Rwanda: Cartographie des crimes
Rwanda: cartographie des crimes du livre "In Praise of Blood, the crimes of the RPF" de Judi Rever
Kagame devra être livré aux Rwandais pour répondre à ses crimes: la meilleure option de réconciliation nationale entre les Hutus et les Tutsis.
Let us remember Our People
Let us remember our people, it is our right
You can't stop thinking
Don't you know
Rwandans are talkin' 'bout a revolution
It sounds like a whisper
The majority Hutus and interior Tutsi are gonna rise up
And get their share
SurViVors are gonna rise up
And take what's theirs.
We're the survivors, yes: the Hutu survivors!
Yes, we're the survivors, like Daniel out of the lions' den
(Hutu survivors) Survivors, survivors!
Get up, stand up, stand up for your rights
et up, stand up, don't give up the fight
“I’m never gonna hold you like I did / Or say I love you to the kids / You’re never gonna see it in my eyes / It’s not gonna hurt me when you cry / I’m not gonna miss you.”
The situation is undeniably hurtful but we can'stop thinking we’re heartbroken over the loss of our beloved ones.
"You can't separate peace from freedom because no one can be at peace unless he has his freedom".
Malcolm X
Welcome to Home Truths
The year is 1994, the Fruitful year and the Start of a long epoch of the Rwandan RPF bloody dictatorship. Rwanda and DRC have become a unique arena and fertile ground for wars and lies. Tutsi RPF members deny Rights and Justice to the Hutu majority, to Interior Tutsis, to Congolese people, publicly claim the status of victim as the only SurViVors while millions of Hutu, interior Tutsi and Congolese people were butchered. Please make RPF criminals a Day One priority. Allow voices of the REAL victims to be heard.
Everybody Hurts
“Everybody Hurts” is one of the rare songs on this list that actually offers catharsis. It’s beautifully simple: you’re sad, but you’re not alone because “everybody hurts, everybody cries.” You’re human, in other words, and we all have our moments. So take R.E.M.’s advice, “take comfort in your friends,” blast this song, have yourself a good cry, and then move on. You’ll feel better, I promise.—Bonnie Stiernberg
KAGAME - GENOCIDAIRE
Paul Kagame admits ordering...
Paul Kagame admits ordering the 1994 assassination of President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda.
Why did Kagame this to me?
Inzira ndende
Search
Hutu Children & their Mums
Rwanda-rebranding
Rwanda-rebranding-Targeting dissidents inside and abroad, despite war crimes and repression
Rwanda has “A well primed PR machine”, and that this has been key in “persuading the key members of the international community that it has an exemplary constitution emphasizing democracy, power-sharing, and human rights which it fully respects”. It concluded: “The truth is, however, the opposite. What you see is not what you get: A FAÇADE”
Rwanda has hired several PR firms to work on deflecting criticism, and rebranding the country.
Targeting dissidents abroad
One of the more worrying aspects of Racepoint’s objectives
was to “Educate and correct the ill informed and factually
incorrect information perpetuated by certain groups of expatriates
and NGOs,” including, presumably, the critiques
of the crackdown on dissent among political opponents
overseas.
This should be seen in the context of accusations
that Rwanda has plotted to kill dissidents abroad. A
recent investigation by the Globe and Mail claims, “Rwandan
exiles in both South Africa and Belgium – speaking in clandestine meetings in secure locations because of their fears of attack – gave detailed accounts of being recruited to assassinate critics of President Kagame….
Ways To Get Rid of Kagame
How to proceed for revolution in Rwanda:
- The people should overthrow the Rwandan dictator (often put in place by foreign agencies) and throw him, along with his henchmen and family, out of the country – e.g., the Shah of Iran, Marcos of Philippines.Compaore of Burkina Faso
- Rwandans organize a violent revolution and have the dictator killed – e.g., Ceaucescu in Romania.
- Foreign powers (till then maintaining the dictator) force the dictator to exile without armed intervention – e.g. Mátyás Rákosi of Hungary was exiled by the Soviets to Kirgizia in 1970 to “seek medical attention”.
- Foreign powers march in and remove the dictator (whom they either instated or helped earlier) – e.g. Saddam Hussein of Iraq or Manuel Noriega of Panama.
- The dictator kills himself in an act of desperation – e.g., Hitler in 1945.
- The dictator is assassinated by people near him – e.g., Julius Caesar of Rome in 44 AD was stabbed by 60-70 people (only one wound was fatal though).
- Organise strikes and unrest to paralyze the country and convince even the army not to support the dictaor – e.g., Jorge Ubico y Castañeda was ousted in Guatemala in 1944 and Guatemala became democratic, Recedntly in Burkina Faso with the dictator Blaise Compaoré.
Almighty God :Justice for US
Killing Hutus on daily basis
RPF Trade Mark: Akandoya
Fighting For Our Freedom?
KAGAME VS JUSTICE
Sunday, March 12, 2017
[Since 1994, the world witnesses the horrifying Tutsi minority (14%) ethnic domination, the Tutsi minority ethnic rule with an iron hand, tyranny and corruption in Rwanda. The current government has been characterized by the total impunity of RPF criminals, the Tutsi economic monopoly, the Tutsi militaristic domination, and the brutal suppression of the rights of the majority of the Rwandan people (85% are Hutus)and mass arrests of Hutus by the RPF criminal organization =>AS International]
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Rwanda is a constitutional republic dominated by a strong presidency. The
ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led a governing coalition that included
four smaller parties. In 2010 voters elected President Paul Kagame to a second
seven-year term with 93 percent of the vote. Three other registered political
parties participated in the presidential election. In 2013 elections were
conducted for parliament’s lower house, the Chamber of Deputies. Candidates
from the RPF and two other parties that supported RPF policies won all of the
open seats, and election observers reported numerous flaws, including possible
irregularities in the vote tabulation process. In 2015 the country held a
constitutional referendum; the National Electoral Commission reported 98 percent
of registered voters participated, and 98 percent endorsed a set of amendments
that included provisions that would allow the president to run for up to three
additional terms in office.
Civilian authorities maintained effective control over state security
forces (SSF).
The most important human rights problems were government harassment,
arrest, and abuse of political opponents, human rights advocates, and
individuals perceived to pose a threat to government control and social order;
security forces’ disregard for the rule of law; and restrictions on media
freedom and civil liberties. Due to restrictions on the registration and
operation of opposition parties, citizens did not have the ability to change
their government through free and fair elections.
Other major human rights problems included arbitrary or unlawful killings;
torture and harsh conditions in prisons and detention centers; arbitrary
arrest; prolonged pretrial detention; government infringement on citizens’
privacy rights and on freedoms of speech, assembly, and association; government
restrictions on and harassment of some local and international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), particularly organizations that monitored and reported on
human rights and media freedoms; some reports of trafficking in persons; and
government restrictions on labor rights; and child labor.
The government in many cases took steps to prosecute or punish officials
who committed abuses, including within the security services, but impunity
involving civilian officials and the SSF was a problem.
There were several reports the government committed arbitrary or unlawful
killings, representing a slight increase compared with the previous year.
Local human rights observers and Muslim community members expressed concern
regarding police killings of Muslims under questionable circumstances. For
example, on January 23, the Rwanda National Police (RNP) shot and killed Muslim
Imam Mohamed Mugemangango while he was in custody. The RNP reported
Mugemangango was trying to escape while in transit from his residence to the
Kanombe police station. On August 19, RNP officers shot and killed three other
Muslim community members in Bugarama. The RNP reported the three were trying to
escape after resisting arrest. This incident came two days after the RNP in
Kigali shot and killed another Muslim, Channy Mbonigaba. The RNP reported Mbonigaba
exchanged gunfire with police, injuring one officer. In all three cases, the
RNP issued statements indicating they suspected the individuals of having links
to foreign terrorist organizations.
On July 21, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported it received information
regarding several persons who died during or just after their detention in the
Mudende detention center, reportedly due to a combination of injuries from
beatings, poor conditions, and lack of medical care.
The African Union (AU) pressed the governments of Rwanda and Burundi to
follow through on their publicly stated support for an AU-led investigation
into the 2014 discovery of corpses in Lake Rweru, which spans the border
between the two countries, but no investigation commenced by year’s end. The
government maintained the bodies appeared on the Burundi side of the border and
insisted that any investigation of the incident must commence in Burundi.
In contrast with the previous year, there were several reports of politically
motivated disappearances during the year.
On March 26, Illuminee Iragena, a member of the unregistered United
Democratic Forces (FDU)-Inkingi party, disappeared, and there were unconfirmed
reports she was killed while in SSF detention. The government had not initiated
an investigation into her disappearance by year’s end.
On August 7, journalist John Ndabarasa disappeared. Ndabarasa is the
brother-in-law of Joel Mutabazi, a former bodyguard to the president, who was
convicted of eight charges, including terrorism and treason, and sentenced to
life in prison in 2014 after being deported from Uganda, a move condemned by
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), HRW, and Amnesty International
as a violation of the principle of nonrefoulement. The RNP opened an
investigation into Ndabarasa’s disappearance and immediately issued a statement
suggesting he had departed the country. Ndabarasa’s family members and domestic
human rights groups disputed this claim.
Domestic organizations critical of the SSF reported interference in their
operations by the government and cited a lack of capacity and independence to
investigate security-sector abuses.
The constitution and law prohibit such practices, but there were numerous
reports of abuse of detainees and prisoners by police, military, and National
Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) officials.
In 2012 the government signed into law a penal code that upgrades torture
from an aggravating circumstance to a crime in itself. The law mandates the
maximum penalty, defined by the extent of injury, for SSF and other government
perpetrators. In 2014 the government ratified and indigenized the Optional
Protocol to the Convention Against Torture.
There were reports military intelligence personnel and the SSF employed
torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment to
obtain confessions in military detention centers. There were no reported
prosecutions of SSF personnel for torture.
There were numerous reports police at times beat newly arrested suspects to
obtain confessions. Allegations of abuse were particularly frequent at the
police station in Gisenyi, located across the border from Goma in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Official reports of sexual abuse were
rare, but according to former detainees, transactional sex in prisons and
detention centers occurred regularly.
In 2015 HRW and domestic observers reported the abuse of detained street
vendors, persons in prostitution, and beggars at the Gikondo Transit Center, a
detention facility in Kigali (locally known as “Kwa Kabuga”), by police and
other detainees. The government disputed HRW’s findings, denying the existence
of undeclared detention centers and referring to Gikondo as a rehabilitation
facility designed to provide “social emergency assistance” in lieu of
incarceration. In November 2015 the Kigali City Council published guidelines
for improving conditions at Gikondo, but the directives were vague and permitted
arbitrary and lengthy detention. A July 21 follow-up report by HRW noted
conditions at Gikondo improved only marginally and documented abuses at
so-called transit centers in Muhanga, Mbazi, and Mudende. Former detainees
reported routine and arbitrary beatings by police and other detainees, often
with sticks. HRW interviews with prisoners and former detainees indicated
inmates, acting under direction of detention center authorities, carried out a
majority of beatings. According to HRW, several persons died during or just
after their detention in Mudende.
Three RNP officers serving in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti were
cited in a February 16 report by the UN secretary-general on sexual
exploitation and abuse of civilians by international peacekeepers. All three
were paternity cases arising from inappropriate relationships with adult
victims. On March 4, the same day the United Nations released its report
publicly, the government suspended the officers and opened investigations into
their conduct, promising appropriate disciplinary action. The investigations
had not concluded by year’s end.
Prison conditions ranged from harsh and life threatening to meeting
international standards. The government took steps to improve conditions in
some prisons and constructed additional facilities to relieve overcrowding, but
conditions varied widely among prisons.
Domestic civil society organizations reported impediments for persons with
disabilities, including lack of sign language interpreters at police stations
and detention centers.
Physical Conditions: According to
the Rwanda Correctional Service (RCS), the prison population steadily declined
from 58,515 in 2011 to 53,600 in 2014. It was expected to decline further in
the coming years as convicted persons sentenced to 20-25 years’ imprisonment
for crimes related to the 1994 genocide, who comprised approximately 60 percent
of the prison population, finished serving their sentences.
Conditions were generally worse and often harsh and life threatening in
detention and transit centers. In July, HRW reported that, according to former
detainees, upwards of 200-400 men, women, and children were detained at any one
time in each of the Mbazi, Muhanga, and Mudende transit centers, while the
number of detainees in Gikondo ranged from 200 to 800 persons, who were held in
several large rooms. HRW reports suggested similar conditions prevailed in
other transit and detention centers, of which there were at least 28 across the
country.
Authorities held men and women separately in similar conditions, although
overcrowding was more prevalent in men’s wards.
Detention centers in general lacked separate facilities for children.
According to HRW, officials held children together with adults in Muhanga,
Mudende, and Gikondo. They sometimes held minors in separate facilities, as in
Mbazi, that had marginally better conditions than the facilities for adults.
There was also a minors-only facility in Nyagatare; observers reported
Nyagatare came close to meeting international norms and noted authorities
provided children detained there with formal education opportunities.
According to the Ministry of Justice, 152 children under age three lived
with their mothers in prison. The law does not allow children over the age of
three to remain with their incarcerated mothers.
Authorities generally separated pretrial detainees from convicted
prisoners, although there were numerous exceptions due to the large number of
detainees awaiting trial.
The government held six prisoners of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in
a purpose-built detention center that the United Nations deemed met
international standards for incarceration of prisoners convicted by
international criminal tribunals. The government held international transfers
and some high-profile “security” prisoners in similarly upgraded maximum-security
wings of Kigali Central “1930” Prison.
Prisoner deaths resulted from anemia, HIV/AIDS, respiratory diseases,
malaria, and other diseases at rates similar to those found in the general
population. Medical care in prisons was commensurate with care for the public
at large, because the government enrolled all prisoners in the national health
insurance plan. Prisoners were fed once per day, but there were no provisions
for feeding those in pretrial detention, who relied on family members for food.
Authorities permitted family members to supplement the diets of vulnerable
prisoners with health problems. HRW stated several detainees shared mattresses
that were often infested with lice and fleas. According to HRW, the government
upgraded the Gikondo Transit Center, including improvements to toilets and
other sanitation facilities, but conditions still fell short of international
standards. There were reports of improvements to heating, ventilation, and
lighting in prisons in the local media; however, the reports did not mention
specific details of upgrades or measures implemented by the government.
Conditions in police and military detention centers varied. Overcrowding
was common in police stations and detention centers, and poor ventilation often
led to high temperatures. Provision of adequate food and medical care was
inconsistent.
Authorities transferred transit center male detainees and at-risk adults
ages 18 to 35 to the Iwawa Rehabilitation and Vocational Development Center on
Iwawa Island in Lake Kivu. Sanitation, nutrition, and health services at the
center generally met international standards.
Administration: Recordkeeping
on prisoners and detainees remained inadequate. Domestic and international
human rights organizations reported instances of long delays and failures to
locate prisoners and detainees. In January authorities implemented a pilot
integrated electronic case management system (IECMS); domestic observers
praised IECMS’s potential to improve accountability and transparency in record
keeping, but they noted it also created substantial barriers in access to
justice in rural areas where lack of computers, internet, electricity, and
technological knowledge prevented many from accessing IECMS.
In January the Ministry of Justice announced the completion of its
investigation into the cases of 7,099 prisoners convicted of genocide and
related crimes by traditional gacaca (community-based) courts who claimed they
were kept in prison beyond their sentences. The Justice Ministry-led
commission, which included the RCS, Ministry of Internal Security, and National
Human Rights Commission (NHRC), stated it found no basis for the prisoners’
claims but noted shoddy record keeping and corruption among RCS personnel led
to an increasing number of incomplete prisoner files. A Ministry of Justice
spokesperson said most of the concerned prisoners appeared to have bribed RCS
officials to remove their sentencing decrees from their prison files, thereby
creating confusion regarding the lengths of their sentences. Although the
commission found that none of the prisoners merited release, it instructed the
RCS to respect fully the prisoners’ rights. The commission did not make its
final report public, and prisoners continued making appeals to the NHRC to have
their cases reviewed.
In 2013 the government disarmed approximately 770 March 23 Movement
Congolese rebel combatants who crossed into the country from the DRC and
detained them in a converted police training facility in Ngoma. As in previous
years, detainees left or escaped the Ngoma internment center, and the
government was unable to account for their whereabouts. In September observers
reported there were approximately 100 detainees in the internment center, a
substantial decrease from the nearly 400 individuals interned in the center at
the end of 2015; 29 of the former combatants were positively identified among
the refugee population in the country’s five Congolese camps.
The RCS investigated reported abuses by corrections officers, and the same
hierarchical structure existed in police and security forces; there was no
independent institution charged with investigating abuses or punishing
perpetrators.
Gisenyi Prisoners at forced work and Torture |
Detainees held at the Iwawa Rehabilitation and Vocational Development
Center did not have the right to appeal their detentions to judicial
authorities.
Independent Monitoring: The government
permitted independent monitoring of prison conditions on a limited basis by
diplomats and the International Committee of the Red Cross. At times, however,
it restricted access to specific prisoners and did not permit monitors to visit
undeclared detention centers and certain military intelligence facilities. The
government effectively barred HRW from conducting research inside the country
after the publication of HRW’s 2015 and 2016 reports on the Gikondo Transit
Center. A limited number of local NGOs were supposedly permitted to monitor
prison conditions but did not do so, citing intimidation by the government.
Journalists could access prisons with a valid press card but required
permission from the RCS commissioner to take photographs or interview prisoners
or guards.
Improvements: According to the Legal Aid
Forum, which provided legal assistance to inmates, there were improvements in
the treatment of the general prison population, including the organization of
“legal aid week” events, the appointment of legal officers in every prison, and
the dedication of the Ngoma prison exclusively for women. Under its strategic
plan for 2013-18, the RCS built a prison in the Mageragere suburb of Kigali to
relieve overcrowding in the Kigali Central “1930” and Kimironko prisons.
Gisenyi Prisoner at forced work and Torture |
The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, but SSF
personnel regularly arrested and detained persons arbitrarily and without due
process.
Domestic observers reported the RNP systematically rounded up and
arbitrarily detained street children, street vendors, suspected drug abusers,
persons in prostitution, homeless persons, suspected petty criminals, and
suspected serious offenders ahead of the AU Summit, held in Kigali July 10-18.
As in previous years, they held detainees without charge at the Gikondo Transit
Center before transferring them to the Iwawa Rehabilitation and Vocational
Development Center without judicial review. The government maintained that
individuals in transit and rehabilitation centers were not detainees, although
they could not leave the centers.
Unregistered opposition political parties reported authorities frequently
arrested their supporters and party officials but released most after detention
of one week or less, although several, including FDU-Inkingi assistant
secretary Leonille Gasengayire, completed longer detention. On August 23,
police arrested Gasengayire for inciting the public against the public order,
and he remained in detention at year’s end. The charge stemmed from meetings
Gasengayire allegedly organized in which she urged residents of Rutsiro
District in Western Province to resist forcible relocation after expropriation
of their land holdings for the construction of government buildings. Domestic
and international observers disputed the prosecution’s claim and argued
political considerations motivated the charges.
In May authorities detained retired colonel Ben Karenzi, who served as
director of the RDF’s Kanombe military hospital, for traveling outside the
country without authorization. Authorities also detained several other
high-ranking military officials for facilitating Kanombe’s trip to Nairobi in
April but subsequently released them without filing charges. Karenzi remained
in detention and had neither been charged with a crime nor appeared in civilian
or military court by year’s end.
ROLE OF THE POLICE AND
SECURITY APPARATUS
The RNP, moved to the Ministry of Justice after the dissolution of the
Ministry of Internal Security in October, is responsible for internal security.
The RDF, under the Ministry of Defense, is in charge of providing external
security, although the RDF also works on internal security and intelligence matters
alongside the RNP. In December the cabinet approved the creation of the Rwanda
Investigation Bureau under the Ministry of Justice. The decision effectively
removes responsibility for investigations and prosecutions from the RNP and
vests it with the newly created bureau.
La vie de prisonnier, de torture et de travail forcé pour les Hutus |
Civilian authorities generally maintained control over the RNP and the RDF,
and the government had mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and
corruption. The Inspectorate General of the RNP generally disciplined police
for excessive use of force and prosecuted acts of corruption. Nevertheless,
there were reports elements of the SSF at times acted independently of civilian
control. For example, there were reports RDF J-2 (intelligence staff), NISS,
and RNP intelligence personnel were responsible for disappearances, illegal
detention, and torture in military and police detention centers, both declared
and undeclared.
The RDF normally displayed a high level of military professionalism and
discipline. In September, RDF Major Aimable Rugomwa shot and killed a young boy
in Kanombe on suspicion of theft. Authorities immediately arrested Rugomwa and
charged him with murder, and a military tribunal refused him bail. The RDF High
Command visited the deceased boy’s family and issued a communique denouncing
the officer.
Police at times lacked sufficient basic resources--such as handcuffs,
radios, and patrol cars--but observers credited the RNP with generally strong
discipline and effectiveness. The RNP institutionalized community relations
training that included appropriate use of force and human rights, although
arbitrary arrests and beatings remained problems.
There were reports of abuse of suspects by the District Administration
Security Support Organ (DASSO), including the May 7 killing of a street vendor
in Kigali during a DASSO patrol. Police arrested the perpetrator and charged
him with murder, and the incident prompted authorities to organize human rights
training for all DASSO personnel, who numbered approximately 2,600.
ARREST PROCEDURES AND
TREATMENT OF DETAINEES
The law requires authorities to investigate and obtain a warrant before
arresting a suspect. Police may detain suspects for up to 72 hours without an
arrest warrant. Prosecutors must submit formal charges within five days of
arrest. Police may detain minors a maximum of 15 days in pretrial detention,
but only for crimes that carry a penalty for conviction of five years’ or more
imprisonment. There were numerous reports police and prosecutors disregarded
these provisions and held individuals, sometimes for months and often without
charge, particularly in security-related cases. The SSF held some suspects
incommunicado or under house arrest. At times police employed nonjudicial
punishment when minor criminals confessed and the victims agreed to the police
officer’s recommended penalty, such as a week of detention or restitution.
The law permits investigative detention if authorities believe public
safety is threatened or the accused might flee, and judges interpreted these
provisions broadly, as in the cases of 28 arrested Rwandan Muslims--17 in
January, three in May, three in July, and five in August--accused of religious
radicalism and suspected of collaboration with international terrorist groups
whose trial had not commenced by year’s end. A judge must review such detention
every 30 days, and it may not extend beyond one year, but the SSF held numerous
suspects indefinitely after the first authorization of investigative detention
and did not always seek reauthorization every 30 days.
After prosecutors formally file a charge, detention may be indefinite
unless bail is granted. Bail exists only for crimes for which the maximum
sentence if convicted is five years’ imprisonment, but authorities may release
a suspect pending trial if satisfied the person would not flee or become a
threat to public safety and order. Authorities generally allowed family members
prompt access to detained relatives, unless the individuals were held on state
security charges, at intelligence-related detention centers such as Camp Kami
or Kwa Gacinya, or in undeclared detention facilities. The government at times
violated the right to habeas corpus.
By law detainees are allowed access to lawyers, but the scarcity of lawyers
and their reluctance to take on cases that were considered sensitive for
political or state security reasons limited access to legal representation.
Some lawyers working on politically sensitive cases reported harassment and
threats by government officials and denial of access to the evidence against
their clients.
During a 2014 RDF and RNP security operation in Musanze and Rubavu, the SSF
detained persons incommunicado without access to legal representation for up to
two months. The SSF released numerous individuals without charge; however, the
government charged 77 persons with crimes against state security, including
collaborating with the rebel group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda. Judges ordered the release of 33 of the 77 in 2014, while upholding
charges against 44 in pretrial hearing. In 2015, six defendants were convicted
and sentenced to life in prison, five were sentenced to 10-year prison terms,
and three were acquitted. Local human rights organizations reported the
defendants did not have legal counsel. Trials of other defendants continued at
year’s end.
Convicted persons sometimes remained in prison after completing their
sentences while waiting for an appeal date or due to problems with prison
records. The law provides that pretrial detention, illegal detention, and
administrative sanctions be fully deducted from sentences imposed, but it does
not provide for compensation to persons who are acquitted. The law allows
judges to impose detention of equivalent duration and fines on SSF and other
government officials who unlawfully detained individuals, but there were no
reports that judges exercised this authority.
Arbitrary Arrest: Unregistered
opposition parties claimed police at times arbitrarily arrested their members
(see section 3).
Although there is no requirement for individuals to carry identification,
police and the DASSO regularly detained street children, vendors, and beggars
without identification and sometimes charged them with illegal street vending
or vagrancy. Authorities released adults who could produce identification and
transported street children to their home districts, to shelters, or for
processing into vocational and educational programs.
There were numerous reports authorities detained family members of
individuals suspected of committing crimes if the suspects themselves could not
be located. Authorities advertised the detention of the suspects’ relatives but
released them without charges if the suspects turned themselves in.
Pretrial Detention: Lengthy
pretrial detention was a serious problem. The NHRC reported to parliament in
2013 that authorities often detained prisoners for extended periods without
arraignment, and domestic and international human rights organizations reported
the practice continued during the year. The law permits detention of genocide
suspects until trial. Authorities permitted the majority of convicted prisoners
(those who confessed their genocide crimes) to return to their families, with
prison time to be served after the suspended and community service portions of
their sentences.
The government made strides toward eliminating the case backlog and
reducing the average length of pretrial detention. The government and the Legal
Aid Forum trained paralegals and Mediation Committees (Abunzi) mediators to
handle minor civil cases through alternate dispute mechanisms outside the court
system. In 2015 the government promulgated national regulations on the
organization, jurisdiction, competence, and functioning of cell- and
sector-level mediation committees, whose members were elected locally,
expanding their jurisdiction to include criminal cases. If one of the parties
to a dispute rejected the sector-level mediation committee’s decision, they
could appeal it to the local primary court.
The inspector general of the National Public Prosecution Authority (NPPA)
sanctioned government officials who abused regulations on pretrial detention
with penalties, including fines and suspensions.
Detainee’s Ability to Challenge Lawfulness of Detention before a Court: Although detainees have the right to challenge their
detention in court, few tried and none were able to obtain prompt release or
compensation for unlawful detention.
The constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, and the
judiciary operated in most cases without government interference. As in
previous years, there were no reports of direct government interference in the
judiciary, and authorities generally respected court orders. Domestic observers
noted, however, that outcomes in high-profile trials of genocide suspects and
military leaders accused of inciting rebellion appeared predetermined.
The would-be President of Rwanda Ms. Ingabire Victoire |
TRIAL PROCEDURES
The law provides for a presumption of innocence. The law requires
defendants be informed promptly and in detail of the charges in a language they
comprehend.
Defendants have the right to a fair trial without undue delay. In its
2015-16 activity report, the NPPA stated it had processed to conclusion 91
percent of the 18,484 cases it had received, just short of its 97 percent
target. Despite the NPPA’s conclusion that its 181 prosecutors handled all
cases without significant undue delay, defense lawyers reported there were an
insufficient number of prosecutors, judges, and courtrooms to hold trials
within a reasonable time.
Defendants have the right to communicate with an attorney of their choice,
although many defendants could not afford private counsel. The law provides for
legal representation of minors. The law does not provide for an attorney at
state expense for indigent defendants. The Rwandan Bar Association and 36 other
member organizations of the Legal Aid Forum provided legal assistance to some
indigent defendants but lacked the resources to provide defense counsel to all
in need. Legal aid organizations noted the requirement that defendants present
a certificate of indigence signed by their village chief made it difficult to
qualify for pro bono representation. Domestic organizations working to expand
access to justice noted that a substantial increase in court fees implemented
in conjunction with the IECMS rollout posed significant additional barriers for
poor defendants.
The law requires that defendants have adequate time and facilities to
prepare their defense, and judges routinely granted requests to extend
preparation time. The law provides for a right to free interpretation, but
domestic human rights organizations noted officials did not always enforce this
right, particularly in cases of deaf and hard of hearing defendants requiring
sign language interpreters. Defendants and their attorneys have the right to
access government-held evidence relevant to their cases, but courts and
prosecutors did not always respect this right. Defendants have the right to be
present at trial, confront witnesses against them, and present witnesses and
evidence on their own behalf. By law defendants may not be compelled to testify
or confess guilt, and judges generally respected the law during trial. The law
provides for the right to appeal, and authorities respected this provision.
There were some reports the SSF coerced suspects into confessing guilt in
security-related cases. Judges tended to accept confessions obtained through
torture despite defendants’ protests and failed to order investigations when
defendants alleged torture during their trial (see section on political
prisoners below). There were fewer such cases during the year compared with
previous years.
The RDF routinely tried military offenders and civilians who previously
served in the RDF before military tribunals that rendered penalties of fines,
imprisonment, or both. Military courts provided defendants with similar rights
as civilian courts, including the right of appeal and access to government-held
evidence relevant to their cases. Defendants often appeared before military
tribunals without legal counsel due to the cost of hiring private attorneys and
the unwillingness of some attorneys to defend individuals accused of crimes
against state security. The law stipulates military courts may try civilian
accomplices of soldiers accused of crimes. The government did not release
figures on the number of civilians tried as coperpetrators or accomplices of
military personnel.
In 2012 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda transferred its
remaining genocide cases to a Tanzania-based branch of the Mechanism for
International Criminal Tribunals. It continued to pursue genocide fugitives
subject to Rwanda tribunal indictments, and in March the former mayor of
Nyakizu, Ladislas Ntaganzwa, was extradited to Rwanda from the DRC. Ntaganzwa
was one of nine major genocide suspects who had remained at large.
POLITICAL PRISONERS AND
DETAINEES
There were numerous reports local officials and the SSF briefly detained
some individuals who disagreed publicly with government decisions or policies.
Opposition leaders and government critics faced indictment under broadly
applied charges of genocide incitement, genocide denial, divisionism, and
incitement to rebel. Numerous individuals identified by international and
domestic human rights groups as political prisoners remained in prison,
including Victoire Ingabire, Deo Mushayidi, and Theoneste Niyitegeka.
President of the FDU-Inkingi and former 2010 presidential candidate
Victoire Ingabire was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment in 2012 in what
was considered a flawed trial based on politically motivated charges. In
February, ahead of Ingabire’s appeal before the African Court on Human and People’s
Rights (ACHPR), her lawyer claimed officials denied him access to Ingabire and
stated authorities had demanded to see all documents he intended to bring to
prison to discuss with his client. In September a visiting delegation from the
EU Parliament was denied access to Ingabire, who is a Dutch citizen; an RCS
spokesperson claimed the government had not received an official request for
the visit.
Convicted and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment in 2008 for complicity in
genocide, former 2003 presidential candidate Theoneste Niyitegeka remained in
prison at year’s end. International and domestic human rights organizations
claimed the charges against Niyitegeka were politically motivated and that
there were serious irregularities in Niyitegeka’s appeal proceedings in
sector-level courts.
On March 31, the Military High Court of Kanombe sentenced Colonel Tom
Byabagamba and retired brigadier general Frank Rusagara to 21 and 20 years’
imprisonment, respectively, for inciting insurrection and tarnishing the
government’s image. The court sentenced Rusagara’s driver, Francois Kabayiza,
to five years’ imprisonment for concealing evidence. Kabayiza said in court
military personnel tortured him in detention, but the judges in the case did
not order an investigation into his allegations, stating he lacked proof he was
tortured. HRW documented numerous irregularities in these two cases, including
the fact judges allowed the defense to cross-examine only four of the 11
prosecution witnesses. One of these, retired captain David Kabuye, was arrested
at approximately the same time; Kabuye stated during his own trial he was
forced to testify against Rusagara and Byabagamba.
CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURES AND
REMEDIES
The judiciary was generally independent and impartial in civil matters.
Mechanisms exist for citizens to file lawsuits in civil matters, including for
violations of human rights. The Office of the Ombudsman processed claims of
judicial wrongdoing on an administrative basis.
In March, days before the ACHPR was set to hear an appeal by Victoire
Ingabire, the government withdrew from the additional ACHPR protocol that
allows individuals and organizations to challenge adverse domestic decisions
before the court. Individuals may still submit cases to the East African Court
of Justice (EACJ).
PROPERTY RESTITUTION
Reports of expropriation of land for the construction of roads, government
buildings, and other infrastructure projects were common, and complainants
frequently cited government failure to provide adequate and timely
compensation. The NCHR investigated these cases and advocated on citizens’
behalf with relevant local and national authorities but was unable to effect
restitution in a majority of the cases.
In September the First Instance Division of the EACJ began hearings in the
case of Tribert Rujugiro Ayabatwa, a Rwandan businessperson living in
self-imposed exile in South Africa whose United Trade Center shopping mall in
Kigali, valued at 16.2 billion Rwandan francs ($20 million), was seized by the
government in 2013. In 2014 the EACJ appellate division ordered a rehearing of
the case, citing irregularities in the original decision.
The government did not provide an update on the case of Assinapol Rwigara,
whose family claimed the SSF killed Rwigara after an automobile accident in
February 2015. Following Rwigara’s death, Kigali municipal authorities seized
real estate owned by him, and in September 2015 demolished a hotel belonging to
the Rwigara family. The authorities claimed the hotel was built without proper
permits and was structurally unsound; the family disputed the claim and
provided copies of building permits to the press. The family claimed the
government and City of Kigali did not provide compensation for the loss of
property and investment. During the year the family further claimed authorities
threatened to close and repossess several factories belonging to the family.
Although the constitution and law prohibit such actions, there were
numerous reports the government monitored homes, movements, telephone calls,
e-mail, other private communications, and personal and institutional data.
There were reports of government informants working within international and
local NGOs, religious organizations, and other social institutions.
The law requires police to obtain authorization from a state prosecutor
prior to entering and searching citizens’ homes. According to human rights
organizations, the SSF at times entered homes without obtaining the required
authorization.
La vie de prisonnier, de torture et de travail forcé pour les Hutus |
The penal code provides legal protection against unauthorized use of
personal data by private entities, although officials did not invoke these
provisions during the year.
RPF members regularly visited citizens’ homes seeking contributions to the
political party and the government’s Agaciro Development Fund, established by
the government in 2012 to accelerate the country’s independence from
international aid.
The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press “in conditions
prescribed by the law,” but the government severely restricted these rights.
Journalists reported government officials questioned, threatened, and at times
arrested journalists who expressed views deemed critical on sensitive topics.
The Rwanda Media Commission (RMC), a self-regulatory body, sometimes
intervened on journalists’ behalf, as it did in the August disappearance of
journalist John Ndabarasa. The RMC also remonstrated against the attack on a
foreign journalist, who was injured by a DASSO officer while covering a DASSO
operation in May. Journalists also reported the RMC lost its independence
following the May 2015 ouster and subsequent exile of its elected chairperson
Fred Muvunyi.
Freedom of Speech and Expression: There were no official restrictions on individuals’ right to criticize
the government publicly or privately on policy implementation and other issues.
Nonetheless, the government generally did not tolerate criticism of the
presidency and government policy on security and other matters that were deemed
sensitive. For example, in February the RNP detained two journalists who were
preparing a report on tax evasion involving the country’s main stone quarry.
After their release, the journalists recounted how members of the RMC
accompanied the RNP officers who searched and confiscated computers and various
files before detaining them.
Laws prohibiting divisionism, genocide ideology, and genocide denial discouraged
citizens from expressing viewpoints some might construe as promoting societal
divisions. The law prohibits the propagation of ideas based on “ethnic,
regional, racial, religious, language, or other divisive characteristics.”
Conviction of public incitement to “genocide ideology” or “divisionism,”
including discrimination and sectarianism, is punishable by five to nine years’
imprisonment and fines of 100,000 to one million Rwandan francs ($123 to
$1,234). Authorities applied the laws broadly, including to silence political
dissent and to shut down investigative journalism.
The 2012 penal code expanded former provisions that prohibited the display
of contempt for the head of state or other high-level public officials to
include administrative authorities or other public servants, with sentences of
one to two years’ imprisonment and fines of 50,000 to 500,000 Rwandan francs
($61 to $617). Other changes included revising the crime of “spreading rumors
aimed at inciting the population to rise against the regime” to “spreading
false information with intent to create a hostile international opinion against
the Rwandan state,” with much more severe penalties, including life in prison
for conviction for acts committed during wartime and seven to 10 years’ imprisonment
for acts committed in peacetime. Slander and libel of foreign and international
officials and dignitaries are illegal, with sentences of one to three years’
imprisonment.
In 2013 the government signed into law a revised genocide ideology law that
introduced international definitions for genocide and narrowed the scope of
what constitutes “genocide ideology” and related offenses to a more specific
range of actions and statements. Specifically, the law states that “genocidal
ideology” must be clearly linked to specific acts or statements, rather than
the broader “aggregate of thoughts” standard defined in the 2008 law.
Nevertheless, authorities applied the statute broadly, and there were numerous
reports of its use to silence persons critical of government policy.
The government investigated and prosecuted individuals accused of
threatening or harming genocide survivors and witnesses or of espousing
genocide ideology, which the law defines as dehumanizing an individual or a
group with the same characteristics by threatening, intimidating, defaming,
inciting hatred, denying the genocide, taking revenge, altering testimony or
evidence, killing, planning to kill, or attempting to kill someone.
Prosecutions for genocide ideology and genocide denial rose from 20
reported cases between October 2014 and September 2015 to 78 cases from October
2015 to September; however, it still fell well short of the nearly 800 cases
handled by the NPPA in 2012-13. According to the NPPA, 69 cases were prosecuted
to completion, two were dropped, and seven remained pending at year’s end.
Press and Media Freedoms: Vendors sold
both private and government-owned newspapers published in English, French, and
Kinyarwanda. There were 53 newspapers, journals, and other publications
registered with the government, although fewer than 10 published regularly.
Sporadically published independent newspapers maintained positions both in
support of and contrary to or critical of the government. There were 33 radio
stations (six government-owned and 27 independent), one government-run
television station, and five independent television stations. Independent media
reported a difficult operating environment and highlighted the reluctance of
the business community to advertise on radio stations that might be critical of
the government, leading one such station to suspend operations. An
independently published newspaper that was sometimes critical of the government
cited similar reasons in announcing its closure in December.
A set of five media laws passed in 2013 provide for greater press freedoms
but had no discernable effect on those freedoms. Despite the reforms, media
professionals reported government officials sought to influence reporting and
warned journalists against reporting information deemed sensitive or critical
of the government. The board of the RMC was reconstituted following the May
2015 resignation of Chairman Fred Muvunyi. Journalists reported all positions on
the RMC board were filled in close consultation with the government and the
board hewed closely to RPF orthodoxy. Journalists also said the December
election of the new RMC board violated the RMC’s bylaws.
The laws provide journalists the freedom to investigate, express opinions,
and “seek, receive, give, and broadcast information and ideas through any
media.” The law explicitly prohibits censorship of information, but censorship
occurred. The laws restrict these freedoms if journalists “jeopardize the general
public order and good morals, an individual’s right to honor and reputation in
the public eye and to the right to inviolability of a person’s private life and
family.” Authorities may seize journalists’ material and information if a
“media offense” occurs but only if a court orders it. Authorities sometimes
seized journalists’ material without a court order. Courts may compel
journalists to reveal confidential sources in the event of an investigation or
criminal proceeding. Persons wanting to start a media outlet must apply with
the “competent public organ.” All media rights and prohibitions apply to
persons writing for websites.
Violence and Harassment: There were
reports police and the SSF at times detained and harassed journalists. In
January police arrested reporter John Williams Ntwari and charged him with
raping a minor. Prior to the arrest, Ntwari reported receiving threats for his
coverage of the Rwigara death and expropriation case. Officials released Ntwari
after 10 days when other journalists interviewed the alleged victim and
discovered that she was not a minor and there was no evidence of use of force.
Several journalists who fled in prior years remained outside the country,
including former RMC chairman Fred Muvunyi, who went into self-exile after
arguing against the government’s call to ban the BBC’s Kinyarwanda service
following the broadcast of a BBC documentary, which was controversial in the
country.
Censorship or Content Restrictions: The law allows the government to restrict access to some government
documents and information, including information on individual privacy and
information or statements deemed to constitute defamation. Journalists reported
editorial boards for major print and broadcast media companies censored
information deemed critical of the RPF or government policies.
Radio stations broadcast criticism of government policies, including on
popular citizen call-in shows; however, journalists reported self-censorship
and were careful to distance themselves from opinions expressed by call-in
guests that could be deemed controversial. Some radio stations, including Radio
1, Radio Isango Star, and Radio Salus, had regular call-in shows that featured
discussion of government programs or policies. Several radio stations hosted live
debates on sensitive topics, such as power sharing after the 2017 presidential
elections.
Libel/Slander Laws: Conviction of
defamation (libel and slander) is a criminal offense punishable by fines and
imprisonment. There were no reports of slander and libel laws being used to
suppress freedom of speech or the publication of material that criticized
government policies or government officials.
National Security: Under the 2013
media laws, journalists must refrain from reporting items that violate
“confidentiality in the national security and national integrity” and
“confidentiality of judicial proceedings, parliamentary sessions, and cabinet
deliberations in camera.” Authorities invoked these laws to arrest and
intimidate journalists covering politically sensitive topics and matters under
government investigation.
INTERNET FREEDOM
The media law includes the right of all citizens to “receive, disseminate,
or send information through internet,” including the right to start and
maintain a website. All provisions of the media laws apply to web-based
publications. Restrictions such as website blocking remained in place, however.
There were numerous reports the government monitored e-mail and internet chat
rooms. Individuals and groups could engage in the peaceful expression of views
via the internet, including by e-mail and social media, but were subject to
monitoring. As in the previous year, there were no confirmed reports monitoring
led to detention or interrogation of individuals by the SSF. According to the International
Telecommunication Union, 18 percent of the population used the internet in
2015.
Government-run social media accounts were used to debate and at times
intimidate individuals who posted online comments considered critical of the
government.
The government blocked access within the country to several websites
critical of its policies. Such sites included websites of the Rwandan diaspora
such as Umuvugizi and Le Profete and online
newspapers such as Ireme.com.
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CULTURAL
EVENTS
The government generally did not restrict academic freedom or cultural
events, but because academic officials frequently suspended outspoken secondary
and university students for divisionism or engaging in genocide ideology,
students and professors practiced self-censorship. Local think tanks deferred
to government officials in selecting subjects for research, and authorities
sometimes prevented the publication of studies that cast the government in a
negative light. The government requires visiting academics to receive official
permission to conduct research; academics reported occasional harassment and
denial of permission to conduct research on political issues, refugees, or the
genocide.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
The constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly, but the
government did not always respect this right. In 2014 the UN special rapporteur
on the rights to freedom of assembly and association, Maina Kiai, reported,
“peaceful protests voicing dissent and criticizing government policies are
reportedly not allowed.”
Authorities may legally require advance notice for public meetings and
demonstrations and must respond to notification within one week or 15 days,
depending on the type of event. Even with prior written authorization, public
meetings were subject to disruption or arbitrary closure. For example, during
the July AU Summit, police prevented local human rights organizations from
organizing a press conference with their regional counterparts. The conference
organizers obtained authorization from relevant ministries well in advance of
the event, but RNP officers forcefully dispersed the participants and prevented
the event from taking place.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
While the constitution provides for freedom of association, the government
limited the right. The law requires private organizations to register. Although
the government generally granted licenses, it impeded the formation of new
political parties, restricted political party activities, and delayed or denied
registration to local and international NGOs seeking to work on human rights,
media freedom, or political advocacy (see section 3). In addition the
government imposed difficult and burdensome NGO registration and renewal
requirements, especially on international NGOs, as well as time-consuming
requirements for annual financial and activity reports (see section 5).
See the
Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
The constitution and law provide for freedom of internal movement, foreign
travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected
these rights.
The government cooperated with UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations
in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons,
refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other
persons of concern. The government granted prima facie refugee status to
Burundian refugees fleeing instability after Burundi’s 2015 presidential
election. In 2015 to November 7, more than 81,600 Burundian refugees entered
the country, joining approximately 74,000 Congolese refugees who had sought
refuge between 1994 and 2015.
UNHCR administered Mahama camp for Burundian refugees and five camps
primarily for Congolese refugees with international NGOs, providing for basic
health, water, sanitation, housing, feeding, and educational needs. Authorities
sometimes restricted access to the camps. In June the government issued new instructions
on camp management clarifying procedures for requesting access to the camps.
Following the promulgation of these instructions, UNHCR reported excellent
cooperation with the government and local community. In addition to increasing
integration of refugees into the national education and health-care systems,
the government also cooperated with UNHCR to launch a livelihoods strategy in
September focused on increasing refugees’ economic integration.
UNHCR recommended that countries invoke the “ceased circumstances” clause
for Rwandans who fled the country between 1959 and 1998. During the year UNHCR
extended the agreement with African states hosting Rwandan refugees that
refugees are to be assisted in returning to Rwanda or obtaining legal permanent
residency in host countries by December 31, 2017. The cessation clause forms
part of the 1951 Refugee Convention and may be applied when fundamental and
durable changes in a refugee’s country of origin, such that they no longer have
a well-founded fear of persecution, remove the need for international
protection. Both UNHCR and the government agreed that since the end of the
civil war and the 1994 genocide, the country had been peaceful, and more than
three million exiled Rwandans had returned, including 5,082 during the year.
Foreign Travel: The law allows
a judge to deprive convicted persons of the right to travel abroad as a
stand-alone punishment or as punishment following imprisonment. Government
officials must obtain written permission from the Office of the Prime Minister
or the president before traveling abroad for official or personal reasons. The
government restricted the travel of serving and former security-sector
officials and arrested those who traveled abroad without authorization.
Members of the unregistered FDU-Inkingi party stated that authorities
denied the issuance of or confiscated the passports of party members and their
relatives.
Exile: The law prohibits forced exile. Some political
dissidents, journalists, social activists, and former “security” detainees who
claimed harassment and intimidation by the government left the country in
previous years and remained in self-imposed exile. Some diplomatic personnel
out of favor with the government failed to return upon conclusion of their
assignments abroad.
Emigration and Repatriation: According to
UNHCR, approximately 2,000 nationals returned from other countries during the
year; most resettled in their districts of origin. The government worked with
UNHCR and other aid organizations to assist the returnees.
The government interned former Congolese March 23 Movement combatants in a
detention facility in Ngoma, but many former combatants continued to depart the
facility during the year (see section 1.c., Prison and Detention Center
Conditions).
The government accepted former Rwandan combatants who returned from the
DRC. The Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, with
international support, placed adult former combatants in a three-month
re-education program at Mutobo Demobilization Center in Northern Province.
After completion, each adult former combatant was enrolled automatically in the
RDF Reserve Force and received 60,000 Rwandan francs ($74) and permission to
return home. After two months each former combatant received an additional
120,000 Rwandan francs ($148). In November, 54 former combatants graduated from
Mutobo, bringing the total number of reintegrated ex-combatants to
approximately 200 for the year. The Musanze Child Rehabilitation Center,
relocated in 2015 from Muhazi, Eastern Province, treated former child
combatants in Northern Province.
PROTECTION OF REFUGEES
Forced work at the Nyamurenge hills in South Eastern Congo |
Authorities generally provided adequate security and physical protection
within refugee camps. The RNP worked with UNHCR to build police posts on the
edge of and station police officers in refugee camps. Refugees were free to
file complaints at both camp and area police stations. Sexual and gender-based
violence (GBV) was a problem, although formal reports of GBV in the camps
declined precipitously during the year. UNHCR attributed the sharp decrease in
reported GBV cases to a combination of increased GBV training of RNP officers
at refugee camps, expanded NGO-run prevention and protection programs, and a
pervasive culture of silence among refugee communities, who tended to
underreport incidents of GBV.
In contrast to the previous year, there were no confirmed reports of recruitment of refugees into armed groups, and the government adopted stronger measures to protect vulnerable refugee populations residing in the country. The government, however, did not conduct a public investigation into credible allegations of recruitment of Burundian refugees, including children, from Mahama refugee camp between May and September 2015, and some refugees reported facing continued harassment and intimidation from authorities for their whistleblowing role in reporting recruitment.
Access to Asylum: The law
provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status. UNHCR, with government
and donor support, assisted approximately 165,000 refugees and asylum seekers,
mostly from Burundi and the DRC. Of these, approximately 9,000 were Congolese
asylum seekers who faced protracted delays in the adjudication of their asylum
claims.
Human rights organizations reported that the government accepted asylum
seekers of Eritrean and Sudanese origin deported from Israel to Rwanda and that
many of the deportees subsequently were transported to Uganda. During the visit
in July of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, the president confirmed continuing
discussions regarding cooperation between the two governments on this issue,
but government officials declined to disclose the terms of any agreement.
Freedom of Movement: The law does not place restrictions on freedom of movement of asylum seekers, but refugees stated that delays in the issuance of identity cards and Convention Travel Documents (CTDs) restricted their ability to travel within and outside the country. The government committed to issuing all refugees identification cards and machine-readable CTDs upon the conclusion of a joint verification exercise with UNHCR. Verification was scheduled for October but had not commenced by year’s end.
Employment: No laws restrict refugee
employment, and in September the Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee
Affairs jointly launched a livelihoods strategy with UNHCR aimed at increasing
the ability of refugees to work in the local economy. Officials acknowledged
very few refugees were able to find local employment and offered periodic job
training and livelihood programs to assist refugees in finding or creating
income-generating opportunities. Refugees cited lack of government-issued
identity documents as one of their main obstacles to employment.
Access to Basic Services: Refugees had
access to public education through grade 10, public health care, housing within
the refugee camps, law enforcement, courts and judicial procedures, and legal
assistance. Refugees who arrived prior to 2013 were registered and provided
with biometric identification cards similar to the national identity cards;
however, there were significant delays in the issuance of identity documents to
refugees who entered the country in 2013 and after. Refugees in the camps
received basic health care and free treatment for more complicated cases through
the national health insurance scheme. There were, however, approximately 30,000
Burundi-origin urban refugees residing in Kigali and Huye who could not access
the national health insurance scheme. UNHCR and the government expanded access
to secondary education beyond ninth grade and collaborated on increasing
integrated learning opportunities. For example, UNHCR constructed a
112-classroom school in the village outside of Mahama camp--now the largest
school in the country--that served more than 8,000 refugee students and 3,000
children from the host community in an integrated setting. Nevertheless,
distance of some refugee camps from secondary schools and the cost of required
school materials hindered access for some refugees.
Durable Solutions: The government
did not accept refugees for resettlement. The government assisted the safe,
voluntary return of refugees to their countries and sought to improve local
integration of refugees in protracted stays by permitting them to accept local
employment and move freely in the country, and by establishing markets to
facilitate trade between refugees and local citizens. The government did not
facilitate the naturalization of refugees resident in the country.
Temporary Protection: The government
provided temporary protection to individual asylum seekers who might not
qualify as refugees.
The constitution and law provide citizens the ability to choose their
government through free and fair elections based on universal and equal
suffrage, but government restrictions on the formation of opposition parties
limited that ability in practice. The law provides for voting by secret ballot
in presidential and parliamentary--but not local--elections. The RPF and allied
parties controlled the government and legislature, and its candidates dominated
elections at all levels.
Recent Elections: Elections for
parliament’s lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, in 2013 were peaceful and
orderly, but according to international observers did not meet the generally
recognized standards for free and fair elections. In 2010 voters elected
President Paul Kagame to a second seven-year term with 93 percent of the vote;
the National Electoral Commission (NEC) reported that 97.5 percent of the
population participated in the election. Observers’ confidence in the integrity
of electoral results was undermined by their being denied access to vote
tabulation at the polling station, district, and national level. Opposition
parties experienced difficulties in registering candidates ahead of the
elections, depriving voters of a meaningful choice at the polls.
In 2015 the government held a constitutional referendum on a set of
amendments that included provisions that would allow the president to run for
up to three additional terms in office. The NEC reported 98 percent of
registered voters participated, and 98 percent endorsed a set of amendments
that retained term limits and included provisions that shorten the terms in
office of the president and prime minister from seven years to five years but
also provided an exception that would allow President Kagame to run for up to
three additional terms in office (one seven-year term and up to two five-year
terms). The text of the amendments was not generally available to voters for
review prior to the referendum, and political parties opposed to the amendments
were not permitted to hold rallies or public meetings to express their
opposition to the amendments. Observers noted authorities strongly encouraged
citizens to commit to supporting the amendments during “umuganda,” the monthly
mandatory day of community service. Independent international observers did not
monitor or report on the conduct of the referendum.
Political Parties and Political Participation: The constitution outlines a multiparty system but provides few rights for
parties and their candidates. There were some reports the RPF pressured youth
into joining the party during mandatory “ingando” civic and military training
camps after completing secondary school and “itorero” cultural school, which
promoted patriotism in addition to inculcating national customs. There were
also reports RPF members pressured teachers, clergy, and businesspersons to
join the party and coerced political donations from both party members and
nonmembers. Political parties allied to the RPF were largely able to operate
freely, but members faced legal sanctions if found guilty of engaging in
divisive acts, destabilizing national unity, threatening territorial integrity,
or undermining national security.
The Democratic Green Party of Rwanda (DGPR) was registered officially as a
political party in 2013, after the government blocked its attempts to register
in 2009 and 2010. Authorities, however, granted the registration just one
working day before candidate lists for the 2013 Chamber of Deputies elections
were due, and the DGPR was unable to register candidates for the election. DGPR
leaders reported the party was permitted to publish policy proposals as
alternatives to RPF policy and hold small meetings with party supporters. Local
officials, however, often threatened DGPR members with dismissal from
employment or the withholding of state services unless they left the party. In
2014 the organizing secretary for DGPR, Jean Damascene Munyeshyaka, disappeared
after meeting with an unknown individual in the town of Nyamata, Bugesera
District. Police reported no developments regarding his disappearance during
the year.
Party leaders for the unregistered opposition party Democratic Pact of the
Imanzi People (PDP-Imanzi) and a splinter party, the People’s Democratic
Alliance (PDA), continued to seek permission to hold a founding party congress
following the cancellation of the PDP-Imanzi congress in Gasabo District in
2013. The Ministry of Local Government and local officials continued to deny
PDP-Imanzi and PDA permission to hold such a meeting, citing the two parties’
connections to Deo Mushayidi, who remained incarcerated on state security
charges (see section 1.e., Political Prisoners and Detainees).
The government no longer required but strongly encouraged all registered
political parties to join the National Consultative Forum for Political
Organizations, which sought to promote consensus among political parties, and
required member parties to support publicly policy positions developed through
dialogue. At year’s end all registered parties were members of the
organization. Government officials praised it for promoting political unity,
while critics argued it stifled political competition and public debate.
Opposition leaders reported police arbitrarily arrested and beat some
members of the unregistered Social Party-Imberakuri (Bernard Ntaganda faction),
PDP-Imanzi, and FDU-Inkingi parties. Party members reported receiving threats
because of their association with those parties.
In accordance with the constitution, which states a majority party in the
Chamber of Deputies may not fill more than 50 percent of cabinet positions,
independents and members of other political parties allied with the RPF held
key positions in government, including that of prime minister and foreign
minister. The Social Party-Imberakuri and the DGPR were not represented in the
cabinet.
Participation of Women and Minorities: To register as a political party, an organization must present a list of
at least 200 members, with at least five members in each of the 30 districts,
and it must reserve at least 30 percent of its leadership positions for women.
Women secured 64 percent of seats in the 2013 Chamber of Deputies
elections. Domestic observers noted, however, that lawmakers (male and female)
in parliament’s lower house appeared to lack capacity and power to influence
policy or advance legislation.
The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials and private
persons transacting business with the government that include imprisonment and
fines. The law also allows citizens who report requests for bribes by
government officials to receive financial rewards when officials are
prosecuted; however, there were no reported cases of such rewards being given.
While the government implemented anticorruption laws and encourage citizens to
report requests for bribes, corruption remained a problem.
Corruption: Transparency International
Rwanda and other NGOs reported the government investigated and prosecuted
reports of corruption among police and government officials. Police frequently
conducted internal investigations of police corruption, including sting
operations, and punished offenders. The Office of the Ombudsman reported the
government obtained 987 convictions for corruption-related offenses from 2011
to 2016, including 61 individuals who were convicted in the first quarter of
2016. The NPPA processed 200 corruption cases in 2015-16, with charges filed in
121 of them. Journalists and other observers noted corruption investigations
focused exclusively on local officials and private persons; the government did
not prosecute any senior officials for corruption during the year.
Embezzlement is a criminal offense that is litigated separately from other
corruption-related crimes. The NPPA reported 483 convictions stemming from 258
cases of embezzlement in 2015-16. A total of 128 individuals were either
acquitted of embezzlement or had charges dropped due to insufficient evidence
during the year.
In July police arrested the former mayor of Gicumbi District on suspicion
of embezzlement. During the year the NPPA and the Office of the Ombudsman
opened investigations into 110 local leaders and government officials for
corruption and embezzlement of up to 500 million Rwandan francs ($617,000) from
government programs to aid the poor. There were reports district officials manipulated
health insurance enrollment and socioeconomic classification statistics to
appear to meet development targets, and observers noted some of the funds
likely went missing due to mismanagement rather than theft.
International and domestic investors reported the government strongly
supported the establishment of businesses, including through one-stop business
licensing efforts that generally resulted in business registration within 72
hours. Nevertheless, investors reported contract disputes with the government
and arbitrary enforcement of tax, immigration, and investment rules.
The NPPA prosecuted civil servants, police, and other officials for fraud,
petty corruption, awarding of public tenders illegally, and mismanagement of
public assets. Under the Ministry of Justice, the NPPA is also responsible for
prosecuting police abuse cases. The RNP Inspectorate of Services investigated
cases of police misconduct, and in 2014 the RNP launched an anticorruption
unit. Authorities arrested two police officers on corruption charges during the
year and dismissed another 33 in December 2015 for misconduct, indiscipline,
and abuse of power. In August the government also dismissed with disgrace 14
RCS officers for gross misconduct and corruption. The RNP advertised a toll-free
hotline number on local radio and in the press and provided deposit boxes in
many communities to encourage citizens to report both positive and negative
police and DASSO behavior.
The Office of the Auditor General worked to prevent corruption, including
by investigating improper ministerial tendering practices. The RNP and the NPPA
used the auditor general’s annual report to pursue investigations into
government-owned businesses. The Office of the Ombudsman led the National
Anticorruption Council and had an active good governance program and several
local-level anticorruption units. In 2013 the Office of the Ombudsman was
granted legal authority to prosecute corruption cases but had prosecuted only
one case. The Rwanda Governance Board monitored governance more broadly and
promoted mechanisms to control corruption. The Rwanda Revenue Authority’s
Anticorruption Unit had a code of conduct and an active mechanism for internal
discipline. The National Tender Board, Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority, and
National Bureau of Standards also enforced their own regulations.
The government utilized a “bagging and tagging” system to aid companies
with regional and international due diligence requirements related to conflict
minerals. The government maintained a ban on the purchase or sale of
undocumented minerals from neighboring countries. Observers and government
officials reported smugglers trafficked an unknown amount of undocumented
minerals through the country.
Financial Disclosure: The
constitution and law require annual reporting of income and assets by public
officials as well as reporting them upon entering and leaving office. There is
no requirement for public disclosure of those assets, except in cases where
irregularities are discovered. The Office of the Ombudsman, which monitors and
verifies disclosures, reported 99 percent of officials complied with the
requirement in 2015. In cases of noncompliance, the Office of the Ombudsman has
the power to garnish wages and impose administrative sanctions that often
involved loss of position or prosecution.
Public Access to Information: The government
promulgated the Access to Information Law in 2013. The law grants wide access
to government information upon request and in some cases to information held by
private entities when disclosure is deemed to be in the public interest. The
government may limit access to information if its release is considered to be
against the public interest or if the information pertains to national
security, as determined by the Prosecutor General’s Office. As of October the
access to information portal Sobanukirwa, which was launched in
2015, indicated that of 108 requests for information submitted to the
government, 14 received replies.
SECTION
5. GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Several domestic and international human rights groups operated in the
country, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. The
government was often intolerant of public reports of human rights violations
and suspicious of local and international human rights observers, and it often
impeded independent investigations and rejected criticism as biased and
uninformed. Human rights NGOs expressed fear of the government, reported SSF
monitoring of their activities, and self-censored their comments. NGOs working
on human rights and deemed to be critical of the government experienced
difficulties securing or renewing required legal registration.
The government criticized HRW, Reporters Without Borders, the Committee to
Protect Journalists, the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Freedom House,
and Amnesty International for being inaccurate and biased. Following the 2015
publication of HRW’s report on the Gikondo Transit Center, the government
revoked its Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with HRW and suspended HRW’s
registration, forcing the HRW head researcher to leave the country and fire
HRW’s local staff. In June the government signed a new MOU with HRW; however,
it did not act on HRW’s application for renewed registration. After an initial
four-week trip in April and May to conclude and sign the MOU, HRW’s head
researcher was unable to obtain a visa to re-enter the country for either work
or tourism purposes. HRW had not renewed operations by year’s end.
The government conducted surveillance on some international and domestic
NGOs. Some NGOs reported authorities pressured individuals affiliated with them
to provide information on their activities and expressed concern that
intelligence agents infiltrated their organizations to gather information,
influence leadership decisions, or create internal problems.
Several domestic NGOs that contributed reports to the country’s Second
Universal Periodic Review on Human Rights (UPR) in 2015 reported the
SSF temporarily detained and questioned members of the groups on content deemed
to be critical of the government’s human rights record. Some individuals
reported being threatened with arrest and prosecution for the contents of their
reports. Due to SSF intimidation and harassment, several organizations
disavowed their contributions to the review during the year, publicly
retracting their criticism of the government’s human rights record.
A few domestic NGOs--including the League for the Protection of Human
Rights, Youth Association for Human Rights Promotion and Development, Rwandan
Association for the Defense of Human Rights, and League for Human Rights in the
Great Lakes Region (LDGL)--nominally focused on human rights abuses, but their
effectiveness was limited due to internal conflict and self-censorship.
On May 28, Epimack Kwokwo, a Congolese national and the LDGL’s former
executive secretary, was expelled after the government refused his work visa
application, which was submitted in October 2015. The LDGL was unable to carry
out any programming between February, when its registration lapsed, and
November when it was renewed, and the organization succumbed to controversy,
with many members alleging the government manipulated the board elections to
insert progovernment members into the leadership.
A progovernment NGO, the Rwanda Civil Society Platform, managed and
directed some NGOs through umbrella groups that theoretically aggregated NGOs
working in particular thematic sectors. Many observers believed the government
controlled some of the umbrella groups.
In 2014 the Office of the Prime Minister published regulations that
required NGOs to participate in joint action and development forums at the
district and sector level. The regulations granted local government broad
powers to regulate activities, levy fees, and bar organizations that did not
comply. NGO leaders expressed concern the forums’ structure might further
tighten government control over NGO activities; the government responded the
structure was intended to coordinate but not direct their activities.
In 2012 the government passed two NGO laws. The law on local NGOs moved
their oversight from the Ministry of Local Government to the Rwanda Governance
Board, replaced annual registration with one-time registration, and required
submission of annual budgets and reports. The law on international NGOs allows
for registration in up to five-year increments, depending on the duration of an
NGO’s funding, but provides for oversight by the Directorate General of
Immigration and Emigration. The government granted only single-year
registration to many international NGOs, including most involved in human
rights, democratic institution building, and other advocacy issues. It also
limited the number of visas issued to the foreign staff of some international NGOs.
International NGOs in the health, education, and development sectors did not
face similar impediments.
Local and international NGOs often experienced difficulties obtaining
registration, in part because the process required submission of a statement of
objectives, plan of action, and detailed financial information for each
district in which an NGO wished to operate. International NGOs reported the
government used the registration process to delay programming and pressure them
into financially supporting government programs and policies. The regulatory
environment worsened during the year for international NGOs focused on
advocacy, the promotion of media freedom and human rights, and expansion of
civic engagement. Some international NGOs were obliged to cancel their
programming after experiencing registration delays of a year or more.
The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The government sometimes cooperated with
international human rights bodies but criticized the UN Group of Experts on the
DRC, claiming it was inaccurate and biased.
Government Human Rights Bodies: The
independent and adequately funded Office of the Ombudsman operated with the
cooperation of executive agencies and took action on cases of corruption and
other abuses, including human rights cases (see section 4).
The government funded and cooperated with the NHRC. According to many
observers, the NHRC did not have adequate resources to investigate all reported
violations and remained biased in favor of the government. Some victims of
human rights abuses did not report abuses to the NHRC because they perceived it
as biased and feared retribution by the SSF.
In 2012 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, based in Tanzania,
transferred its remaining genocide cases to a Tanzania-based branch of the
Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals that continued to pursue
genocide suspects. From 1994 through year’s end, the tribunal completed 75
cases; of these, 52 were convictions, 11 were convictions pending appeal, and
12 were acquittals. Eight suspects remained fugitives.
Rape and Domestic Violence: The law
criminalizes rape and spousal rape, and the government handled rape cases as a
judicial priority. Penalties for conviction of rape range from five years’ to
life imprisonment with fines of 500,000 to one million Rwandan francs ($617 to
$1,234). Penalties for spousal rape range from two months to life imprisonment
with fines of 100,000 to 300,000 Rwandan francs ($123 to $370).
The law provides for imprisonment of three to six months for threatening,
harassing, or beating one’s spouse. Domestic violence against women was common.
Authorities encouraged the reporting of domestic violence cases, although most
incidents remained within the extended family and were not reported or
prosecuted. The NPPA reported 190 cases of rape; 182 of these were prosecuted
during the year, resulting in 152 convictions. The NPPA also reported 448 cases
of spousal abuse that resulted in 338 prosecutions; of these, 319 cases
resulted in convictions; the remaining 19 were dismissed for lack of evidence.
Police headquarters in Kigali had a hotline for domestic violence. Several
other ministries also had free GBV hotlines. Each of the 78 police stations
nationwide had its own gender desk, an average of three officers trained in
handling domestic violence and GBV cases, and a public outreach program. The
RNP Directorate against GBV handled all cases of such violence and child protection.
The government established 29 one-stop centers throughout the country,
providing medical, psychological, legal, and police assistance at no cost to
victims of domestic violence. The government expanded the network of one-stop
centers in hospitals, districts, and refugee camps.
The government conducted a whole-of-government, multistakeholder campaign
against GBV, child abuse, and other types of domestic violence. GBV was a
required training module for police and military at all levels and was included
as a module for all troops and police deploying to peacekeeping missions
abroad.
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
FGM/C was not traditionally practiced in the country. The government ratified
the Maputo Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa (2003), which prohibits “all forms of female genital
mutilation, scarification, medicalization and paramedicalization of female genital
mutilation, and all other practices in order to eradicate them.”
The law considers all sex-based practices carried out on children,
regardless of form or method and including FGM/C, to be defilement punishable
if convicted by life in prison and a fine of 100,000 to one million Rwandan
francs ($123 to $1,234). There were no reports of FGM/C perpetrated against
children during the year.
Sexual Harassment: The law
prohibits sexual harassment by employers or any other person and provides for
penalties for conviction of two months’ to two years’ imprisonment and fines
from 100,000 to 500,000 Rwandan francs ($123 to $617). Nevertheless, advocacy
organizations reported sexual harassment remained common. The City of Kigali
conducted a program to combat sexual harassment of women and girls in public
spaces, and government officials frequently spoke publicly against sexual
harassment and GBV.
Reproductive Rights: The government
encouraged couples to have no more children than they could afford but also
respected the right of couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly
the number, spacing, and timing of children; manage their reproductive health;
and have the information and means to do so, free from discrimination,
coercion, and violence.
According to the United Nations, the estimated maternal mortality ratio
decreased from 340 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2010 to 290 in 2015, with
a lifetime risk of maternal death of one in 66. Major factors influencing
maternal mortality included lack of access to health facilities due to cost or
distance, and unhygienic conditions.
The UN Population Division estimated 46.7 percent of girls and women ages
15-49 used a modern method of contraception in 2015.
The NGO Ipas and the Great Lakes Initiative for Human Rights Development
reported in 2015 that an average of 25 percent of women in prison were serving
sentences for illegal abortion and were often arrested after seeking emergency
health care for the management of complications arising from abortion. The RCS
disputed the findings, stating only 2 percent of women in prison were serving
sentences for illegal abortion. In December the president pardoned 62 women and
girls serving sentences for abortion; media reported they were under age 16 at
the time of conviction.
Discrimination: Women have the
same legal status and are entitled to the same rights as men, including under
family, labor, nationality, and inheritance laws. The law allows women to
inherit property from their fathers and husbands, and couples may make their
own legal property arrangements. Women experienced some difficulties pursuing
property claims due to lack of knowledge, procedural bias against women in
inheritance matters, multiple spousal claims due to polygyny, and the threat of
GBV. The law requires equal pay for equal work and prohibits discrimination in
hiring decisions.
After the 1994 genocide, which left many women as heads of households,
women assumed a larger role in the formal sector, and many operated their own
businesses. According to the National Institute of Statistics’ 2015
Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey, women headed 26 percent of
households, and 24 percent of these households were in the lowest socioeconomic
category. Women’s work was more concentrated in the agricultural sector, with
79 percent of women engaged in agricultural work, compared with 59 percent of
men. Women worked in sales and commerce in similar proportion to men.
Women comprised 64 percent of the Chamber of Deputies and one-third of
cabinet ministers but were a minority in district- and sector-level government
positions. The 2015 organic law on cell- and sector-level mediation committees
decreed that at least 30 percent of mediation committee members must be women.
Men owned the major assets of most households, particularly those at the lower
end of the economic spectrum, making bank credit inaccessible to many women and
rendering it difficult to start or expand a business.
The government-funded National Women’s Council served as a forum for
women’s issues and consulted with the government on land, inheritance, and
child protection laws. The Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion led
government programs to address women’s issues and coordinated programs with
other ministries, police, and NGOs, including the national action plan for the
implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and
security. The government provided scholarships for girls in primary and
secondary school and loans to rural women. A number of women’s groups actively promoted
women and children’s concerns, particularly those of widows, orphaned girls,
and households headed by children. The government-run Gender Monitoring Office
tracked the mainstreaming of gender equality and women’s empowerment throughout
all sectors of society and collected gender-disaggregated data to inform policy
processes.
Birth Registration: Children
derive citizenship from their parents. Children born to two Rwandan parents
automatically receive citizenship. Children with one Rwandan parent must apply
for citizenship before turning 18. Children born in the country to unknown or
stateless parents automatically receive citizenship. Minor children adopted by
Rwandans, irrespective of nationality or statelessness, automatically receive
citizenship. Children retain their citizenship in the event of dissolution of
the parents’ marriage. Births were registered at the sector level upon
presentation of a medical birth certificate. There were no reports of
unregistered births leading to denial of public services.
Education: The government implemented a
12-year basic education program in 2012 that extended free universal public
education to six years of primary and six years of secondary education.
Education through grade nine is compulsory. Parents were not required to pay
tuition fees, although the LDGL reported in 2015 that “in practice parents have
to pay high education fees for teachers’ incentives and meal expenses.” Radio
programs echoed similar concerns throughout the year.
According to the 2015 Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey,
88 percent of children attended primary school in 2013/14, and 23 percent
attended secondary school. Attendance was higher among girls than boys for both
levels of education: 89 percent for girls compared with 87 percent for boys in
primary school, and 25 percent for girls compared with 21 percent for boys in secondary
school.
Child Abuse: While statistics on child
abuse were unreliable, such abuse was common within the family, in the village,
and at school. The government conducted a high-profile public awareness
campaign against GBV and child abuse. The government supported a network of
one-stop centers and hospital facilities that offered integrated police, legal,
medical, and counseling services to victims of GBV and child abuse.
The government reported all cases of child abuse under the broad heading of
“defilement” regardless of whether the abuse was sexual in nature. From July 1,
2015, to June 30, the NPPA reported prosecuting 1,479 defilement cases; of
these, 1,203 resulted in convictions and 276 in acquittals.
In May the NHRC released a report on sexual harassment and defilement of
minors with the goal of establishing evidence-based mitigation strategies to
combat GBV. Based on interviews with more than 200 child victims of sexual
abuse and harassment, the report identified teachers and caretakers as the most
common perpetrators of GBV while noting the study revealed extensive
underreporting due to cultural reasons and fear of stigma.
Early and Forced Marriage: The minimum
age for marriage is 21. Anecdotal evidence suggested child marriage was more
common in rural areas and refugee camps than in urban areas.
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): For information for girls under 18, see Women’s section above.
Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law states sexual relations with a child under age 18 constitute
child defilement and are punishable if convicted by life in prison and a fine
of 100,000 to one million Rwandan francs ($123 to $1,234). Between July 2015
and July 2016, the NPPA received 2,272 defilement cases; of these, 1,479 were
prosecuted to conclusion, 437 cases were dismissed due to lack of evidence, and
356 remained in litigation at year’s end.
The law prohibits commercial sexual exploitation of children and child
pornography, which are punishable by penalties if convicted of six months to
seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 to 20 million Rwandan francs
($617 to $24,700). Conviction statistics were not available. The government,
however, reported prosecuting 30 human trafficking cases during the year,
resulting in seven convictions and seven acquittals, with 16 cases undecided at
year’s end. Local media reports indicated victims in a number of these cases
were minors.
Child Soldiers: There were no
reports of RDF recruitment of Rwandan children as child soldiers. In contrast
with the previous year, there were no confirmed reports of refugee children of
Burundian origin recruited into armed groups.
The government supported the Musanze Child Rehabilitation Center in
Northern Province that provided care and social reintegration preparation for
children who previously served in armed groups in the DRC (see section 2.d.,
Emigration and Repatriation). The center provided education, psychosocial
support, recreational and cultural activities, medical care, and agricultural
vocational training.
Displaced Children: There were
numerous street children throughout the country. Authorities gathered street
children in district transit centers and placed them in rehabilitation centers.
Conditions and practices varied at 29 privately run rehabilitation centers for
street children.
UNHCR reported that approximately 1,500 unaccompanied children entered the
country as part of an influx of more than 81,000 refugees from Burundi in
2015-16. UNHCR accommodated unaccompanied minors in the Mahama refugee camp and
had camp staff provide them additional protection measures.
Institutionalized Children: The UN
Children’s Fund reported in 2014 that one privately run and 30 government-run
childcare institutions provided shelter, basic needs, and rehabilitation for
approximately 3,000 orphans and street children. According to the National
Commission for Children, 70 percent of children in orphanages were not orphans
but had either run away from or been abandoned by their families. The
government worked with international organizations and NGOs to provide
vocational training and psychosocial support to orphans and street children,
reintegrate them into their communities, and educate parents on how to prevent
their children from becoming street children.
International Child Abductions: The country is
not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction. See the Department of State’s Annual Report on
International Parental Child Abduction at travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/en/legal/compliance.html.
There was a very small Jewish community, consisting entirely of foreigners,
and there were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.
The law prohibits discrimination against persons with physical, sensory,
intellectual, and mental disabilities in employment, education, air travel and
other transportation, access to health care, the judicial system, and the
provision of other state services, and the government generally enforced these
provisions. The law also mandates access to public facilities, accommodations
for taking national examinations, provision of medical care by the government,
and monitoring of implementation by the NHRC. The government generally
implemented all of the foregoing provisions. Despite a continuing campaign to
create a barrier-free environment for persons with disabilities, accessibility
remained a problem throughout the country, including in public buildings. For
example, civil society groups reported a need for interpreters fluent in sign
language in police stations and courts.
Many children with disabilities did not attend primary or secondary school.
The National Council of Persons with Disabilities estimated in 2014 there were
3,500 primary school students in special centers established to serve children
with disabilities. Few students with disabilities reached the university level
because many primary and secondary schools were unable to accommodate their
disabilities. Institutes of higher education admitted some students with
disabilities, but only the National University of Rwanda and the Kigali
Institute of Education were able to accommodate students with visual
disabilities.
There was one government psychiatric referral hospital in Kigali, with
district hospitals providing limited psychiatric services. All other mental
health facilities were nongovernmental. Facilities were often underequipped and
understaffed, although the government worked to improve staffing and equipment
in health facilities throughout the country.
Some citizens viewed disability as a curse or punishment that could result
in social exclusion and sometimes abandoned or hid children with disabilities
from the community.
The National Council of Persons with Disabilities, which assisted
government efforts to provide for the rights of persons with disabilities,
designated one member with disabilities to the Chamber of Deputies. The
National Union of Disability Organizations in Rwanda provided an umbrella civil
society platform for advocacy on behalf of persons with disabilities. A
disabilities coordination forum was organized every trimester.
Persons with mental disabilities were required to submit a medical
certificate to be eligible to vote. Some disabilities advocates complained
requirements for electoral candidates to hold secondary education diplomas or
higher degrees, depending on position, disadvantaged persons with disabilities.
Advocates for persons with disabilities raised concerns regarding exclusion of
persons with disabilities from polling centers and denial of their applications
to the NHRC to serve as election monitors.
Longstanding tensions in the country culminated in the 1994
state-orchestrated genocide that killed between 750,000 and one million
citizens, including approximately three-quarters of the Tutsi population.
Following the killing of the president in 1994, an extremist interim government
directed the Hutu-dominated national army, militia groups, and ordinary
citizens to kill resident Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The genocide ended later
in 1994 when the predominantly Tutsi RPF, operating from Uganda and northern
Rwanda, defeated the national army and Hutu militias and established an RPF-led
government of national unity that included members of eight political parties.
Since 1994 the government has called for national reconciliation and
abolished the policies of the former government that created and deepened
ethnic cleavages. The government removed all references to ethnicity in
official discourse--with the exception of references to the genocide, which is
officially termed “the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi”--and eliminated ethnic
quotas for education, training, and government employment.
Some individuals stated the government’s reconciliation policies and
programs failed to recognize Hutu victims of the genocide or stated crimes
committed by the RPF after the end of the genocide.
The constitution provides for the eradication of ethnic, regional, and
other divisions in society and the promotion of national unity. Most citizens
know the regional or ethnic origin of their fellow citizens, and anecdotal
reports suggested ethnic background played an important role in marriage,
particularly in rural communities.
Beginning in the 1920s, colonial authorities formally assigned “racial”
categories to all citizens and required them to carry identity cards indicating
their designated ethnicity: Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. Government authorities
continued this practice until after the 1994 genocide. The postgenocide
government banned identity card references to ethnicity and prohibited social
or political organizations based on ethnic affiliation. As a result the Twa,
who number approximately 34,000, lost their official designation as an ethnic
group. The government no longer recognizes groups advocating specifically for
Twa needs, and some Twa believed this government policy denied them their
rights as an indigenous ethnic group. Nonetheless, the government recognized
the Community of Rwandan Potters, a registered NGO focused primarily on Twa
community needs, as an advocate for the most marginalized. Most Twa lived on
the margins of society with very limited access to health care and education.
There are no laws that criminalize sexual orientation or consensual
same-sex sexual conduct, and cabinet-level government officials expressed
support for the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex
(LGBTI) persons. LGBTI persons reported societal discrimination and abuse, and
LGBTI rights groups reported occasional harassment by neighbors and police.
There were no known reports of physical attacks against LGBTI persons, nor
were there any reports of LGBTI persons fleeing the country due to harassment
or attack.
The constitution is silent on HIV-positive status; however, the penal code
provides for imprisonment of up to six months for persons convicted of
stigmatizing an individual who suffers from an incurable infection. There were
no reports of prosecutions under this statute. Discrimination against persons
with HIV/AIDS occurred, although such incidents remained rare. The government
actively supported relevant public education campaigns, including establishing
HIV/AIDS awareness clubs in secondary schools and making public pronouncements
against stigmatization of those with the disease.
The penal code also provides stiffer penalties for conviction of rape and
defilement in cases of transmission of an incurable illness. In most cases of
sexual violence, the victim and alleged perpetrator both undergo HIV testing.
The law provides penalties for conviction of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment in
cases where an adult rape victim contracted an incurable disease; in cases
where no transmission occurs, the penalty is typically five years’ imprisonment.
Conviction of rape with intention to infect another person with an incurable
illness carries a 20- to 25-year prison sentence. The law provides for life
imprisonment in cases where child defilement led to the transmission of an
incurable disease.
According to RDF policy and in keeping with UN guidelines, the military did
not permit its members with HIV/AIDS to participate in peacekeeping missions
abroad but allowed them to remain in the RDF.
The law provides that “every worker in every enterprise,” except for
certain senior public servants, police, and soldiers, has the right to form and
join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. The
law also permits informal-sector workers to join unions, conduct strikes, and
bargain collectively, but informal workers are exempt from other protections of
the law. Most provisions of the law generally do not protect unregistered small
business, cooperatives, and informal-sector workers.
The law restricts voluntary collective bargaining by requiring prior
authorization or approval by authorities and requiring binding arbitration in
cases of nonconciliation. The law allows unions to negotiate with employers for
an industry-level minimum wage in certain sectors, but these agreements were
not enforced.
The law provides some workers the right to conduct strikes, subject to
numerous restrictions. Public servants, soldiers, and employees providing
“essential services” generally are not permitted to strike, and participation
in unauthorized demonstrations may result in employee dismissal, nonpayment of
wages, and civil action against the union. A union’s executive committee must
approve any strike, and the union must first try to resolve its differences
with management through complex compulsory arbitration, conciliation, and
mediation processes prescribed by the Ministry of Public Service and Labor.
Other provisions of the law frequently abrogated these rights. For example,
a ministerial order that broadly defines essential services to include public
transportation, security, education (during national exams), water and
sanitation, and telecommunications severely restricts the right to strike in
these fields.
Ministerial orders define the implementation of the labor law; there are no
significant inconsistencies between the law and ministerial orders. All unions
must register with the Ministry of Public Service and Labor. The application
process was cumbersome, lengthy, and costly, and it required unions to disclose
their membership and property.
The law allows unions to conduct activities without interference, prohibits
antiunion discrimination, and requires employers to reinstate workers fired for
union activity. Conviction of antiunion interference and discrimination are
subject to penalties of up to two months in prison and fines of 50,000 to
300,000 Rwandan francs ($62 to $370), which were not sufficient to deter
violations.
There were 29 labor unions organized into three confederations: 15 unions
were represented by the Rwanda Confederation of Trade Unions (CESTRAR), seven
by the Labor and Worker’s Brotherhood Congress (COTRAF), and seven by the
National Council of Free Trade Union Organizations in Rwanda. All three
federations ostensibly were independent, but CESTRAR had close links to the
government and the ruling RPF party.
Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining generally
were not respected. The government did not enforce applicable laws effectively
and restricted these rights.
The government severely limited the right to collective bargaining, and
legal mechanisms were inadequate to protect this right. Labor union officials
commented that many private-sector businesses controlled by the RPF or the RDF
were off limits to collective bargaining negotiations. The government also
controlled collective bargaining with cooperatives. No labor union had an
established collective bargaining agreement with the government.
Collective bargaining occasionally was practiced in the private sector. For
example, in 2015 an international tea exporter renewed its 2012 collective
bargaining agreement with its employees. CESTRAR, COTRAF, and the Ministry of
Public Service and Labor participated in the negotiations.
There were neither registered strikes nor anecdotal reports of unlawful
strikes during the year; the last recorded strike was by textile workers in
2013.
National elections for trade union representatives were held in 2015. Trade
union leaders stated the government interfered in the elections and pressured
some candidates not to run.
There were no functioning labor courts or other formal mechanisms to resolve
antiunion discrimination complaints, and COTRAF reported it could take four to
five years for labor disputes to be resolved through the civil courts.
According to several trade unions, employers in small companies frequently used
transfers, demotions, and dismissals to intimidate union members.
The law prohibits most forms of forced or compulsory labor, and the
government generally enforced the law. In 2014 the government issued a national
trafficking in persons action plan that included programs to address forced
labor. The penal code criminalizes human trafficking under a variety of
articles. The law prescribes penalties for conviction of seven to 10 years’
imprisonment or fines ranging from 5,444,600 to 10,958,120 Rwandan francs
($6,722 to $13,528) for internal trafficking, and up to 15 years’ imprisonment
for transnational trafficking. Penalties are sufficiently stringent and
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes. Child trafficking
convictions are subject to a minimum five-year prison term, while slavery
convictions carry three- to 12-year prison terms. Statistics on the number of
victims removed from forced labor were not available.
Also see the
Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.
The minimum age for full-time employment is 16. The law prohibits children
under age 18 from participating in hazardous work, defined as night work from 7
p.m. to 5 a.m.; the worst forms of child labor as defined under International
Labor Organization Convention 182; or any work deemed difficult, unsanitary, or
dangerous by the Ministry of Public Service and Labor. Prohibited sectors
include work in industrial institutions, domestic service, mining and
quarrying, construction, brick making, or applying fertilizers and pesticides.
The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor by children; children in military
service, prostitution, or pornography; and child trafficking and slavery. The
law provides for working children to have at least 12 hours of rest between
work periods. The law provides six months to 20 years’ imprisonment and fines
of 500,000 to five million Rwandan francs ($617 to $6,173) for violations. The
law applies to contractual employment but not to noncontractual employment,
such as subsistence family farming or casual labor in agricultural
cooperatives, and thus leaves most working children unprotected. In addition to
national law, some districts enforced local regulations against hazardous child
labor and sanctioned employers and parents for violations. The government did
not enforce the law effectively. Police, immigration officials, local
government officials, and labor inspectors received training on identifying
victims of trafficking.
The National Commission for Children (NCC) took the lead role in
designating responsible agencies and establishing actions to be taken,
timelines, and other concrete measures in relation to the integrated child
rights policy and various national commissions, plans, and policies related to
child protection subsumed therein. At the local level, 149 child labor
committees monitored incidents of child labor, and each district was required
to establish a steering committee to combat child labor. At the village level,
320 child labor focal point volunteers were appointed, supported by 10 national
protection officers appointed by the NCC and 48 social workers. A domestic NGO
completed a survey on child labor under NCC supervision in July, but it had not
made the results public by year’s end. Similarly, a different NGO completed a
targeted survey of the prevalence of child labor in tea-growing districts, but
the survey results, presented to the Ministry of Public Service and Labor in
March, remained unpublished at year’s end. The ministry conducted labor
inspections of firms previously known to employ children, focusing on companies
operating in the mining, construction, and agriculture sectors. The RNP
operated a Child Protection Unit. District government officials, as part of
their performance contracts, enforced child labor reduction and school
attendance benchmarks.
The government worked with NGOs to raise awareness of the problem and to
identify and send to school or vocational training children involved in child
labor. The Ministry of Public Service and Labor invited private-sector
businesses to sign a memorandum of understanding committing them to eradicate
child labor. The government’s 12-year basic education program aided in reducing
the incidence of child labor, although many children who worked also attended
school because classes were held in alternating morning or afternoon shifts.
The government fined those who illegally employed children or parents who sent
their children to work instead of school. Teachers and local authorities
received training on the rights of children and other human rights. The
ministry raised public awareness of the worst forms of child labor through
radio shows, television announcements, and skits. Government efforts to stop
child prostitution included a high-profile public campaign to discourage
intergenerational sex and sexual procurement.
The majority of child laborers worked in the agricultural sector and as
household domestics. Child labor also existed in isolated instances in small
companies and light manufacturing, in cross-border transportation, and in the
brick making, charcoal, rock crushing, and mining industries. Children received
low wages, and abuse was common. In addition trafficking of children, including
child prostitution, were problems.
Also see the
Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/findings/.
The law prohibits discrimination based on race, ethnicity, national origin,
gender, marital status, religion, political affiliation, pregnancy, disability,
socioeconomic status, age, and “any other type of discrimination.” The law does
not specifically protect sexual orientation, gender identity, and HIV-positive
status. The constitution requires equal pay for equal work.
The government sought to enforce antidiscrimination laws, but there were
numerous reports not challenged in court of discrimination based on gender,
pregnancy, disability, and political affiliation. Migrant workers enjoyed the
same legal protections, wages, and working conditions as citizens.
During the year the National Labor Council approved a proposal to increase
the national minimum wage, which would be the first revision to the minimum
wage since 1974, when it was set at 100 Rwandan francs ($0.12) per day. The
government, however, did not publish the new minimum wage by October. The
Ministry of Public Service and Labor set industry-specific minimum wages in the
small formal sector. For example, the minimum wage in the tea industry ranged
from 500 to 1,000 Rwandan francs ($0.61 to $1.23) per day, while in the
construction industry it ranged from 1,500 to 5,000 Rwandan francs ($1.85 to
$6.17) a day, depending on skill level. Sector minimum wages were not enforced.
Minimum wages provided a higher standard of living than that of the
approximately 80 percent of the population relying on subsistence farming. As
the country’s largest employer, the government effectively set most other
formal-sector wage rates.
According to the 2015 Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey,
the percentage of citizens in 2014 living below the poverty line was 39
percent, and the percentage living in extreme poverty was 16 percent.
The law provides a standard workweek of 45 hours and 18 to 21 days paid
annual leave, in addition to official holidays. The law provides for premium
pay for overtime for some salaried employees and sets prohibitions on excessive
compulsory overtime, but these provisions often were disregarded and rarely
enforced. The law provides employers with the right to determine daily rest
periods. Most employees received a one-hour lunch break.
During the year the labor law was amended to provide fully paid maternity
leave for up to three months. In February the government required formal-sector
employees to contribute 0.3 percent of their salary to a fund to support
maternity benefits; employers are required to match employee contributions on a
one-to-one basis.
The law regulates hours of work and occupational health and safety standards
in the formal-wage sector. Ministerial orders determine the modalities for
establishing and operating occupational safety and health committees, but the
committees had not been established. The same labor standards applied to
migrant and foreign workers as to citizens.
The ministry had 35 labor inspectors, with at least one in each district,
who reported to district mayors. Inspectors did not enforce labor standards
effectively. The many violations reported to labor unions compared to the few
actions taken by the government and employers to remedy substandard working
conditions suggested penalties were insufficient to deter violations.
Some workers accepted less than the minimum wage. Families regularly
supplemented their incomes by working in small businesses or subsistence
agriculture. Most workers in the formal sector worked six days per week.
Violations of wage, overtime, and occupational health and safety standards were
common in both the formal and informal sectors. Local media highlighted the common
problem of employers not registering employees for social security or
occupational health insurance and not paying into those benefit systems as
required by law. Workers in the subcontractor and business process outsourcing
sectors were especially vulnerable to hazardous or exploitative working
conditions. Statistics on workplace fatalities and accidents were not
available, but ministry officials singled out mining as a sector with
significant problems in implementing occupational safety and health standards.
There were no major industrial accidents during the year.
Workers did not have explicit rights to remove themselves from situations
that endangered their health or safety without jeopardizing their jobs. The
Ministry of Public Safety and Labor sought to promote the health and safety of
workers by maintaining a list of dangerous professions subject to heightened
safety scrutiny.
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine
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Profile
I am Jean-Christophe Nizeyimana, an Economist, Content Manager, and EDI Expert, driven by a passion for human rights activism. With a deep commitment to advancing human rights in Africa, particularly in the Great Lakes region, I established this blog following firsthand experiences with human rights violations in Rwanda and in the DRC (formerly Zaïre) as well. My journey began with collaborations with Amnesty International in Utrecht, the Netherlands, and with human rights organizations including Human Rights Watch and a conference in Helsinki, Finland, where I was a panelist with other activists from various countries.
My mission is to uncover the untold truth about the ongoing genocide in Rwanda and the DRC. As a dedicated voice for the voiceless, I strive to raise awareness about the tragic consequences of these events and work tirelessly to bring an end to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)'s impunity.
This blog is a platform for Truth and Justice, not a space for hate. I am vigilant against hate speech or ignorant comments, moderating all discussions to ensure a respectful and informed dialogue at African Survivors International Blog.
Genocide masterminded by RPF
Finally the well-known Truth Comes Out.
After suffering THE LONG years, telling the world that Kagame and his RPF criminal organization masterminded the Rwandan genocide that they later recalled Genocide against Tutsis. Our lives were nothing but suffering these last 32 years beginning from October 1st, 1990 onwards. We are calling the United States of America, United Kingdom, Japan, and Great Britain in particular, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Germany to return to hidden classified archives and support Honorable Tito Rutaremara's recent statement about What really happened in Rwanda before, during and after 1994 across the country and how methodically the Rwandan Genocide has been masterminded by Paul Kagame, the Rwandan Hitler. Above all, Mr. Tito Rutaremara, one of the RPF leaders has given details about RPF infiltration methods in Habyarimana's all instances, how assassinations, disappearances, mass-slaughters across Rwanda have been carried out from the local autority to the government,fabricated lies that have been used by Gacaca courts as weapon, the ICTR in which RPF had infiltrators like Joseph Ngarambe, an International court biased judgments & condemnations targeting Hutu ethnic members in contraversal strategy compared to the ICTR establishment to pursue in justice those accountable for crimes between 1993 to 2003 and Mapping Report ignored and classified to protect the Rwandan Nazis under the RPF embrella . NOTHING LASTS FOREVER.
Human and Civil Rights
Human Rights, Mutual Respect and Dignity
For all Rwandans :
Hutus - Tutsis - Twas
Rwanda: A mapping of crimes
Rwanda: A mapping of crimes in the book "In Praise of Blood, the crimes of the RPF by Judi Rever
Be the last to know: This video talks about unspeakable Kagame's crimes committed against Hutu, before, during and after the genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda.
The mastermind of both genocide is still at large: Paul Kagame
KIBEHO: Rwandan Auschwitz
Kibeho Concetration Camp.
Mass murderers C. Sankara
Stephen Sackur’s Hard Talk.
Prof. Allan C. Stam
The Unstoppable Truth
Prof. Christian Davenport
The Unstoppable Truth
Prof. Christian Davenport Michigan University & Faculty Associate at the Center for Political Studies
The killing Fields - Part 1
The Unstoppable Truth
The killing Fields - Part II
The Unstoppable Truth
Daily bread for Rwandans
The Unstoppable Truth
The killing Fields - Part III
The Unstoppable Truth
Time has come: Regime change
Drame rwandais- justice impartiale
Carla Del Ponte, Ancien Procureur au TPIR:"Le drame rwandais mérite une justice impartiale" - et réponse de Gerald Gahima
Sheltering 2,5 million refugees
Credible reports camps sheltering 2,500 million refugees in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo have been destroyed.
The UN refugee agency says it has credible reports camps sheltering 2,5 milion refugees in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo have been destroyed.
Latest videos
Peter Erlinder comments on the BBC documentary "Rwanda's Untold Story
Madam Victoire Ingabire,THE RWANDAN AUNG SAN SUU KYI
Rwanda's Untold Story
Rwanda, un génocide en questions
Bernard Lugan présente "Rwanda, un génocide en... par BernardLugan Bernard Lugan présente "Rwanda, un génocide en questions"
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Everything happens for a reason
Bad things are going to happen in your life, people will hurt you, disrespect you, play with your feelings.. But you shouldn't use that as an excuse to fail to go on and to hurt the whole world. You will end up hurting yourself and wasting your precious time. Don't always think of revenging, just let things go and move on with your life. Remember everything happens for a reason and when one door closes, the other opens for you with new blessings and love.
Hutus didn't plan Tutsi Genocide
Kagame, the mastermind of Rwandan Genocide (Hutu & tutsi)
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