutorial independence and the Tribunal’s integrity. Indeed, the ICTR’s one-sided justice stands in sharp contrast to the impartial justice achieved by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which have resolutely prosecuted all sides of those conflicts.
Last year, Prosecutor Jallow ceded the Tribunal’s primacy over RPF crimes by striking a deal with the RPF-led government whereby they would try four RPF officers for the notorious June 5, 1994 massacre of the Catholic Archbishop of Kigali, three bishops, nine clergy, and two other civilians who had been taken into the RPF’s supposedly protective custody. Flawed proceedings resulted in five-year prison sentences for two lower-ranking officers (who confessed to the killings) and acquittals for the two commanding officers.
This domestic case was a completely inappropriate substitute for ICTR prosecutions. For the past 15 years, the RPF-led government has shown that it is neither willing nor able to deliver justice for such politically sensitive crimes. First, the RPF never prosecuted any of its soldiers for war crimes in 1994 until this 2008 case. Second, the two acquittals and two light sentences handed down in this case do not reflect the gravity of the crimes committed. Third, in the past year, several ICTR trial chambers, the ICTR appeals chamber, and England’s High Court of Justice have ruled that Rwanda cannot even provide fair trials in high-profile genocide cases. The English High Court, in particular, expressed serious concerns about the Rwandan judiciary’s independence and impartiality.
Prosecutor Jallow promised to assess the Rwandan proceedings and reassert jurisdiction over the case if they did not meet international standards. Although the appeal process concluded in late February, Prosecutor Jallow has remained silent on the integrity of Rwanda’s RPF trial. He should take back jurisdiction over that case.
In conclusion, we call on you to ensure that the ICTR prosecutes RPF crimes. This issue should be raised when Prosecutor Jallow addresses the United Nations Security Council about his completion strategy on June 4, 2009. Under the current strategy, the ICTR is supposed to complete all trials in 2009 and all appeals in 2011. Unless the Prosecutor acts swiftly, the ICTR will squander not only its last chance to provide accountability for those serious crimes, but also its legitimacy.
cc:
Patricia O’Brien, Under-Secretary-General, The Legal Counsel, Office of Legal Affairs
Judge Charles Michael Dennis Byron, President, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Prosecutor Hassan Jallow, Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State
Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa
HE Dr. Susan Rice, US Ambassador to the United Nations
HE Clint Williamson, US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues
Michelle Gavin, Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council
James B. Donovan, Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Mission to the United Nations
David Miliband, UK Foreign Secretary
Lord Malloch-Brown, Minister with responsibility for Africa in the Foreign Office
Douglas Alexander, Secretary of State for International Development
HE Sir John Sawers, UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Cathy Adams, Legal Counsellor, United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
Signatories
Professor Erin Baines, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
Elizabeth Barad
Larissa Begley, University of Sussex, UK
Professor David Black, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada
Professor Stephen Brown, University of Ottawa
Professor Anuradha Chakravarty, University of South Carolina
Professor Christina Clark-Kazak, York University, Toronto, Canada
Professor Roger Des Forges, University at Buffalo
Professor Nigel Eltringham, University of Sussex
Conor Foley, International housing, land and property rights expert
Professor Paul Gready, Centre for Applied Human Rights, University of York
Professor Sarah Freedman, University of California at Berkeley
Dr. Ann Griffiths, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada
Aloys Habimana, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Professor Rhoda Howard-Hassman, FRSC, Canada Research Chair in International Human Rights, Wilfred Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada
Chris Huggins, Specialist, Conflicts over Land and Natural Resources Rights
Catharine Jenkins, Chair, Centre for Law & Conflict, SOAS, London
Professor Emeritus René Lemarchand, University of Florida
Professor Elizabeth Levy Paluck, Princeton University
Professor Timothy Longman, Director, African Studies Center, Boston University
Dr. J. Paul Martin, Director, Human Rights Studies, Barnard College, Columbia University
Constance Morrill, Human rights advocate
Professor Rosemary Nagy, Nipissing University, Thunder Bay, Canada
Professor Catharine Newbury, Smith College
Professor David Newbury, Smith College
Dr. Scott Newton, School of Law, SOAS
Professor Victor Peskin, School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University
Tiamoyo Peterson, M.A., University of California, Irvine, USA
Professor Vern Neufeld Redekop, Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada
Dr. Luc Reydams, University of Notre Dame
Professor Filip Reyntjens, University of Antwerp, Belgium.
Samantha A. Smith, University of California, Irvine, USA
Professor Chandra Lekha Sriram, Director, Centre on Human Rights in Conflict, University of East London
Karen Stauss, Former Human Rights Watch researcher for the Democratic Republic of Congo
Professor Scott Straus, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Tony Tate, Former Human Rights Watch researcher for Burundi
Carina Tertsakian, Former Amnesty International researcher on Rwanda
Dr. Susan Thomson, University of Ottawa, Canada
Alana Tiemessen, PhD Candidate, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
Professor Kathryn Trevenen, Institute of Women's Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada
Noel Twagiramungu, Tufts University
Professor Jan Vansina, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Michele D. Wagner, former professor, University of Minnesota
Lars Waldorf, Director, Centre for International Human Rights, University of London
Peter Webster
Professor Harvey M. Weinstein, University of California at Berkeley
Professor Richard A. Wilson, Director, Human Rights Institute, University of Connecticut
Eugenia Zorbas, Former staff, UNHCR-Rwanda
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine
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SurViVors SPEAK OUT - Rights of Victims Seeking Justice and Compensation for the RPF Genocide. This is an Exciting Collaborative Project launched by The AS International Founder Jean-Christophe Nizeyimana, Economist and Human Rights Activist. Join US and Be the First to know about the Mastermind of the Rwandan Genocide Still At large and enjoing Impunity.