Ms Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza Wacu The Would-Be President of Rwanda STILL in Kagame's solitary goal.

Letter dated 20 June 2013 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee establishedpursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo
The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the honour to transmit the mid-term report of the Group, prepared in pursuance of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2078 (2012).

Nelson Alusala
Daniel Fahey
Henry Fomba
Bernard Leloup
Marie Plamadiala
Emilie Serralta


I. Introduction

1. By his letter dated 28 December 2012 (S/2012/967), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had appointed to the Group of Experts the following individuals: Mr. Nelson Alusala of Kenya (arms); Mr. Henry Fombah of Cameroon (customs and aviation); Mr. Bernard Leloup of Belgium (regional issues); Ms. Marie Plamadiala of the Republic of Moldova (armed groups); and Ms. Emilie Serralta of France (natural resources and Coordinator).

2. By his letter dated 2 January 2013 (S/2013/1), the Secretary-General appointed the sixth member of the Group, Mr. Daniel Fahey of the United States (finance). Mr. Stéphane Auvray, Political Affairs Officer in the Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat, assists the Group.

3. Following bilateral consultations with members of the Security Council Committeeestablished pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter “the Committee”) and concerned Member States in New York, the Group presented its investigative priorities to the Committee on 1 February 2013. The Group arrived in the DRC on 9 February and met with DRC central and provincial government authorities. Between February and May 2013, the Group visited the provinces of Katanga, Maniema, North Kivu, Orientale and South Kivu.

4. During the first part of its mandate, the Group conducted two official visits to Uganda, two official visits to Rwanda, and an official visit to Burundi. The Group also conducted official visits to Germany, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Group wishes to express its gratitude to these governments for their availability and cooperation. However, the Group regrets that the Government of Rwanda did not authorize two members of the Group (its experts on armed groups and regional issues) to carry out official missions on its territory or to meet with the Rwandan delegation in New York on 29 January 2013.

5. The Group of Experts also wishes to express its appreciation to MONUSCO for its support and continued cooperation since the beginning of this mandate.

6. The Group of Experts’ role is to gather and analyze all relevant information on flows of arms and related material, and on networks operating in violation of the arms embargo concerning the DRC.

7. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2078 (2012), the Group of Experts submits the following mid-term report in fulfillment of its obligation to report to the Council, through the Committee, by 28 June 2013. The purpose of the report is: (a) To describe the Group’s mandate and methodology; (b) To define the framework of the Group’s current investigations; and (c) To highlight critical events related to the Group’s mandate which have taken place since the submission of its final report on 12 October 2012 (S/2012/843), including updates on sanctioned individuals and entities.

8. The Group used evidentiary standards recommended by the report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997), relying on authentic documents and, as much as possible, on first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves. The Group corroborated information by using at least three independent and reliable sources. The Group notably used eyewitness testimonies from former and current combatants of armed groups, and members of local communities where incidents took place. In addition, the Group obtained telephone records, bank statements, money transfers records, photos, videos, and other material evidence to corroborate its findings.

II- Congolese armed groups

A- Mouvement du 23 mars (M23)

9. The Group of Experts’ 2012 final report (S/2012/843) documented arms embargoviolations committed by the Government of Rwanda and by senior officials of theGovernment of Uganda, in their support of M23 rebels and their allies. As part of itscommitment to uphold the right of reply, the Group annexes to the present report a letterwritten by the Prime Minister of Uganda regarding the 2012 report findings (see annex 1). Since the outset of its current mandate, the Group has to date found no indication of support to the rebels from within Uganda, and has gathered evidence of continuous - but limited - support to M23 from within Rwanda. The Group sent a letter to the Government of Rwanda on 14 June 2013 asking for clarification about this support and looks forward to a reply.

10. In early 2013, leadership struggles between sanctioned M23 leaders Gen. BoscoNtaganda and his deputy, “Brig. Gen.” Sultani Makenga, led to a split in M23, and ultimately to military confrontations between both factions. After a period of two weeks of combat, Makenga’s troops, supported by demobilized soldiers from Rwanda, defeated troops loyal to Ntaganda on 15 March 2013. At the same time, Rwandan officials dismantled Ntaganda’s network of support and recruitment in Rwanda.  FN1

11. After Ntaganda and 788 of his loyal troops and political cadres fled into Rwanda,Makenga struggled to rebuild a weakened M23. The movement is unable to control its entire territory and suffers from poor morale and scores of desertions. FN2 During the course of the Group’s mandate, Makenga’s M23 has continued to recruit in Rwanda and to enlist demobilized Rwandan soldiers. Some Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) officers have also held meetings with M23 commanders and impeded the voluntary repatriation of M23 combatants to Rwanda.
1 See para. 16-17

2 See para. 31 and 99Ntaganda-led M23

12. Fearing arrest pursuant to a warrant from the International Criminal Court (ICC), M23’s senior commander Gen. Ntaganda clandestinely led the rebellion from a hideout near the Rwandan border, while his deputy Makenga acted as the official leader of the movement. FN3 Ntaganda played a key role in M23 by developing a recruitment network within Rwanda and forging alliances between M23 and other armed groups. Starting in late 2012, Ntagand increasingly endeavored to control M23 and monopolized leadership positions for his loyal officers. While M23 attempted to build an image of a political movement with legitimate demands, such a movement led by Ntaganda and his officers, who are notorious for their poo human rights records, FN4 was not a credible interlocutor during the International Conference on the Great Lakes (ICGLR)-led negotiations in Kampala, Uganda.

13. Strong disagreements between Ntaganda and Makenga concerning the management of M23 eventually led to a split and subsequently to open military confrontation. Ntaganda used his network of contacts within Rwanda to support his own M23 faction. To halt Ntaganda’s activities, Rwandan authorities arrested some of the individuals who were part of this network FN5. Some Rwandan officers also provided limited material support to Makenga as he sought to defeat Ntaganda.

Divisions within M23

14. The two M23 commanders first clashed during their November 2012 takeover of Goma FN6. Ntaganda moved into the city, once it fell into the rebels’ hands, despite Makenga’s advice to not do so, according to two M23 cadres and provincial authorities. Current M23 president Bertrand Bisimwa reported to the Group that Makenga ordered his soldiers to vacate Goma following international pressure, but Ntaganda’s loyalists attempted to remain in the provincial capital. According to M23 cadres and politicians close to M23, M23’s then President and Ntaganda’s ally, Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero, unilaterally promoted Col. Baudoin Ngaruye as a “Brigadier General,” elevating him to the same rank as Makenga to have more leverage on decision-making.

15. Following M23’s withdrawal from Goma on 1 December 2012, the leadership struggles continued. Ntaganda and Makenga clashed over the division of the goods looted from Goma (see box below), and both endeavored to appoint their officers and cadres to key positions within the M23. FN7 According to former M23 soldiers, Ntaganda bribed M23 officers to gain their loyalties and managed to mobilize a majority of M23 officers around him. Former M23 political cadres and an M23 supporter stated that Ntaganda recruited in Rwanda FN8 and maintained supporters within the RDF.

3 See S/2012/843; para.6

4 Ntaganda’s loyal officers include sanctioned individuals Col. Baudouin Ngaruye, Col. Innocent Zimurinda, and Lt Col Eric Badege, whose names were added to the 1533 Sanctions Committee List on 31 December 2012 (Badege), 30 November 2012 (Ngaruye), and 1 December 2010 (Zimurinda) respectively.

5 For more details on Ntaganda’s network, see S/2012/843; para. 30

6 Ntaganda and Makenga had already clashed following former CNDP Gen. Laurent Nkunda’s arrest in January 2009. Nkunda was betrayed by Ntaganda, who took over his position as the military commander of CNDP.

7 Ntaganda accused Makenga of receiving bribes from the Congolese delegation in Kampala to integrate in the FARDC. Ntaganda had imposed his military Aide de Camp, Col. Alex Bizimungu Masozera, as part of the M23 political delegation to receive reports of the negotiations. Col. Masozera had been instrumental in large scale smuggle of minerals in Goma before the 2012 mutiny (see S/2011/738, para. 613).

8 See S/2012/843, paras. 22-23


16. According to M23 cadres, a former RDF officer, a former M23 officer, an M23collaborator, and two Congolese politicians, Rwandan officials who had previously supported Ntaganda, and who could no longer control his network in Rwanda or his actions in the DRC, decided to sideline him from M23 and to dismantle his support in Rwanda. In late December 2012, Rwandan authorities arrested RDF Col. Jomba Gakumba, due to his close ties with Ntaganda, according to former RDF officers and an M23 collaborator. FN9 A former Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) member, two former RDF officers and a politician loyal to Ntaganda, told the Group that Bishop John Rucyahana, a Ntaganda ally in Rwanda who recruited politicians and raised funds for M23 FN10, had to stop his collaboration. The Group has sought clarification from the Government of Rwanda on the matter and is awaiting a response.

17. An RDF officer, an M23 cadre, and two M23 collaborators stated that on 10 March 2013, Rwandan authorities arrested Gafishi Semikore and Theo Bitwayiki, while they attempted to help Ntaganda from Rwanda by supplying him with small quantities of ammunition, food and medical supplies during the hostilities between the two factions in Kibumba FN11.

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M23 looted Goma

M23 engaged in extensive looting while in Goma in November 2012. M23 cadres and several politicians informed the Group that Ntaganda and former M23 president Runiga had appointed loyal M23 members to positions in the DRC customs offices at the border between Goma and Gisenyi, Rwanda, where they embezzled cash and other goods (see annex 2). On 26 November 2012, Ntaganda’s business associate Logo Kubu FN12 deposited USD 38,050 in an account with Equity Bank just across the border in Gisenyi (see annex 3). The Group hascontacted Equity Bank for furtherdetails. Ntaganda loyalist Ngaruye organized the systematic looting of Government offices and vehicles (annex 4). Officers loyal to Makenga seized one FARDC T55 tank (see annex 5), as well as an extensive stock of FARDC heavy weapons and mortars (see annex 6). A DRC government report estimates that M23-stolen goods from government offices were valued at over USD 3,000,000 (see annex 7). In April, the Group observed trucks stolen in Goma stationed in M23-controlled Bunagana, at theborder with Uganda (annex 8).

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Separation between M23 factions

18. M23 split in two factions on 28 February 2013. Ntaganda and his officers took uppositions at Kibumba, 27 kilometers north of Goma (see annex 9), while Makengamaintained control of Rumangabo, situated further north (see annex 10). Former Ntaganda loyalists reported that Ntaganda had grown suspicious, fearing arrest, and increased his own protection. Ntaganda had retained the loyalty of most of the movement’s troops, and M23 “Minister of Finance” Ephrem Bwishe told the Group that prior to joining Ntaganda in Kibumba, Runiga took with him most of the M23’s finances. Makenga retained most of the movement’s weapons and ammunition stock.
9 S/2012/843, para. 83.10 S/2012/843, para.30.

11 Gafishi Semikore and Theo Bitwayiki were part of Ntaganda's recruitment and support network in Gisenyi.

12 S/2011/738; para. 601.19. The presidents of both M23 factions denied having collaborated with Ntaganda. InFebruary 2013, Bertrand Bisimwa, the president of Makenga’s M23, told the Group that M23 leaders had discovered that Ntaganda was hiding in M23-held territory. On 27 February, Bisimwa issued a communiqué accusing Runiga of offering Ntaganda “political leverage to influence decisions of the M23”, and firing him as president (see annex 11). In an interview with the Group, however, Runiga denied having allied with Ntaganda and said that he had not seen him since January 2012.20. In late February 2013, Ntaganda attempted to prepare an escape route towards Masisi. According to an Ntaganda loyalist, a former M23 officer and a M23 collaborator, Ntaganda maintained regular contacts with ex-Congrès national du peuple (CNDP) Col. Francois Mudahunga, the FARDC 812th Regiment commander in Kitchanga. In collaboration with Mudahunga, Ntaganda sent about 50 men to prepare for his eventual escape to Masisi and to collect ammunition from the weapons caches hemaintained there (see para. 117-123).

Fight between M23 factions

21. On 28 February 2013, fighting broke out between the two M23 factions. Three former RDF officers, an M23 cadre, an M23 collaborator and a Congolese politician stated that while some Rwandan officers had ensured Ntaganda of their assistance, in reality they had decided to support Makenga.

22. Demobilized Rwandan soldiers assisted Makenga’s advance against Ntaganda. Twoactive M23 members and an M23 collaborator confirmed that groups of demobilizedRwandan soldiers had infiltrated into the DRC during the two weeks of fighting to assistMakenga. Five former M23 officers separately witnessed the arrival of small groups of men from Rwanda, who were immediately assigned specific military roles, and joined Makenga’s forces in combat against Ntaganda’s troops. FN13 The Group sought clarification about this matter from the Government of Rwanda and is awaiting an answer.

23. Makenga had a tactical advantage since he controlled most of the heavy weapons looted in Goma, as well as weapons M23 had captured during previous operations and the movement’s ammunition stock. Makenga’s commanders used a tank, a multi-barrel rocket launcher and 14.5 mm heavy machine guns to push Ntaganda’s soldiers towards the Rwandan border. According to one M23 officer, one former M23 officer and one M23 civilian member, four demobilized Rwandan soldiers assisted Makenga’s troops to operate the heavy weapons.

13 These same sources told the Group that this type of immediate assignment to military roles only takes place when the recruits have prior military or police experience, in contrast to recruits who have no experience, who are assigned to a training program.

24. Rwandan officers also fed disinformation to Ntaganda which precipitated his defeat.According to two former RDF officers, an M23 officer, former M23 officers, and anNtaganda loyalist, some RDF officers met Ntaganda in early March 2013, ahead of the final battle, and promised to support him with troops and ammunition. Former M23 soldiers who fought alongside Ntaganda reported that soldiers of the RDF Special Forces that were deployed along the border provided Ntaganda with ammunition at the outset of the fighting, which made him believe that he enjoyed RDF support.

25. Two former M23 officers and one former M23 soldier told the Group they overheard regular telephone communications between Ngaruye and RDF officers during that week, following which Ngaruye ensured his troops they would receive support from Rwanda. However, as the fight progressed, it became clear the ammunition would not come. According to three former M23 soldiers, Ntaganda’s soldiers who attempted to flee to Rwanda during the week of 11 March 2013 were caught by RDF soldiers at the border and
handed over to Makenga’s force.

Surrender of Ntaganda’s M23 branch

26. As his troops ran low on ammunition, Ntaganda fled into Rwanda. According to three loyalists, former M23 officers, and soldiers who fought alongside him, Ntaganda feared that the RDF soldiers deployed along the border would kill him. Makenga’s deputy, sanctioned Colonel Innocent Kaina, also told the Group that he had planned to kill Ntaganda. Two officers loyal to Makenga also reported that the latter had ordered his troops to kill Ntaganda.

27. On 15 March 2013, Ntaganda clandestinely crossed the border into Rwanda using a small path in the Gasizi area, with one escort. Four of Ntaganda’s troops, two politicians loyal to Ntaganda, three M23 members, and an Ntaganda family member told the Group that he reached Kigali with the help of his family, and arrived at the United States embassy on 18 March where he requested to be transferred to the ICC, without the prior knowledge of Rwandan authorities. Subsequently, Rwandan authorities arrested an individual suspected of having aided Ntaganda’s escape, and interrogated Ntaganda’s wife and brother FN14.

28. According to the ICGLR Joint Verification Mechanism, 788 individuals, consisting of 718 FN15 of Ntaganda’s troops and 70 political cadres, began crossing into Rwanda on 15 March through the Kabuhanga and Gasizi border points. About 500 troops surrendered to Makenga in the DRC on Saturday 16 March (see annex 12). RDF soldiers disarmed Ntaganda’s troops who entered Rwanda. In a letter to the Group in April 2013, the Government of Rwanda confirmed that “upon their arrival on the territory of Rwanda, all M23 combatants were disarmed”. According to Rwandan authorities, the combatants handed over a total of 409 arms, including 333 sub-machine guns (see annex 13).

14 In 2012, Ntaganda’s brother facilitated the travels of recruits through Ntaganda’s hotel – Bushokoro - in Kinigi, Rwanda. See S/2012/843 para. 22.

15 This figure has also been reported by a foreign diplomat to the Group and by the Kigali-based New Times in an article on 18 March 2013.


29. Ntaganda’s M23 faction that crossed the border into Rwanda from 15 to 16 Marchincluded five sanctioned individuals. While Ntaganda was transferred on 22 March 2013from Kigali to the ICC in the Hague, on 1 April 2013 the Rwandan authorities relocated  Runiga, Ngaruye, Col. Innocent Zimurinda and Col. Eric Badege to Ngoma, about 300 km
away from the DRC border. The DRC authorities have issued arrest warrants for thesesanctioned individuals. On 22 March 2013, the Group visited the former M23 members in Rwanda. Rwandan officials shared with the Group a list of 509 of the 788 individuals who crossed into their territory (see annex 14).

30. Based on the accounts of former M23 officers and M23 medical personnel, the Group estimates that over 200 combatants from both factions died during the fighting. The same sources reported over 50 injured on the Makenga side, and that some of the injured on Ntaganda’s side were executed on Ntaganda’s orders (see para. 141). Rwandan authorities told the Group that of the Ntaganda loyalists who crossed into Rwanda, 159 were injured.

Makenga-led M23

31. After Ntaganda’s defeat, Makenga remained with a weakened M23 of some 1,500soldiers spread out over an area of 700 square kilometers. From 20 March to 19 June 2013, a total of 349 M23 combatants surrendered to MONUSCO DDRRR and many others have surrendered to the FARDC or fled. Moreover, M23 has lost the support of leaders and communities which had supported Ntaganda in northern Rwanda, and stopped benefitting from the recruitment and financial networks he had established. Troop shortages forced Makenga to vacate several M23 positions, opening the way to incursions of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and Nyatura into M23-held areas (see annex 15).

32. Makenga has attempted to increase the movement's strength through recruitment in DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. Thanks to assistance from some sympathetic Rwandan officials, Makenga has been able to recruit in Rwanda, but Ugandan officials have thwarted several M23 attempts to recruit on their territory. Despite recent recruitment, M23’s failed attempt at the end of May 2013 to recover a key FARDC position near Goma illustrates the movement's current inability to carry out large-scale coordinated military operations. M23 prepares new military operations

33. After Ntaganda’s M23 faction was dismantled, negotiations between the Government of the DRC and Makenga’s M23 resumed in Kampala in June 2013. However, while Makenga promised his soldiers that they would be integrated into the FARDC after defeating Ntaganda, eight former M23 soldiers interviewed by the Group indicated that Makenga planned a new attack on Goma.

34. Subsequent to the adoption on 28 March 2013 of Security Council resolution 2098 (2013) authorizing the deployment of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to neutralize and disarm Congolese rebels, M23 leaders addressed letters to Member States contributing troops to the FIB (South Africa, Tanzania) to dissuade them from sending their troops to the DRC (see annex 16).

35. According to former M23 soldiers, M23 held military training sessions in April and May 2013, which included training on urban warfare and guerilla techniques to defend against the FIB. Current and former M23 members informed the Group that on 27 May 2013, all M23 political cadres attended a one-week training session in leadership and management, during which the rebels apportioned key administrative functions in the event of a recapture of Goma.

Recruitment

36. The Group notes that M23 recruitment in Rwanda has decreased since the dismantling of Ntaganda’s recruitment network; community leaders in northern Rwanda who supported Ntaganda have ceased collaborating with the M23. However, an active M23 political cadre, former M23 officers, and local leaders reported that since the end of March 2013, M23 has recruited approximately 200 new recruits, some of whom came from refugee camps in Rwanda, while others – including children – were recruited in Rutshuru and Masisi territories in the DRC. The M23 also attempted to recruit in refugee camps in western Uganda (see para. 39).

37. Since mid-February 2013, the Group has interviewed 66 surrendered M23 officers and soldiers, including 23 Rwandan nationals. Between 1 January and 9 June 2013, theMONUSCO DDRRR section had demobilized and repatriated 57 former M23 soldiers who declared they were Rwandan nationals.16 However, during its May 2013 visit to Mutobo, the DDRRR demobilization camp in Rwanda, a camp official told the Group that no former M23 combatants had ever arrived at the base.

38. Fourteen former M23 soldiers told the Group that Rwandan nationals who deserted M23 and tried to return directly to Rwanda, were forcibly returned to M23 by RDF officers. Amongst the 14, the Group spoke to two soldiers who had themselves been forced back to M23 in DRC by RDF soldiers. One of the two soldiers had fled to Rwanda alongside four other M23 soldiers in March. The soldier said his group was immediately brought back to the DRC border by RDF soldiers and handed over to M23 commanders, who imprisoned them at Rumangabo. The other M23 soldier told the Group he fled from M23 in January and was arrested in Rwanda by RDF officers and sent back to M23. In April, another former M23 soldier witnessed RDF soldiers bringing a group of 10 soldiers back to Makenga after they had attempted to flee to Rwanda.

39. M23 has also been recruiting in Uganda on a limited scale. The Group interviewed three Ugandan citizens who had been recruited in Kampala by an M23 agent called Mufuruki in May 2013 and subsequently escaped. Mufuruki had promised them lucrative jobs in the DRC. Upon their arrival at the Bunagana border post, they were handed over to another M23 agent named Mr. Kazungu who ferried them across the border into Congo and delivered the to M23 commanders. The commanders threatened to shoot the recruits when they protested. Ugandan officials told the Group that on 7 May 2013, they arrested seven individuals suspected of recruiting for M23. In June 2013, six Ugandan nationals deserted M23 and surrendered to MONUSCO DDRRR.FN16 During the same period, DDRRR also repatriated 1 Ugandan and 1 Kenyan nationals who surrendered from M23.Infiltration of demobilized Rwandan soldiers

40. In 2013, M23 has enlisted demobilized Rwandan soldiers in its ranks. FN17 Three former RDF officers, ten former M23 soldiers, and five former M23 officers reported that M23 agents recruit demobilized soldiers in Rwanda. Since February, the Group interviewed threedemobilized Rwandan soldiers who reported that RDF officers sympathetic to M23 had recruited them. According to three former RDF officers, an M23 collaborator, and a M23 current member, RDF officers sympathetic to M23 have facilitated M23’s recruitment inside Rwanda by asking senior demobilized officers at the district level to work with local chiefs to enlist demobilized RDF soldiers for M23. Former RDF officers, an M23 cadre, and a former M23 officer told the Group that M23 recruited both former RDF and former FDLR soldiers in Musanze and Rubavu.

41. Since March 2013, former M23 officers reported to the Group that demobilized soldiers joined M23 in discreet groups of 5 to 30 individuals which were also sighted by local leaders from the Chanzu and Kabuhanga areas. Once in M23-held territory, these recruits received military fatigues, ranks, and weapons at the M23 headquarters at Chanzu, and atRumangabo. FN18 They subsequently received a briefing at Chanzu and were mixed into different brigades. Former and current M23 cadres told the Group that demobilized soldiers usually performed specialized functions such as the operation of heavy weapons.

42. Demobilized Rwandan soldiers have been killed on M23 frontlines in the DRC. The Group obtained the identities and addresses of seven families residing in the northern Rwandan villages of Bigogwe and Mukamira, whose sons fought in the ranks of M23 as demobilized soldiers and died during the fighting between Makenga and Ntaganda.

43. Since the beginning of its current mandate, the Group has interviewed one active RDF soldier who was arrested in the DRC at the end of 2012. However, since the fall of Goma in November 2012, the Group has not documented any instances of full RDF units support toM23. FN19

Begin Box

Mutaho operation

On 20 May 2013, three days prior to the visit of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to Goma, M23 unsuccessfully attempted to seize Mutaho hill, one of the FARDC’s positions defending Goma (see annex 17). Current and former M23 members reported that M23redeployed troops towards Goma, vacating other positions (see annex 18). The rebels also moved their heavy weapons southwards (see annex 19). However, faced with strong resistance from the FARDC, the rebels retreated to their initial positions. According to former M23 officers who participated in the combat, M23 soldiers ran out of ammunition, lacked rockets and shells, suffered 40 dead and over 30 injured, and were compelled to announce a unilateral cease-fire, after failing to receive promised troo and ammunition support from within Rwanda (see annex 20). Between 21 and 22 May 2013, five 122mm cannon rounds were fired by M23 on a densely inhabited area of Goma and the Mugunga IDP camp (see annex 21). Two M23 members and three former M23 soldiers who participated in the fighting told the Group that the rounds had been fired on a civilian objective following an operator error (see para. 142). In early June 2013, an active M23 member and two M23 collaborators told the Group that M23 maintained troops in advanced positions close to Goma. According to the same sources, during a meeting held on 1 June at Chanzu, Makenga told his troops that operations on Goma were to be resumed.

End box
17 In Rwanda, most demobilized RDF soldiers and demobilized FDLR soldiers become part of the RDF Reserve Forces (see S/2012/843; para. 20).

18 M23 administrative headquarters are in Rumangabo and the military headquarters in Chanzu.

19 S/2012/348/Add.1, para. 31.Meetings with RDF officers

44. The Group received information that M23 commanders have regularly met with RDF officers. Three former M23 officers, a former M23 cadre and several local authorities told the Group that, from March through May 2013, they had witnessed M23 Colonels Kaina and Yusuf Mboneza meeting with RDF officers at the border of Kabuhanga. Current and former M23 members reported that some RDF officers, or their representatives, have also travelled to Chanzu or Rumangabo to hold meetings with Makenga.
Arms and ammunition used by M23.

45. FARDC officers and M23 members told the Group that, as it left Goma on 1 December 2012, M23 captured a large quantity of rockets, mortars and ammunition. However, current and former M23 members reported that while much of the ammunition stolen by the rebels in Goma is still available in the movement’s stocks, it does not always correspond to the types of weapons the rebels use. Finance

46. According to M23 cadres, Ntaganda and Runiga financed M23 through a network of individual supporters and business dealings. They used part of their revenues to bribe M23 officers to join their side. M23 officers who had formerly supported Ntaganda told the Group that they had received salaries during his last few months with the M23 because he had attempted to buy their loyalties. All of the M23 officers and soldiers interviewed by the Group who surrendered from Makenga’s M23 stated that they had not received salaries while serving under Makenga.

47. According to current and former M23 members, M23 continue taxing commercial trucks crossing its checkpoints at Kibumba and Kiwanja, and the border at Bunagana; these taxes are currently the main source of revenues for M23. M23 tax USD 200 to USD 1000 per truck, depending on the load (see annex 22). According to M23 members, the movement earns an average of USD 6.000 per day from this taxation or USD 180.000 per month. Since Ntaganda’s surrender, Makenga has attempted to reorganize the movement’s finances (see annex 23).

B- Armed groups allied with M23

48. Since 2012, M23 has attempted to create a broad coalition of armed groups in theexpectation that simultaneous attacks on several fronts would overburden the FARDC.During 2013, M23 continued to foster insecurity while its representatives were at thenegotiating table in Kampala. The movement’s objective was to demonstrate the existence of a wider governance problem in the DRC, seemingly unrelated to M23. Following M23’s brief takeover of Goma, the rebels expanded their alliances in the DRC using Rwandan territory. After Ntaganda’s surrender, Makenga consolidated M23’s collaboration with most armed groups that Ntaganda and Runiga had originally mobilized. However, many of the M23-led alliances were short lived, as the DRC government managed to arrest or neutralize several M23 allies operating in South Kivu and the Beni area.

a- Union des forces révolutionnaires du Congo (UFRC)

49. In its 2012 final report, the Group documented M23 attempts to win allies in SouthKivu FN20. However, these alliances have not gained much ground, as M23 lacks popular support in South Kivu. After M23 withdrew from Goma on 1 December, its initiatives to open a second front in South Kivu continued. Gustave Bagayamukwe Tadji, a political activist and former employee of the DRC Central Bank, attempted to organize armed groups in South Kivu on behalf of M23.

50. In August 2012, Bagayamukwe travelled to M23-held areas to meet Col. Albert Kahasha, who hails from South Kivu and had joined M23 in Rutshuru, North Kivu. M23 commanders decided that Kahasha was to become the military leader of the M23 in South Kivu (see annex 24). Makenga coordinated Kahasha’s move to South Kivu with Bagayamukwe. According to Bagayamukwe, one of his collaborators, and a current M23 cadre, in November 2012 Kahasha travelled through Rwanda where he held a series of meetings, following which he crossed back into the DRC. After a failed attempt to integrate into the FARDC in November 2012, Kahasha fled to Walungu territory in South Kivu and continued his collaboration with
M23.

20 see S/2012/843, paras. 69-81

51. On 16 December 2012, Kahasha and Bagayamukwe created a political-military group called Dynamique populaire pour le changement (DPC), to bring together various armed groups for the M23. The declaration signed by Bagayamukwe and Kahasha at this occasion included the phrase “sent to M23 for approval” and called for all DRC institutions to be disbanded (see annex 25).

52. Bagayamukwe travelled again to M23-held Bunagana on 8 January 2013 to participate in a meeting led by sanctioned M23 leaders Runiga, Makenga and Ngaruye. The purpose of the meeting was to further consolidate M23 alliances and open a front in South Kivu. Bagayamukwe, a UFRC member, and a UFRC collaborator confirmed the details of this meeting to the Group. Two participants in the meeting, as well as two former M23 politicians, told the Group that representatives of several armed groups from South Kivu had gathered at Bunagana that day. Among the attendees were Benoît Kadage, Sadock Kayira, and Citoyen Ruhema, who lived in Kigali at the time and were trying to recruit members of the Banyamulenge community throughout the Great Lakes region for M23.

53. According to three participants in this meeting, Makenga thanked the attendees for having turned against the DRC Government, promised financial support, and stated that he maintained a weapons cache in South Kivu. He added that while M23 was not able to carry out military operations because it was negotiating in Kampala, “salvation needed to come from South Kivu”. After the meeting, Bagayamukwe spent several days in M23-held areas to learn about the movement (see annex 26).

54. Three UFRC members told the Group that through this coalition, M23 leaders intended to ally with several Raia Mutomboki factions operating in South Kivu and mobilize Banyamulenge youth, together with Lt Col. Bede Rusagara’s group under the command of Kahasha. According to the same sources, Raia Mutomboki Colonels Kashi Maheshe and Mukimbula Ndushi allied with M23, as well as Deogratias Bizibu Balola, the former opposition party Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS) president in Bukavu, who resigned in September 2012 to create an armed group. The Group obtained a copy of a declaration made by Bagayamukwe during the meeting with M23 at Bunagana, in which he outlined the details of the armed groups he wished to federate (see annex 27). The Group also obtained the copy of a text message sent by Bagayamukwe on 3 February 2013, in which he claimed that he would soon liberate the DRC (see annex 28).

55. Bagayamukwe told the Group that he travelled to and from Bunagana through theCyanika border between Rwanda and Uganda (see annex 29), and that he subsequently went to Gisenyi, Rwanda. Bagayamukwe also reported that he had prepared a declaration creating UFRC in Gisenyi, which he released on 20 January 2013 (see annex 30); this was confirmed to the Group by a UFRC collaborator. In addition, M23 political cadres told the Group they had met Bagayamukwe in Gisenyi.

56. UFRC diaspora members interviewed by the Group confirmed that Bagayamukwe had coordinated the creation of the UFRC while he was in Rwanda. The Group obtained a rental contract in the name of Bagayamukwe for a residence in Kamembe, Rwanda (see annex 31), as well as a letter dated 6 January 2013 in which Bagayamukwe requested to set up his residence in Rwanda (see annex 32). After spending nearly three weeks in Rwanda between Kigali and Kamembe, Bagayamukwe travelled through Burundi to cross back into the DRC on 9 February, and was arrested the following day by the DRC authorities.

57. Bagayamukwe told the Group that the UFRC received the support of diaspora members. In this connection, the Group has been in contact with Tamusa Lumembo residing in Belgium, Moké Silubwe residing in France, and Gaudens Bisimwa residing in Germany. All three confirmed they were active UFRC members. The Group obtained the copy of a draft communiqué nominating Lumembo as the coordinator of the UFRC diaspora (see annex 33). After Bagayamukwe’s arrest, Silubwe became the president of the UFRC and issued a declaration condemning the arrest (see annex 34).

58. UFRC diaspora members told the Group that the diaspora is specifically tasked withcollecting money to finance the UFRC and that its members have opened a bank account for that purpose (see annex 35). The same sources reported that diaspora members created a budget based on the estimated cost of toppling the DRC Government (see annex 36). To date, the Group has concluded that the diaspora linked to the UFRC has mainly carried out propaganda on behalf of the movement; the Group intends to further investigate other forms of support.

59. The DRC Government cracked down on the UFRC and arrested Bagayamukwe and Colonels Mushamuka and Mbangu Mukaz, two Raia Mutomboki leaders operating under Kahasha’s command. As a result, the prospect of forming a coalition for South Kivu has lost momentum. However, Kahasha continues operating in Walungu alongside some Raia Mutomboki factions, maintains his alliance with M23 and enjoys the cooperation of the same diaspora members. On 24-25 April 2013, Kahasha attacked the positions of FARDC 1002 Regiment in Chishadu in South Kivu. Silubwe issued a communiqué acknowledging UFRC responsibility for the attack (see annex 37). While the communiqué claimed victory for UFRC, an FARDC officer and a UN source told the Group that several Raia Mutomboki soldiers had been killed in the battle.

 Attentat contre Habyarimana. Kagame dans de sales draps. Patrick Karegeya et Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa prêts à témoigner

Importance "HIGH" : Find out on this: A powerful and indeed extra-ordinary revelation if you ask me. But before we go any further, let’s try to make sense of this claim

A LIRE SURTOUT: Kayumba Nyamwasa: «Je suis prêt à apporter toutes les preuves»

 Ancien chef des services de renseignement extérieur du Rwanda, Patrick Karegeya comme le général Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, accusent le président Paul Kagame d’être le responsable de l’attentat qui, en avril 1994, a coûté la vie à Juvénal Habyarimana.


 Di you know anything about the TEST OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE : Assassinations of political opponents followed by riots in Kigali and other major towns of Rwanda were included in the genocide planning that might help RPF and Kagame in particular to seize UNSHARED AND TOTAL POWER in Rwanda.

The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine

 [Since 1994, the world witnesses the horrifying Tutsi minority (14%) ethnic domination, the Tutsi minority ethnic rule with an iron hand, tyranny and corruption in Rwanda. The current government has been characterized by the total impunity of RPF criminals, the Tutsi economic monopoly, the Tutsi militaristic domination, and the brutal suppression of the rights of the majority of the Rwandan people (85% are Hutus)and mass arrests of Hutus by the RPF criminal organization =>AS International]

Le prophète Esaïe s’est écrié:

"Sourds, écoutez! Aveugles, regardez et voyez! "

 

Rwanda's refugees should not be forced to return

A "cessation clause" invoked by the UN could remove protections for many of the world's 100,000 Rwandan refugees.

Yoletta Nyange Yoletta Nyange is a Rwandan-born journalist who has lived and worked across several countries including UK, Venezuela, Tunisia, Ethiopia and the Sudans, covering international affairs.

Paul Kagame came to power in 1994 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front captured the capital, Kigali

On June 30, roughly 100,000 Rwandan refugees around the world lost their refugee status and could become stateless if they do not return to Rwanda. Arguing that Rwandan refugees no longer have a reasonable fear of persecution if they return, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has invoked a "cessation clause" applying to Rwandans who fled their country before December 31, 1998. The clause essentially frees host countries from their economic, political and ethical duty to provide sanctuary and services to refugees. As a result, Rwandan refugees fear losing their food ration cards, having their children expelled from school, being fired from their jobs, and being pushed into the abyss of statelessness. Rwandan refugees aren't the only ones to have been affected by cessation clauses, which have been applied to 26 other nationalities in the past. With the clause in effect, refugees face three options: voluntarily repatriate to Rwanda, appeal or challenge the cessation clause to stay in their host country, or apply for asylum again in a third country. Letter from my Child - Rwanda: Children of Bad Memories The UNHCR maintains that it only implements such clauses after ensuring that human rights and general conditions in the refugees' countries of origin have improved and calls these "ceased circumstances". The agency sees the cessation clause as part of a long-term strategy to push states to commit to lasting solutions. States are free to choose whether to implement the cessation clause, but are encouraged to put in place certain procedures to transition refugees to alternative statuses such as local integration programmes. Thankfully, countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and South Africa have defended the status of Rwandan refugees living there. Yet although life may have become better for some refugees who have returned home, Rwanda is still one of the least peaceful nations in the world: according to the Institute for Economics and Peace's 2013 Global Peace Index, the country ranks 135 out of 162 states. Accordingly, many Rwandan refugees view this cessation clause as a scam, a global fraud of unprecedented scale. It adds insults to their injuries and should be revoked. Rwandans and Paul Kagame In April 1994, after a plane carrying the Rwandan and Burundian presidents was shot down, killing both men, members of Rwanda's Hutu majority launched a genocidal campaign that resulted in the deaths of more than half a million people of both Tutsi and Hutu ethnicities. By the time the Rwandan Patriotic Front, an ethnic Tutsi army led by Paul Kagame, captured the Rwandan capital, half the country's population had fled, fearing for their lives. More than 800,000 Hutu crossed into Congo within four days, one of the largest and fastest refugee exoduses in modern times. But Rwanda's new masters did not want to rule over ghost towns, and needed a sizeable portion of the refugees to return. As a result, the government tried to reassure Hutu refugees that the worst was over, creating the narrative: "Rwandans are one, there are no problems in Rwanda - and please come back."  Rwandans are one indeed. Yet under the rule of Kagame - who has served as Rwanda's president since the RPF's triumph in 1994 - ethnic Hutus have been cruelly mistreated by the government, subjected todeportation, intimidation, and detention. The government's passing of a law in 2004 banning ethnic distinctions - discussing the topic in a manner deemed provocative can even result in jail time - has had the effect of granting only a handful the right to grieve from a collective pain afflicting Rwanda. The cessation clause is only the latest chapter in this agony. Kagame - or the "Darling Dictator", as a New York Times op-ed referred to him - has built his credentials on the heroic tale of having stopped the Tutsi genocide and sending the Hutu "genocidaires" into exile. The president's story has been that those who do not want to live in Rwanda have a dark, ugly past to hide and are running away from prosecution. While it cannot be ruled out that some genocide perpetrators may have quietly resettled abroad, it does not justify branding all refugees and their unborn children as criminals on the run.  The Rwandan government has come to realise that casting all exiles as 'genocidaires' was clumsy and deeply harmful to its attempt to brand itself as a business-friendly 'Singapore of Africa'. The fact is that Rwandans living inside and outside the country are overwhelmingly Hutu, and are part and parcel of the country's fabric. Rwanda's exiles cannot be discarded, if only because they foster the sole space where a healthy conversation about Rwanda is possible. Not everyone wants to go back to Rwanda, and certainly not all at once. The Rwandan government has come to realise that casting all exiles as "genocidaires" was clumsy and deeply harmful to its attempt to brand itselfas a business-friendly "Singapore of Africa". Rwanda needs the exiled Hutu elites, and not the other way around. Between 2005 and 2011, Rwandans living abroad have sent more than $500m in remittances to support their family and friends back home, including $166m in 2011 alone - a major reason why Rwanda's economy has risen from the ashes since Kagame became president. Many argue that Rwanda's policy of marginalising its Hutu exiles stems from the fear that these remittances may create an underground economy, a potentially destabilising financial force and long-term political danger that cannot be controlled by the state: Tutsi traders, under the previous Hutu administration, had bought influence from the allowances received from their exiled relatives. Accordingly, Kagame has begun to - reluctantly - court rich Hutu to extend his web of influence as he wants to avoid a similar episode at all costs. The government has launched a series of suspicious programmes such as Rwanda Day, Agaciro Fund and Come and See, targeting the Rwandan diaspora, "to help dispelrumours among the refugees, mainly spread by genocide perpetrators that the country is not peaceful and that refugees are arrested or killed upon repatriation". Enrolling in the Come and See expedition is free. Former participants have even reported receiving stipends from the government. In exchange, the participants who return commit to preach the gospel of Rwanda's rapid growth. To his credit, Kagame has boosted Rwanda's international profile, securing highly sought-after positions for a handful of former Rwandan refugees. The head of the African Development Bank and the secretary general of the East African Community are both Rwandans, and in April 2013 a Rwandan served as president of the UN Security Council. Another Rwandan was recently appointed to lead the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Mali, after successfully leading the African Union-UN mission in Darfur. The country is also said to be eyeing the top job at UN Women. But although Rwanda has made some impressive strides, such as lifting one million people out of poverty in the past five years, the country remains an autocratic state, and the government has been suspected by foreign governments of supporting attacks and funding hit squads against exiles living abroad. Understandably enough, many Rwandans dread returning to their home country. But now that the cessation clause has been invoked, that may be what many are forced to do. Yoletta Nyange is a Rwandan-born journalist who has lived and worked across several countries including UK, Venezuela, Tunisia, Ethiopia and the Sudans, covering international affairs. Erasing The Nuba is Nyange's highly acclaimed debut documentary. Follow her on Twitter: @Bubulcusibis http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/20136301155211706.html

The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine

“Many of the Western countries have been wasting time on supporting and building the Rwandan economy, and the end has come out of full hands of a bloody dictatorship and a terrorist state built on:
 
the horrifying Tutsi minority (14%) ethnic domination, the Tutsi minority ethnic rule with an iron hand, tyranny and corruption in Rwanda. The Tutsi-led government has always been characterized by the total impunity of RPF criminals, the Tutsi economic monopoly, the Tutsi militaristic domination, and the brutal suppression of the rights of the Hutu majority (85%) added to their assassinations, mass arrests and killings by the RPF criminal organization”. =>AS International]


 

“Peace, president Obama said, relies on the golden rule of doing unto others as we would have them do unto us. “Adhering to this law of love has always been the core struggle of human nature.”

'You negotiate peace with your enemies not with your friends'

Former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker

“If you want to make peace, you don’t talk to your friends. You talk to your enemies.” – Moshe Dayan.

For pretty much his entire time, man has been fighting wars against his enemy, which is traditionally also man. Yup, that’s right. Mankind, a species with so much going for it, with such a wonderful potential future ahead, seems to be more interested in spending its time fighting itself.
Irrespective of what these fights are about, there are generally 3 possible outcomes for any given faction -

1. Win. You beat your enemy, overwhelm them with superior force and strength, until they are so badly destroyed that they can’t stop you and they give in.
2. Lose. Your enemy kills so many of you and destroys so much of your resources that you can’t fight any longer and you give in, letting them do whatever it was they wanted to do.
3. Draw. Both sides suffer such heavy losses that they both agree to stop fighting for now and nothing is resolved.

And so the fighting stops for a while. But there is no real lasting resolution. The victor rejoices for a while. The loser goes away and licks their physical wounds, while the psychological wounds run deeper and fester away, ready to resurface later when the loser’s strength and numbers have increased or the winner has got complacent; often it will be some other excuse to start fighting again, but the root cause is the unfinished business from the first fight. And so the destructive cycle continues, fighting until one side loses, both go away, the loser brooding and regrouping, the victor having to keep an eye out for the next attack, neither side able to grow and move on. And should the result be a draw due to mutual attrition, then both sides will regroup and fester and plot until they spot a weakness in the other side and launch the attack anew.
Such has been mankind’s history for longer than there has been history.

However, there is another way. One which doesn’t happen too often but when it does, can lead to lasting peace and growth for both sides. And that is to talk with the enemy. To negotiate with them. To find out just what the heck you are both fighting about and why. Because when two enemies can actually talk about the issues, they open up the very real possibility of finding areas of common ground, areas of mutual interest, areas of potential compromise which do not mean having to “give in” to the other’s demands, but which stem from fostering a mutual respect and understanding and, over time, working together to achieve common aims. Alas this happens all to rarely – it is so much easier just to keep battering the “enemy” down, safe in the knowledge that you are right and they must be wrong, completely rejecting the reality that you re both right and both wrong and both have more in common than you might choose to believe.

Yet when this does happen, it can have very strong positive and rapid results.

A prime example of this is “The Troubles” (as they were known) regarding Ireland, Northern Ireland & Eire. These had been going on for decades or even centuries, depending upon where you trace the roots. Certainly the open warfare element arose in the 1960s with several different armed groups on all sides being heavily involved in 30 years of ongoing fighting, attacks, terrorism (it all depends upon which side you were on as to which was which). People on all sides were murdered with disturbing regularity, including a great many members of the general public both throughout Ireland and on the British mainland. No end was in sight.
Until the late 1990s which suddenly heralded negotiations and a peace treaty which, whilst not resolving all of the issues overnight, certainly lead to long-term ceasefires, weapons decommissioning, cross-community co-operation and growth, the removal of the British Army, and a cessation of violence in a very short space of time.
What decades of outright and brutal fighting had failed to achieve, discreet discussions and negotiations between the “enemies” on both sides managed to achieve in very short time.

They talked with each other. Listened to each other. Understood what each actually wanted, what each was working towards, and found common ground. Not by fighting but by talking with the enemy.
Far more solid progress can be made by talking with the enemy rather than with friends. Understanding what you are fighting over, understanding what you are both looking to get, understanding that in many cases you have common grounds and aspirations and goals, and realising that the only way to achieve them is to stop fighting and to work together.

Of course, I’m not just talking about armies or countries or towns fighting, am I?
Just like our species at large, each and every one of us is capable of many achievements and a great future;  we spend a disproportionate amount of our time fighting ourselves. We face these battles with ourself on a daily basis, sometimes many times in a day, and every single battle is destructive, counter-productive and a waste of our time and resources, holding us back from fulfilling our potential (or even just from making it unscathed through another day).

What do I mean when I say we fight ourselves?

Well consider any time you’ve wanted to do something, anything, and you find yourself in the position where part of you wants to do it, part of you doesn’t. and you have a great long fight with yourself over whether you should or shouldn’t. Sound familiar? When you are in that position, you are fighting yourself! And the sad thing is, the part of you that wants to and the part of you that doesn’t, both reached their position based on wanting what they believe is the best for you – they are both working in your own best interests! Or when you want to do something but this nagging voice at the back of your head says you can’t do it because you are not good enough. Or any of countless other examples where we fight ourselves, but the fight is based upon each aspect of us wanting what is best overall.

If only we realised!

If only we talked to our own internal enemies instead of fighting them, finding that common ground, working together, how much more could we be?

If only we understood not what each side wants, but why they want it, what is driving them, what do they think it will get for us… Try it. Next time you are “in two minds” about doing something, don’t just write down the age old list of pros and cons; instead, consider what doing it would get for you, what it would mean for you, what the purpose behind it might be. And then do the same for the other side of the argument.

You might be surprised at what comes up…





 
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine

[Since 1994, the world witnesses the horrifying Tutsi minority (14%) ethnic domination, the Tutsi minority ethnic rule with an iron hand, tyranny and corruption in Rwanda. The current government has been characterized by the total impunity of RPF criminals, the Tutsi economic monopoly, the Tutsi militaristic domination, and the brutal suppression of the rights of the majority of the Rwandan people (85% are Hutus)and mass arrests of Hutus by the RPF criminal organization =>AS International].


" the term FDLR in Kagame’s political paradigm means ” political opposition.”" Charles Kambanda


WHITE HOUSE — U.S. President Barack Obama returns to Africa next week, only the second visit of his presidency to the continent. In Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania, he will stress support for democracies and economic progress, and speak about the importance of human rights.

1. Obama, Bush to be in Africa at same time
2. Obama to seek return for investment in Africa
3. Obama Africa Trip is Effort to Re-engage With Continent

****

"Asking Africa to choose between prosperity and democracy is not only a false choice but also an unattractive one. The more America trades with Africa, the more political influence it is likely to gain. That, it seems, is also the view of Mr Obama".


As PRESS

The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine

In 1997, those orphans and street Children decided to to bear arms to protect themselves (FDLR) and fight for their rights

Kagame,The Rwandan dictator spends huge money to be granted Honoris Causa

The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine