A Candle For Remembering
May this memorial candle lights up the historical past of our beloved Country: Rwanda, We love U so much. If Tears could build a stairway. And memories were a lane. I would walk right up to heaven. To bring you home again. No farewell words were spoken. No time to say goodbye. You were gone before I knew it And. Only Paul Kagame knows why. My heart still aches with sadness. And secret tears still flow. What It meant to lose you. No one will ever know.
Why did Kagame this to me?
Can't forget. He murdered my mother. What should be my reaction? FYI: the number of orphans in Rwanda has skyrocketed since the 1990's Kagame's invasion. Much higher numbers of orphans had and have no other option but joining FDLR fighters who are identified as children that have Lost their Parents in Kagame's Wars inside and outside of Rwanda.If someone killed your child/spouse/parent(s) would you seek justice or revenge? Deep insight: What would you do to the person who snuffed the life of someone I love beyond reason? Forgiving would bring me no solace. If you take what really matters to me, I will show you what really matters. NITUTIRWANAHO TUZASHIRA. IGIHE KIRAGEZE.If democracy is to sell one's motherland(Africa), for some zionits support, then I prefer the person who is ready to give all his live for his motherland. Viva President Putin!!!
RPF committed the unspeakable
The perverted RPF committed the UNSPEAKABLE.Two orphans, both against the Nazi world. Point is the fact that their parents' murder Kagame & his RPF held no shock in the Western world. Up to now, the Rwandan Hitler Kagame and his death squads still enjoy impunity inside and outside of Rwanda. What goes through someone's mind as they know RPF murdered their parents? A delayed punishment is actually an encouragement to crime, In Praise of the ongoing Bloodshed in Rwanda. “I always think I am a pro-peace person but if someone harmed someone near and dear to me, I don't think I could be so peaceful. I would like to believe that to seek justice could save millions of people living the African Great Lakes Region - I would devote myself to bringing the 'perp' along to a non-happy ending but would that be enough? You'd have to be in the situation I suppose before you could actually know how you would feel or what you would do”. Jean-Christophe Nizeyimana, Libre Penseur
Hutu Children & their Mums
Look at them ! How they are scared to death. Many Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi, Foreign human rights advocates, jounalists and and lawyers are now on Death Row Waiting to be murdered by Kagame and his RPF death squads. Be the last to know.
Almighty God :Justice for US
Hutu children's daily bread: Intimidation, Slavery, Sex abuses led by RPF criminals and Kagame, DMI: Every single day, there are more assassinations, imprisonment, brainwashing & disappearances. Do they have any chance to end this awful life?
Killing Hutus on daily basis
RPF targeted killings, very often in public areas. Killing Hutus on daily basis by Kagame's murderers and the RPF infamous death squads known as the "UNKNOWN WRONGDOERS"
RPF Trade Mark: Akandoya
Rape, torture and assassination and unslaving of hutu women. Genderside: Rape has always been used by kagame's RPF as a Weapon of War, the killings of Hutu women with the help of Local Defense Forces, DMI and the RPF military
The Torture in Rwanda flourishes
How torture flourishes across Rwanda despite extensive global monitoring
Fighting For Our Freedom?
We need Freedom, Liberation of our fatherland, Human rights respect, Mutual respect between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority
Wednesday, July 24, 2013
"One good reason to focus more attention on opportunity is that Americans have always cared more about equal opportunity than about equal results. The commitment to provide everyone with a fair chance to develop their own talents to the fullest is a central tenet of the American creed. This belief has deep roots in American culture and American history and is part of what distinguishes our public philosophy from that of Europe".
Hello everybody --
The basic bargain of this country says that if you work hard, you can get ahead -- you can build a secure life for your family, and know that your kids will do even better someday.
But for more than a decade, that bargain has frayed, and a devastating recession made it worse.
Over the past four and a half years, America has fought its way back, laying a new foundation for more durable economic growth. But many of the challenges that faced the middle class before the recession remain. And Washington has taken its eye off the ball.
 |
| President Obama |
Too many people in this town are focused on scoring political points or fanning phony scandals instead of finding ways to help grow our economy, create jobs, or roll back a 30-year trend of rising inequality.
It’s time for that to stop. It’s time for all of us to focus on our top priority as a country, and that’s reigniting the engine of our prosperity: a rising, thriving middle class.
That’s what I just said while speaking at Knox College, back home in Illinois, where I kicked off a series of speeches on what truly matters to the middle class.
This has been my North Star for as long as I've been in office, and it's what will shape the time that I have left in the White House.
In the weeks ahead, in towns across the country, I’ll be talking about my ideas for building on the cornerstones of middle-class security: Good jobs with good wages. An education that prepares our children and our workers for a new economy. A home to call your own. Affordable health care when you get sick. A secure retirement even if you’re not rich. A better bargain for the middle class, and for all who are striving to join it.
This is the debate we need to have. And you can join me right now.
Let the country know that you believe that America works best not when it grows from the top down, but when it grows from the middle out:
Thank you,
President Barack Obama
This email was sent to jeanchris19@hotmail.com.
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Please do not reply to this email. Contact the White House
The White House • 1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW • Washington, DC 20500 • 202-456-1111
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine
The United States on Tuesday called on Rwanda to end support for M23 rebels in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo, saying there was evidence Rwandan military officials were involved.
US urges Rwanda to drop support for DR Congo rebels
WASHINGTON, July 23, 2013 (AFP) – The United States Tuesday toughened its tone against Rwanda, demanding it withdraw troops from the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and end support to M23 rebels accused of atrocities there.
In its strongest comments to date against Rwandan leaders, Washington said there was “a credible body of evidence” linking top Rwandan officials to the rebels who have brought months of terror to the central African country.
“We call upon Rwanda to immediately end any support to the M23, withdraw military personnel from eastern DRC and follow through on its commitments,” State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki told reporters.
Her comments came after a damning report by Human Rights Watch and ahead of a UN Security Council meeting on the Great Lakes meeting to be chaired in New York on Thursday by US Secretary of State John Kerry.
The HRW report found M23 rebels have summarily executed some 44 people and raped 61 women and girls since March 2013 in eastern DR Congo.
Residents had reported regular movements of men dressed in Rwandan army uniforms into Congo, while food, ammunition and other supplies were coming from Rwanda to the M23.
“Not only is Rwanda allowing its territory to be used by the abusive M23 to get recruits and equipment, but the Rwandan military is still directly supporting the M23,” said Daniel Bekele, Africa director at Human Rights Watch.
“This support is sustaining an armed group responsible for numerous killings, rapes and other serious abuses.”
The M23 are Tutsi fighters formerly of the Rwanda-backed rebel group National Congress for the Defense of the People, or CNDP.
They were integrated into DR Congo’s regular army in 2009 as part of a peace deal following their failed 2008 offensive on the eastern city of Goma.
Rwanda has long denied any complicity in the violence, with Rwandan President Paul Kagame — a US ally — last year dismissing the allegations made by the UN and various human rights groups as “ridiculous.”
Psaki said: “We believe there is a credible body of evidence that supports the key findings of the Human Rights Watch report, including support by senior Rwandan officials to the M23 and of Rwandan military personnel in the DRC.”
She refused to say whether there had been any direct contact between the US administration and Kigali following the release of the HRW report on Monday, but she said the State Department’s views were shared by the White House.
Last year the US froze $200,000 of military aid to Kigali amid concerns over support for M23 rebels but did not go as far as accusing the Rwandan military and officials of specific involvement.
Fresh fighting raged in the DR Congo’s restive east for several hours Monday as army helicopters attacked positions of the M23 rebels, who fired mortars in return, both sides said.
The latest clashes in the central African country’s mineral-rich but conflict-torn east broke four days of relative calm, further damaging a tattered truce that had lasted from late May, when UN chief Ban Ki-moon visited the region, until July 14.
jkb/nss
Residents had reported regular movements of men dressed in Rwandan army uniforms into Congo, while food, ammunition and other supplies were coming from Rwanda to the M23.
“Not only is Rwanda allowing its territory to be used by the abusive M23 to get recruits and equipment, but the Rwandan military is still directly supporting the M23,” said Daniel Bekele, Africa director at Human Rights Watch.
“This support is sustaining an armed group responsible for numerous killings, rapes and other serious abuses.”
The M23 are Tutsi fighters formerly of the Rwanda-backed rebel group National Congress for the Defense of the People, or CNDP.
They were integrated into DR Congo’s regular army in 2009 as part of a peace deal following their failed 2008 offensive on the eastern city of Goma.
Rwanda has long denied any complicity in the violence, with Rwandan President Paul Kagame — a US ally — last year dismissing the allegations made by the UN and various human rights groups as “ridiculous.”
Psaki said: “We believe there is a credible body of evidence that supports the key findings of the Human Rights Watch report, including support by senior Rwandan officials to the M23 and of Rwandan military personnel in the DRC.”
She refused to say whether there had been any direct contact between the US administration and Kigali following the release of the HRW report on Monday, but she said the State Department’s views were shared by the White House.
Last year the US froze $200,000 of military aid to Kigali amid concerns over support for M23 rebels but did not go as far as accusing the Rwandan military and officials of specific involvement.
Fresh fighting raged in the DR Congo’s restive east for several hours Monday as army helicopters attacked positions of the M23 rebels, who fired mortars in return, both sides said.
The latest clashes in the central African country’s mineral-rich but conflict-torn east broke four days of relative calm, further damaging a tattered truce that had lasted from late May, when UN chief Ban Ki-moon visited the region, until July 14.
jkb/nss
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine
Wednesday, July 17, 2013
 |
| Ms Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza Wacu The Would-Be President of Rwanda STILL in Kagame's solitary goal. |
SOLIDARITY FOREVER !
Here is the UN Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo MidtermReport under Resolution 1533, Dated June 20, 2013, Exclusively Put Online by Inner City Press
Letter dated 20 June 2013 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee establishedpursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo
The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the honour to transmit the mid-term report of the Group, prepared in pursuance of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2078 (2012).
Nelson Alusala
Daniel Fahey
Henry Fomba
Bernard Leloup
Marie Plamadiala
Emilie Serralta
I. Introduction
1. By his letter dated 28 December 2012 (S/2012/967), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had appointed to the Group of Experts the following individuals: Mr. Nelson Alusala of Kenya (arms); Mr. Henry Fombah of Cameroon (customs and aviation); Mr. Bernard Leloup of Belgium (regional issues); Ms. Marie Plamadiala of the Republic of Moldova (armed groups); and Ms. Emilie Serralta of France (natural resources and Coordinator).
2. By his letter dated 2 January 2013 (S/2013/1), the Secretary-General appointed the sixth member of the Group, Mr. Daniel Fahey of the United States (finance). Mr. Stéphane Auvray, Political Affairs Officer in the Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat, assists the Group.
3. Following bilateral consultations with members of the Security Council Committeeestablished pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter “the Committee”) and concerned Member States in New York, the Group presented its investigative priorities to the Committee on 1 February 2013. The Group arrived in the DRC on 9 February and met with DRC central and provincial government authorities. Between February and May 2013, the Group visited the provinces of Katanga, Maniema, North Kivu, Orientale and South Kivu.
4. During the first part of its mandate, the Group conducted two official visits to Uganda, two official visits to Rwanda, and an official visit to Burundi. The Group also conducted official visits to Germany, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Group wishes to express its gratitude to these governments for their availability and cooperation. However, the Group regrets that the Government of Rwanda did not authorize two members of the Group (its experts on armed groups and regional issues) to carry out official missions on its territory or to meet with the Rwandan delegation in New York on 29 January 2013.
5. The Group of Experts also wishes to express its appreciation to MONUSCO for its support and continued cooperation since the beginning of this mandate.
6. The Group of Experts’ role is to gather and analyze all relevant information on flows of arms and related material, and on networks operating in violation of the arms embargo concerning the DRC.
7. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2078 (2012), the Group of Experts submits the following mid-term report in fulfillment of its obligation to report to the Council, through the Committee, by 28 June 2013. The purpose of the report is: (a) To describe the Group’s mandate and methodology; (b) To define the framework of the Group’s current investigations; and (c) To highlight critical events related to the Group’s mandate which have taken place since the submission of its final report on 12 October 2012 (S/2012/843), including updates on sanctioned individuals and entities.
8. The Group used evidentiary standards recommended by the report of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997), relying on authentic documents and, as much as possible, on first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves. The Group corroborated information by using at least three independent and reliable sources. The Group notably used eyewitness testimonies from former and current combatants of armed groups, and members of local communities where incidents took place. In addition, the Group obtained telephone records, bank statements, money transfers records, photos, videos, and other material evidence to corroborate its findings.
II- Congolese armed groups
A- Mouvement du 23 mars (M23)
9. The Group of Experts’ 2012 final report (S/2012/843) documented arms embargoviolations committed by the Government of Rwanda and by senior officials of theGovernment of Uganda, in their support of M23 rebels and their allies. As part of itscommitment to uphold the right of reply, the Group annexes to the present report a letterwritten by the Prime Minister of Uganda regarding the 2012 report findings (see annex 1). Since the outset of its current mandate, the Group has to date found no indication of support to the rebels from within Uganda, and has gathered evidence of continuous - but limited - support to M23 from within Rwanda. The Group sent a letter to the Government of Rwanda on 14 June 2013 asking for clarification about this support and looks forward to a reply.
10. In early 2013, leadership struggles between sanctioned M23 leaders Gen. BoscoNtaganda and his deputy, “Brig. Gen.” Sultani Makenga, led to a split in M23, and ultimately to military confrontations between both factions. After a period of two weeks of combat, Makenga’s troops, supported by demobilized soldiers from Rwanda, defeated troops loyal to Ntaganda on 15 March 2013. At the same time, Rwandan officials dismantled Ntaganda’s network of support and recruitment in Rwanda. FN1
11. After Ntaganda and 788 of his loyal troops and political cadres fled into Rwanda,Makenga struggled to rebuild a weakened M23. The movement is unable to control its entire territory and suffers from poor morale and scores of desertions. FN2 During the course of the Group’s mandate, Makenga’s M23 has continued to recruit in Rwanda and to enlist demobilized Rwandan soldiers. Some Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) officers have also held meetings with M23 commanders and impeded the voluntary repatriation of M23 combatants to Rwanda.
1 See para. 16-17
2 See para. 31 and 99Ntaganda-led M23
12. Fearing arrest pursuant to a warrant from the International Criminal Court (ICC), M23’s senior commander Gen. Ntaganda clandestinely led the rebellion from a hideout near the Rwandan border, while his deputy Makenga acted as the official leader of the movement. FN3 Ntaganda played a key role in M23 by developing a recruitment network within Rwanda and forging alliances between M23 and other armed groups. Starting in late 2012, Ntagand increasingly endeavored to control M23 and monopolized leadership positions for his loyal officers. While M23 attempted to build an image of a political movement with legitimate demands, such a movement led by Ntaganda and his officers, who are notorious for their poo human rights records, FN4 was not a credible interlocutor during the International Conference on the Great Lakes (ICGLR)-led negotiations in Kampala, Uganda.
13. Strong disagreements between Ntaganda and Makenga concerning the management of M23 eventually led to a split and subsequently to open military confrontation. Ntaganda used his network of contacts within Rwanda to support his own M23 faction. To halt Ntaganda’s activities, Rwandan authorities arrested some of the individuals who were part of this network FN5. Some Rwandan officers also provided limited material support to Makenga as he sought to defeat Ntaganda.
Divisions within M23
14. The two M23 commanders first clashed during their November 2012 takeover of Goma FN6. Ntaganda moved into the city, once it fell into the rebels’ hands, despite Makenga’s advice to not do so, according to two M23 cadres and provincial authorities. Current M23 president Bertrand Bisimwa reported to the Group that Makenga ordered his soldiers to vacate Goma following international pressure, but Ntaganda’s loyalists attempted to remain in the provincial capital. According to M23 cadres and politicians close to M23, M23’s then President and Ntaganda’s ally, Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerero, unilaterally promoted Col. Baudoin Ngaruye as a “Brigadier General,” elevating him to the same rank as Makenga to have more leverage on decision-making.
15. Following M23’s withdrawal from Goma on 1 December 2012, the leadership struggles continued. Ntaganda and Makenga clashed over the division of the goods looted from Goma (see box below), and both endeavored to appoint their officers and cadres to key positions within the M23. FN7 According to former M23 soldiers, Ntaganda bribed M23 officers to gain their loyalties and managed to mobilize a majority of M23 officers around him. Former M23 political cadres and an M23 supporter stated that Ntaganda recruited in Rwanda FN8 and maintained supporters within the RDF.
3 See S/2012/843; para.6
4 Ntaganda’s loyal officers include sanctioned individuals Col. Baudouin Ngaruye, Col. Innocent Zimurinda, and Lt Col Eric Badege, whose names were added to the 1533 Sanctions Committee List on 31 December 2012 (Badege), 30 November 2012 (Ngaruye), and 1 December 2010 (Zimurinda) respectively.
5 For more details on Ntaganda’s network, see S/2012/843; para. 30
6 Ntaganda and Makenga had already clashed following former CNDP Gen. Laurent Nkunda’s arrest in January 2009. Nkunda was betrayed by Ntaganda, who took over his position as the military commander of CNDP.
7 Ntaganda accused Makenga of receiving bribes from the Congolese delegation in Kampala to integrate in the FARDC. Ntaganda had imposed his military Aide de Camp, Col. Alex Bizimungu Masozera, as part of the M23 political delegation to receive reports of the negotiations. Col. Masozera had been instrumental in large scale smuggle of minerals in Goma before the 2012 mutiny (see S/2011/738, para. 613).
8 See S/2012/843, paras. 22-23
16. According to M23 cadres, a former RDF officer, a former M23 officer, an M23collaborator, and two Congolese politicians, Rwandan officials who had previously supported Ntaganda, and who could no longer control his network in Rwanda or his actions in the DRC, decided to sideline him from M23 and to dismantle his support in Rwanda. In late December 2012, Rwandan authorities arrested RDF Col. Jomba Gakumba, due to his close ties with Ntaganda, according to former RDF officers and an M23 collaborator. FN9 A former Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) member, two former RDF officers and a politician loyal to Ntaganda, told the Group that Bishop John Rucyahana, a Ntaganda ally in Rwanda who recruited politicians and raised funds for M23 FN10, had to stop his collaboration. The Group has sought clarification from the Government of Rwanda on the matter and is awaiting a response.
17. An RDF officer, an M23 cadre, and two M23 collaborators stated that on 10 March 2013, Rwandan authorities arrested Gafishi Semikore and Theo Bitwayiki, while they attempted to help Ntaganda from Rwanda by supplying him with small quantities of ammunition, food and medical supplies during the hostilities between the two factions in Kibumba FN11.
Begin box
M23 looted Goma
M23 engaged in extensive looting while in Goma in November 2012. M23 cadres and several politicians informed the Group that Ntaganda and former M23 president Runiga had appointed loyal M23 members to positions in the DRC customs offices at the border between Goma and Gisenyi, Rwanda, where they embezzled cash and other goods (see annex 2). On 26 November 2012, Ntaganda’s business associate Logo Kubu FN12 deposited USD 38,050 in an account with Equity Bank just across the border in Gisenyi (see annex 3). The Group hascontacted Equity Bank for furtherdetails. Ntaganda loyalist Ngaruye organized the systematic looting of Government offices and vehicles (annex 4). Officers loyal to Makenga seized one FARDC T55 tank (see annex 5), as well as an extensive stock of FARDC heavy weapons and mortars (see annex 6). A DRC government report estimates that M23-stolen goods from government offices were valued at over USD 3,000,000 (see annex 7). In April, the Group observed trucks stolen in Goma stationed in M23-controlled Bunagana, at theborder with Uganda (annex 8).
End box
Separation between M23 factions
18. M23 split in two factions on 28 February 2013. Ntaganda and his officers took uppositions at Kibumba, 27 kilometers north of Goma (see annex 9), while Makengamaintained control of Rumangabo, situated further north (see annex 10). Former Ntaganda loyalists reported that Ntaganda had grown suspicious, fearing arrest, and increased his own protection. Ntaganda had retained the loyalty of most of the movement’s troops, and M23 “Minister of Finance” Ephrem Bwishe told the Group that prior to joining Ntaganda in Kibumba, Runiga took with him most of the M23’s finances. Makenga retained most of the movement’s weapons and ammunition stock.
9 S/2012/843, para. 83.10 S/2012/843, para.30.
11 Gafishi Semikore and Theo Bitwayiki were part of Ntaganda's recruitment and support network in Gisenyi.
12 S/2011/738; para. 601.19. The presidents of both M23 factions denied having collaborated with Ntaganda. InFebruary 2013, Bertrand Bisimwa, the president of Makenga’s M23, told the Group that M23 leaders had discovered that Ntaganda was hiding in M23-held territory. On 27 February, Bisimwa issued a communiqué accusing Runiga of offering Ntaganda “political leverage to influence decisions of the M23”, and firing him as president (see annex 11). In an interview with the Group, however, Runiga denied having allied with Ntaganda and said that he had not seen him since January 2012.20. In late February 2013, Ntaganda attempted to prepare an escape route towards Masisi. According to an Ntaganda loyalist, a former M23 officer and a M23 collaborator, Ntaganda maintained regular contacts with ex-Congrès national du peuple (CNDP) Col. Francois Mudahunga, the FARDC 812th Regiment commander in Kitchanga. In collaboration with Mudahunga, Ntaganda sent about 50 men to prepare for his eventual escape to Masisi and to collect ammunition from the weapons caches hemaintained there (see para. 117-123).
Fight between M23 factions
21. On 28 February 2013, fighting broke out between the two M23 factions. Three former RDF officers, an M23 cadre, an M23 collaborator and a Congolese politician stated that while some Rwandan officers had ensured Ntaganda of their assistance, in reality they had decided to support Makenga.
22. Demobilized Rwandan soldiers assisted Makenga’s advance against Ntaganda. Twoactive M23 members and an M23 collaborator confirmed that groups of demobilizedRwandan soldiers had infiltrated into the DRC during the two weeks of fighting to assistMakenga. Five former M23 officers separately witnessed the arrival of small groups of men from Rwanda, who were immediately assigned specific military roles, and joined Makenga’s forces in combat against Ntaganda’s troops. FN13 The Group sought clarification about this matter from the Government of Rwanda and is awaiting an answer.
23. Makenga had a tactical advantage since he controlled most of the heavy weapons looted in Goma, as well as weapons M23 had captured during previous operations and the movement’s ammunition stock. Makenga’s commanders used a tank, a multi-barrel rocket launcher and 14.5 mm heavy machine guns to push Ntaganda’s soldiers towards the Rwandan border. According to one M23 officer, one former M23 officer and one M23 civilian member, four demobilized Rwandan soldiers assisted Makenga’s troops to operate the heavy weapons.
13 These same sources told the Group that this type of immediate assignment to military roles only takes place when the recruits have prior military or police experience, in contrast to recruits who have no experience, who are assigned to a training program.
24. Rwandan officers also fed disinformation to Ntaganda which precipitated his defeat.According to two former RDF officers, an M23 officer, former M23 officers, and anNtaganda loyalist, some RDF officers met Ntaganda in early March 2013, ahead of the final battle, and promised to support him with troops and ammunition. Former M23 soldiers who fought alongside Ntaganda reported that soldiers of the RDF Special Forces that were deployed along the border provided Ntaganda with ammunition at the outset of the fighting, which made him believe that he enjoyed RDF support.
25. Two former M23 officers and one former M23 soldier told the Group they overheard regular telephone communications between Ngaruye and RDF officers during that week, following which Ngaruye ensured his troops they would receive support from Rwanda. However, as the fight progressed, it became clear the ammunition would not come. According to three former M23 soldiers, Ntaganda’s soldiers who attempted to flee to Rwanda during the week of 11 March 2013 were caught by RDF soldiers at the border and
handed over to Makenga’s force.
Surrender of Ntaganda’s M23 branch
26. As his troops ran low on ammunition, Ntaganda fled into Rwanda. According to three loyalists, former M23 officers, and soldiers who fought alongside him, Ntaganda feared that the RDF soldiers deployed along the border would kill him. Makenga’s deputy, sanctioned Colonel Innocent Kaina, also told the Group that he had planned to kill Ntaganda. Two officers loyal to Makenga also reported that the latter had ordered his troops to kill Ntaganda.
27. On 15 March 2013, Ntaganda clandestinely crossed the border into Rwanda using a small path in the Gasizi area, with one escort. Four of Ntaganda’s troops, two politicians loyal to Ntaganda, three M23 members, and an Ntaganda family member told the Group that he reached Kigali with the help of his family, and arrived at the United States embassy on 18 March where he requested to be transferred to the ICC, without the prior knowledge of Rwandan authorities. Subsequently, Rwandan authorities arrested an individual suspected of having aided Ntaganda’s escape, and interrogated Ntaganda’s wife and brother FN14.
28. According to the ICGLR Joint Verification Mechanism, 788 individuals, consisting of 718 FN15 of Ntaganda’s troops and 70 political cadres, began crossing into Rwanda on 15 March through the Kabuhanga and Gasizi border points. About 500 troops surrendered to Makenga in the DRC on Saturday 16 March (see annex 12). RDF soldiers disarmed Ntaganda’s troops who entered Rwanda. In a letter to the Group in April 2013, the Government of Rwanda confirmed that “upon their arrival on the territory of Rwanda, all M23 combatants were disarmed”. According to Rwandan authorities, the combatants handed over a total of 409 arms, including 333 sub-machine guns (see annex 13).
14 In 2012, Ntaganda’s brother facilitated the travels of recruits through Ntaganda’s hotel – Bushokoro - in Kinigi, Rwanda. See S/2012/843 para. 22.
15 This figure has also been reported by a foreign diplomat to the Group and by the Kigali-based New Times in an article on 18 March 2013.
29. Ntaganda’s M23 faction that crossed the border into Rwanda from 15 to 16 Marchincluded five sanctioned individuals. While Ntaganda was transferred on 22 March 2013from Kigali to the ICC in the Hague, on 1 April 2013 the Rwandan authorities relocated Runiga, Ngaruye, Col. Innocent Zimurinda and Col. Eric Badege to Ngoma, about 300 km
away from the DRC border. The DRC authorities have issued arrest warrants for thesesanctioned individuals. On 22 March 2013, the Group visited the former M23 members in Rwanda. Rwandan officials shared with the Group a list of 509 of the 788 individuals who crossed into their territory (see annex 14).
30. Based on the accounts of former M23 officers and M23 medical personnel, the Group estimates that over 200 combatants from both factions died during the fighting. The same sources reported over 50 injured on the Makenga side, and that some of the injured on Ntaganda’s side were executed on Ntaganda’s orders (see para. 141). Rwandan authorities told the Group that of the Ntaganda loyalists who crossed into Rwanda, 159 were injured.
Makenga-led M23
31. After Ntaganda’s defeat, Makenga remained with a weakened M23 of some 1,500soldiers spread out over an area of 700 square kilometers. From 20 March to 19 June 2013, a total of 349 M23 combatants surrendered to MONUSCO DDRRR and many others have surrendered to the FARDC or fled. Moreover, M23 has lost the support of leaders and communities which had supported Ntaganda in northern Rwanda, and stopped benefitting from the recruitment and financial networks he had established. Troop shortages forced Makenga to vacate several M23 positions, opening the way to incursions of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and Nyatura into M23-held areas (see annex 15).
32. Makenga has attempted to increase the movement's strength through recruitment in DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. Thanks to assistance from some sympathetic Rwandan officials, Makenga has been able to recruit in Rwanda, but Ugandan officials have thwarted several M23 attempts to recruit on their territory. Despite recent recruitment, M23’s failed attempt at the end of May 2013 to recover a key FARDC position near Goma illustrates the movement's current inability to carry out large-scale coordinated military operations. M23 prepares new military operations
33. After Ntaganda’s M23 faction was dismantled, negotiations between the Government of the DRC and Makenga’s M23 resumed in Kampala in June 2013. However, while Makenga promised his soldiers that they would be integrated into the FARDC after defeating Ntaganda, eight former M23 soldiers interviewed by the Group indicated that Makenga planned a new attack on Goma.
34. Subsequent to the adoption on 28 March 2013 of Security Council resolution 2098 (2013) authorizing the deployment of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to neutralize and disarm Congolese rebels, M23 leaders addressed letters to Member States contributing troops to the FIB (South Africa, Tanzania) to dissuade them from sending their troops to the DRC (see annex 16).
35. According to former M23 soldiers, M23 held military training sessions in April and May 2013, which included training on urban warfare and guerilla techniques to defend against the FIB. Current and former M23 members informed the Group that on 27 May 2013, all M23 political cadres attended a one-week training session in leadership and management, during which the rebels apportioned key administrative functions in the event of a recapture of Goma.
Recruitment
36. The Group notes that M23 recruitment in Rwanda has decreased since the dismantling of Ntaganda’s recruitment network; community leaders in northern Rwanda who supported Ntaganda have ceased collaborating with the M23. However, an active M23 political cadre, former M23 officers, and local leaders reported that since the end of March 2013, M23 has recruited approximately 200 new recruits, some of whom came from refugee camps in Rwanda, while others – including children – were recruited in Rutshuru and Masisi territories in the DRC. The M23 also attempted to recruit in refugee camps in western Uganda (see para. 39).
37. Since mid-February 2013, the Group has interviewed 66 surrendered M23 officers and soldiers, including 23 Rwandan nationals. Between 1 January and 9 June 2013, theMONUSCO DDRRR section had demobilized and repatriated 57 former M23 soldiers who declared they were Rwandan nationals.16 However, during its May 2013 visit to Mutobo, the DDRRR demobilization camp in Rwanda, a camp official told the Group that no former M23 combatants had ever arrived at the base.
38. Fourteen former M23 soldiers told the Group that Rwandan nationals who deserted M23 and tried to return directly to Rwanda, were forcibly returned to M23 by RDF officers. Amongst the 14, the Group spoke to two soldiers who had themselves been forced back to M23 in DRC by RDF soldiers. One of the two soldiers had fled to Rwanda alongside four other M23 soldiers in March. The soldier said his group was immediately brought back to the DRC border by RDF soldiers and handed over to M23 commanders, who imprisoned them at Rumangabo. The other M23 soldier told the Group he fled from M23 in January and was arrested in Rwanda by RDF officers and sent back to M23. In April, another former M23 soldier witnessed RDF soldiers bringing a group of 10 soldiers back to Makenga after they had attempted to flee to Rwanda.
39. M23 has also been recruiting in Uganda on a limited scale. The Group interviewed three Ugandan citizens who had been recruited in Kampala by an M23 agent called Mufuruki in May 2013 and subsequently escaped. Mufuruki had promised them lucrative jobs in the DRC. Upon their arrival at the Bunagana border post, they were handed over to another M23 agent named Mr. Kazungu who ferried them across the border into Congo and delivered the to M23 commanders. The commanders threatened to shoot the recruits when they protested. Ugandan officials told the Group that on 7 May 2013, they arrested seven individuals suspected of recruiting for M23. In June 2013, six Ugandan nationals deserted M23 and surrendered to MONUSCO DDRRR.FN16 During the same period, DDRRR also repatriated 1 Ugandan and 1 Kenyan nationals who surrendered from M23.Infiltration of demobilized Rwandan soldiers
40. In 2013, M23 has enlisted demobilized Rwandan soldiers in its ranks. FN17 Three former RDF officers, ten former M23 soldiers, and five former M23 officers reported that M23 agents recruit demobilized soldiers in Rwanda. Since February, the Group interviewed threedemobilized Rwandan soldiers who reported that RDF officers sympathetic to M23 had recruited them. According to three former RDF officers, an M23 collaborator, and a M23 current member, RDF officers sympathetic to M23 have facilitated M23’s recruitment inside Rwanda by asking senior demobilized officers at the district level to work with local chiefs to enlist demobilized RDF soldiers for M23. Former RDF officers, an M23 cadre, and a former M23 officer told the Group that M23 recruited both former RDF and former FDLR soldiers in Musanze and Rubavu.
41. Since March 2013, former M23 officers reported to the Group that demobilized soldiers joined M23 in discreet groups of 5 to 30 individuals which were also sighted by local leaders from the Chanzu and Kabuhanga areas. Once in M23-held territory, these recruits received military fatigues, ranks, and weapons at the M23 headquarters at Chanzu, and atRumangabo. FN18 They subsequently received a briefing at Chanzu and were mixed into different brigades. Former and current M23 cadres told the Group that demobilized soldiers usually performed specialized functions such as the operation of heavy weapons.
42. Demobilized Rwandan soldiers have been killed on M23 frontlines in the DRC. The Group obtained the identities and addresses of seven families residing in the northern Rwandan villages of Bigogwe and Mukamira, whose sons fought in the ranks of M23 as demobilized soldiers and died during the fighting between Makenga and Ntaganda.
43. Since the beginning of its current mandate, the Group has interviewed one active RDF soldier who was arrested in the DRC at the end of 2012. However, since the fall of Goma in November 2012, the Group has not documented any instances of full RDF units support toM23. FN19
Begin Box
Mutaho operation
On 20 May 2013, three days prior to the visit of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to Goma, M23 unsuccessfully attempted to seize Mutaho hill, one of the FARDC’s positions defending Goma (see annex 17). Current and former M23 members reported that M23redeployed troops towards Goma, vacating other positions (see annex 18). The rebels also moved their heavy weapons southwards (see annex 19). However, faced with strong resistance from the FARDC, the rebels retreated to their initial positions. According to former M23 officers who participated in the combat, M23 soldiers ran out of ammunition, lacked rockets and shells, suffered 40 dead and over 30 injured, and were compelled to announce a unilateral cease-fire, after failing to receive promised troo and ammunition support from within Rwanda (see annex 20). Between 21 and 22 May 2013, five 122mm cannon rounds were fired by M23 on a densely inhabited area of Goma and the Mugunga IDP camp (see annex 21). Two M23 members and three former M23 soldiers who participated in the fighting told the Group that the rounds had been fired on a civilian objective following an operator error (see para. 142). In early June 2013, an active M23 member and two M23 collaborators told the Group that M23 maintained troops in advanced positions close to Goma. According to the same sources, during a meeting held on 1 June at Chanzu, Makenga told his troops that operations on Goma were to be resumed.
End box
17 In Rwanda, most demobilized RDF soldiers and demobilized FDLR soldiers become part of the RDF Reserve Forces (see S/2012/843; para. 20).
18 M23 administrative headquarters are in Rumangabo and the military headquarters in Chanzu.
19 S/2012/348/Add.1, para. 31.Meetings with RDF officers
44. The Group received information that M23 commanders have regularly met with RDF officers. Three former M23 officers, a former M23 cadre and several local authorities told the Group that, from March through May 2013, they had witnessed M23 Colonels Kaina and Yusuf Mboneza meeting with RDF officers at the border of Kabuhanga. Current and former M23 members reported that some RDF officers, or their representatives, have also travelled to Chanzu or Rumangabo to hold meetings with Makenga.
Arms and ammunition used by M23.
45. FARDC officers and M23 members told the Group that, as it left Goma on 1 December 2012, M23 captured a large quantity of rockets, mortars and ammunition. However, current and former M23 members reported that while much of the ammunition stolen by the rebels in Goma is still available in the movement’s stocks, it does not always correspond to the types of weapons the rebels use. Finance
46. According to M23 cadres, Ntaganda and Runiga financed M23 through a network of individual supporters and business dealings. They used part of their revenues to bribe M23 officers to join their side. M23 officers who had formerly supported Ntaganda told the Group that they had received salaries during his last few months with the M23 because he had attempted to buy their loyalties. All of the M23 officers and soldiers interviewed by the Group who surrendered from Makenga’s M23 stated that they had not received salaries while serving under Makenga.
47. According to current and former M23 members, M23 continue taxing commercial trucks crossing its checkpoints at Kibumba and Kiwanja, and the border at Bunagana; these taxes are currently the main source of revenues for M23. M23 tax USD 200 to USD 1000 per truck, depending on the load (see annex 22). According to M23 members, the movement earns an average of USD 6.000 per day from this taxation or USD 180.000 per month. Since Ntaganda’s surrender, Makenga has attempted to reorganize the movement’s finances (see annex 23).
B- Armed groups allied with M23
48. Since 2012, M23 has attempted to create a broad coalition of armed groups in theexpectation that simultaneous attacks on several fronts would overburden the FARDC.During 2013, M23 continued to foster insecurity while its representatives were at thenegotiating table in Kampala. The movement’s objective was to demonstrate the existence of a wider governance problem in the DRC, seemingly unrelated to M23. Following M23’s brief takeover of Goma, the rebels expanded their alliances in the DRC using Rwandan territory. After Ntaganda’s surrender, Makenga consolidated M23’s collaboration with most armed groups that Ntaganda and Runiga had originally mobilized. However, many of the M23-led alliances were short lived, as the DRC government managed to arrest or neutralize several M23 allies operating in South Kivu and the Beni area.
a- Union des forces révolutionnaires du Congo (UFRC)
49. In its 2012 final report, the Group documented M23 attempts to win allies in SouthKivu FN20. However, these alliances have not gained much ground, as M23 lacks popular support in South Kivu. After M23 withdrew from Goma on 1 December, its initiatives to open a second front in South Kivu continued. Gustave Bagayamukwe Tadji, a political activist and former employee of the DRC Central Bank, attempted to organize armed groups in South Kivu on behalf of M23.
50. In August 2012, Bagayamukwe travelled to M23-held areas to meet Col. Albert Kahasha, who hails from South Kivu and had joined M23 in Rutshuru, North Kivu. M23 commanders decided that Kahasha was to become the military leader of the M23 in South Kivu (see annex 24). Makenga coordinated Kahasha’s move to South Kivu with Bagayamukwe. According to Bagayamukwe, one of his collaborators, and a current M23 cadre, in November 2012 Kahasha travelled through Rwanda where he held a series of meetings, following which he crossed back into the DRC. After a failed attempt to integrate into the FARDC in November 2012, Kahasha fled to Walungu territory in South Kivu and continued his collaboration with
M23.
20 see S/2012/843, paras. 69-81
51. On 16 December 2012, Kahasha and Bagayamukwe created a political-military group called Dynamique populaire pour le changement (DPC), to bring together various armed groups for the M23. The declaration signed by Bagayamukwe and Kahasha at this occasion included the phrase “sent to M23 for approval” and called for all DRC institutions to be disbanded (see annex 25).
52. Bagayamukwe travelled again to M23-held Bunagana on 8 January 2013 to participate in a meeting led by sanctioned M23 leaders Runiga, Makenga and Ngaruye. The purpose of the meeting was to further consolidate M23 alliances and open a front in South Kivu. Bagayamukwe, a UFRC member, and a UFRC collaborator confirmed the details of this meeting to the Group. Two participants in the meeting, as well as two former M23 politicians, told the Group that representatives of several armed groups from South Kivu had gathered at Bunagana that day. Among the attendees were Benoît Kadage, Sadock Kayira, and Citoyen Ruhema, who lived in Kigali at the time and were trying to recruit members of the Banyamulenge community throughout the Great Lakes region for M23.
53. According to three participants in this meeting, Makenga thanked the attendees for having turned against the DRC Government, promised financial support, and stated that he maintained a weapons cache in South Kivu. He added that while M23 was not able to carry out military operations because it was negotiating in Kampala, “salvation needed to come from South Kivu”. After the meeting, Bagayamukwe spent several days in M23-held areas to learn about the movement (see annex 26).
54. Three UFRC members told the Group that through this coalition, M23 leaders intended to ally with several Raia Mutomboki factions operating in South Kivu and mobilize Banyamulenge youth, together with Lt Col. Bede Rusagara’s group under the command of Kahasha. According to the same sources, Raia Mutomboki Colonels Kashi Maheshe and Mukimbula Ndushi allied with M23, as well as Deogratias Bizibu Balola, the former opposition party Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS) president in Bukavu, who resigned in September 2012 to create an armed group. The Group obtained a copy of a declaration made by Bagayamukwe during the meeting with M23 at Bunagana, in which he outlined the details of the armed groups he wished to federate (see annex 27). The Group also obtained the copy of a text message sent by Bagayamukwe on 3 February 2013, in which he claimed that he would soon liberate the DRC (see annex 28).
55. Bagayamukwe told the Group that he travelled to and from Bunagana through theCyanika border between Rwanda and Uganda (see annex 29), and that he subsequently went to Gisenyi, Rwanda. Bagayamukwe also reported that he had prepared a declaration creating UFRC in Gisenyi, which he released on 20 January 2013 (see annex 30); this was confirmed to the Group by a UFRC collaborator. In addition, M23 political cadres told the Group they had met Bagayamukwe in Gisenyi.
56. UFRC diaspora members interviewed by the Group confirmed that Bagayamukwe had coordinated the creation of the UFRC while he was in Rwanda. The Group obtained a rental contract in the name of Bagayamukwe for a residence in Kamembe, Rwanda (see annex 31), as well as a letter dated 6 January 2013 in which Bagayamukwe requested to set up his residence in Rwanda (see annex 32). After spending nearly three weeks in Rwanda between Kigali and Kamembe, Bagayamukwe travelled through Burundi to cross back into the DRC on 9 February, and was arrested the following day by the DRC authorities.
57. Bagayamukwe told the Group that the UFRC received the support of diaspora members. In this connection, the Group has been in contact with Tamusa Lumembo residing in Belgium, Moké Silubwe residing in France, and Gaudens Bisimwa residing in Germany. All three confirmed they were active UFRC members. The Group obtained the copy of a draft communiqué nominating Lumembo as the coordinator of the UFRC diaspora (see annex 33). After Bagayamukwe’s arrest, Silubwe became the president of the UFRC and issued a declaration condemning the arrest (see annex 34).
58. UFRC diaspora members told the Group that the diaspora is specifically tasked withcollecting money to finance the UFRC and that its members have opened a bank account for that purpose (see annex 35). The same sources reported that diaspora members created a budget based on the estimated cost of toppling the DRC Government (see annex 36). To date, the Group has concluded that the diaspora linked to the UFRC has mainly carried out propaganda on behalf of the movement; the Group intends to further investigate other forms of support.
59. The DRC Government cracked down on the UFRC and arrested Bagayamukwe and Colonels Mushamuka and Mbangu Mukaz, two Raia Mutomboki leaders operating under Kahasha’s command. As a result, the prospect of forming a coalition for South Kivu has lost momentum. However, Kahasha continues operating in Walungu alongside some Raia Mutomboki factions, maintains his alliance with M23 and enjoys the cooperation of the same diaspora members. On 24-25 April 2013, Kahasha attacked the positions of FARDC 1002 Regiment in Chishadu in South Kivu. Silubwe issued a communiqué acknowledging UFRC responsibility for the attack (see annex 37). While the communiqué claimed victory for UFRC, an FARDC officer and a UN source told the Group that several Raia Mutomboki soldiers had been killed in the battle.
Wednesday, July 10, 2013
Attentat contre Habyarimana. Kagame dans de sales draps. Patrick Karegeya et Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa prêts à témoigner
Importance "HIGH" : Find out on this: A powerful and indeed extra-ordinary revelation if you ask me. But before we go any further, let’s try to make sense of this claimA LIRE SURTOUT: Kayumba Nyamwasa: «Je suis prêt à apporter toutes les preuves»
Ancien chef des services de renseignement extérieur du Rwanda, Patrick Karegeya comme le général Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, accusent le président Paul Kagame d’être le responsable de l’attentat qui, en avril 1994, a coûté la vie à Juvénal Habyarimana.
Pour Patrick Karegeya, la CPI devait traduire en justice Paul Kagame et pas Bosco Ntaganda, qui est du reste Rwandais lui aussi. Il a été choisi dans l’armée rwandaise, avant d’être envoyé auprès de Thomas Lubanga. Auteur des crimes contre l’humanité, le coupable ne devait pas être Ntaganda, mais bien Kagame, renchérit-il.
Tous ceux qui ont suivi les interviewes de Patrick Karegeya et Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa sur les antennes de lRadio France Internationale (RFI) sont non seulement étonnés mais superbement surpris de la tournure que prend cet accident d’avion qui a malheureusement coûté la vie au Général Habyarimana, ancien président du Rwanda avant d’ouvrir la brèche au génocide rwandais. Après les contradictions suscitées par le rapport du juge Jean-Louis Brugière, tout le monde pensait que cette question appartenait déjà au passé, d’autant qu’elle était à la base de plusieurs incidents diplomatiques entre la France et le Rwanda.
Une certaine opinion estime que le passage de Barak Obama en Tanzanie, un pays membre de la Communauté internationale pour la région des Grands Lacs (CIRGL) a été un élément déclencheur. D’autres pensent à la visite de Yamina Benguigui et Valérie Trierweiler dans l’Est de la Rdc comme fait déclencheur, tant elles ont palpé du doigt les réalités jamais vécues. D’où la Rfi aurait arrosé à flot le pauvre président rwandais dans toutes ses grandes éditions d’hier.
Mais d’autres analystes pensent que la communauté internationale en a marre de la situation de guerre qui ne se termine pas à l’Est de la Rd Congo et est déterminée à s’occuper de tous les pyromanes.
Quoiqu’on en dise, cette fois-ci, il s’agit donc d’une affaire rwando-rwandaise qui met à nu l’implication personnelle de Paul Kagame dans le choix fait sur la personne de Bosco Ntaganda pour venir en appui à Thomas Lubanga. Selon Patrick Karegeya, Bosco Ntaganda est bien sûr Rwandais. Il a été choisi dans l’armée rwandaise, envoyé auprès de Lubanga.
Donc, quand il cause tous ces crimes, le coupable ne devait pas être Ntaganda, mais bien Kagame. Kagame serait donc dans de sales draps et la fin de son mandat risque d’être riche en rebondissements dans la mesure où il a fait tuer des innocents pendant qu’il était le vrai coupable.
L’Avenir
The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine
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SurViVors SPEAK OUT - Rights of Victims Seeking Justice and Compensation for the RPF Genocide. This is an Exciting Collaborative Project launched by The AS International Founder Jean-Christophe Nizeyimana, Economist and Human Rights Activist. Join US and Be the First to know about the Mastermind of the Rwandan Genocide Still At large and enjoing Impunity.