Thursday, 16 April 2009, 14:11
S E C R E T STATE 037561
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 04/16/2034
TAGS PINR, KSPR, ECON, KDEM, KHIV, ZF, XA, CF, RW, BY
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: AFRICAN GREAT
LAKES (DROC, BURUNDI, RWANDA)


REF: A. 08 KIGALI 00830--05/DEC/2008 B. 08 STATE 122706--19/NOV/2008 C. 04 STATE 101403--06/MAY/2004


Classified By: SUZANNE MCCORMICK, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS, REASON: 1.4(C).
Summary


A national human intelligence collection directive issued under Hillary Clinton's name calls for highly detailed and personal information on figures at top levels of society in Congo, Rwanda and Burundi. It asks for details on military facilities, such as airfields and army camps, and on military equipment, including numbers, operational status and procurement/refurbishment activity. Key passage highlighted in yellow


1. (S/NF) This cable provides the full text of the new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on African Great Lakes (paragraph 3-end) as well as a request for continued DOS reporting of biographic information relating to DROC, Burundi, and Rwanda (paragraph 2).


A. (S/NF) The NHCD below supersedes the NHCD contained in Ref C and reflects the results of a recent Washington review of reporting and collection needs announced in Ref B focused on African Great Lakes. The review produced a comprehensive list of strategic priorities (paragraph 3) and reporting and collection needs (paragraph 4) intended to guide participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and update plans to collect information on African Great Lakes. We thank Kigali for its Ref A input. The priorities should also serve as a useful tool to help the Embassy manage reporting and collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans (MSPs).


B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.


C. (S/NF) Important information often is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose agencies participated in the review of this National HUMINT Collection Directive. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to encourage relevant reporting through their own or State Department channels. We appreciate Ref A response from Kigali.


2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting:


A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State reporting officers for much of the biographical information collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email and other means is vital to the community's collection efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for dissemination to the IC.


B. (S/NF) Reporting officers should include as much of the following information as possible when they have information relating to persons linked to African Great Lakes: office and organizational titles; names, position titles and other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other relevant biographical information.


3. (S/NF) Priority issues and issues outline:


I. Regional Issues


A. Democratization and Political Stability 1) Leadership Dynamics (DEPS) 2) Rebel and Militia Groups (SRCC) 3) Democracy and Governance (DEPS) 4) Political Opposition (DEPS) B. Military and Security 1) Military Developments (FMCC) 2) Weapons Procurement (FMCC) 3) Police and Paramilitary Forces (CINT) 4) GRPO can provide text of this issue. 5) Support to US Military Contingency Planning (HREL) 6) Terrorism (TERR) C. Societal Challenges 1) Refugees (DEMG) 2) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC) 3) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH) 4) Food Security and Agriculture (FOOD) 5) Economic Stability (ECFS) D. External Relations 1) Regional Relations (SRCC) 2) International Relations (FPOL) E. Overarching Issues 1) Media Structure and Availability (INFR) 2) Information Systems and Telecommunications Infrastructure (INFR)


II. Country-Specific Issues

A. Mineral Resources (ENVR) B. Genocidal Legacy Issues (HRWC)

4. (S/NF) Reporting and collection needs:

I. Regional Issues

A. Democratization and Political Stability

1) Leadership Dynamics (DEPS)

-- Leadership dynamics and decision-making processes of key civilian and military officials; influence of corruption and patronage in decision-making. -- Status of relations among top leaders of African Great Lakes countries, especially Kigali and Kinshasa, and Kampala and Kinshasa. -- Plans and intentions regarding political succession, including post-election transitions; indications of coup plotting. -- Leader influence on popular opinion and popular sentiments. -- Influence on government leadership of religious organizations, interest groups, ethnic groups, and military. -- The role of military, intelligence, and security services in national policy decision-making and their control of government institutions and parastatals. -- Leadership policies and actions that cause or respond to political instability or economic deterioration. -- Leadership financial resources and personal relationships. -- Government and public views about and evidence of impact of corruption and crime on internal stability and development. -- Information on political stability, sources of instability, and nature of challenges to effective governance. -- Government plans and efforts to respond to threats to political stability; strategies for addressing underlying discontent. -- Changes inside key ministries and security forces, including personal dynamics, tribal politics and factions. -- Details on identities, motives, influence, and relations among principal advisors. -- Biographic and biometric data, including health, opinions toward the US, training history, ethnicity (tribal and/or clan), and language skills of key and emerging political, military, intelligence, opposition, ethnic, religious, and business leaders. Data should include email addresses, telephone and fax numbers, fingerprints, facial images, DNA, and iris scans.


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H


2) Rebel and Militia Groups (SRCC)


-- Efforts by rebel or militia groups or non-state actors--especially entities such as the FDLR that contain Rwandans who participated in the 1994 genocide--to obtain control of or greater participation in national or local government; to obtain control of natural or financial resources; to integrate into the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) or to cooperate with the FARDC in the exploitation of economic resources. -- Extent of political influence of rebel or militia groups. -- Attitudes toward implementation of regional peace accords. -- Organization, leadership, order of battle, training, strategies and tactics of armed groups and factions, including those integrated into government. -- Efforts by rebel or militia groups to recruit government forces or demobilized troops/fighters. -- Indications of shifting alliances and factions. -- Indications of political and social infrastructure development by rebel and militia groups, including fundraising, recruitments, weapons and repair parts procurement, and propaganda. -- Public sympathy or antipathy toward rebel and militia groups. -- Evidence of influence or pressure on, or support for, rebel or militia groups from foreign governments, non-state actors, and Congolese diaspora. -- Infiltration and resupply routes used by rebel and militia groups. -- Evidence that drug trafficking, evasion of the Kimberly Process, or other criminal activities, including cyber crime, are used to finance the activities of rebel and militia groups. -- Evidence and impact of the presence of troops from neighboring countries and their proxy forces in Congo, particularly the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF).


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI- PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5 REGIONAL REBEL GROUPS AND NON-STATE ACTORS WHO CARRY OUT ATROCITIES AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES: ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES (ADF), DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA (FDLR), LORD,S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA)-PRIORITY- 4


3) Democracy and Governance (DEPS)


-- Leadership views, intentions, and actions on democratic reforms, to include free press, treatment of opposition political or ethnic groups, respect for human rights, respect for rule of law and independent judiciary, and fair elections. -- Extent/effectiveness of government control over national territory and over cross-border flows of people and goods. -- Progress of or obstacles to disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, and reintegration (DDRR) of ex-combatants into a civilian society. -- Structure, interaction, and role of administrative, judicial, and legislative organs, including indications that they are overshadowed by personal politics. -- Information on effectiveness or abuse of the electoral system or judiciary, including government procedures to maintain the integrity and secrecy of the ballot during each phase of balloting and vote reconciliation. -- Details on all aspects of the electoral process, to include election laws, electoral procedures, election monitoring, balloting, and election equipment. -- Details on corruption in government institutions and efforts to reduce it. -- Signs of ethnic, religious, or generational polarization and role of ethnic, regional or class distinctions in access to decision-making and natural or financial resources. -- Information on government improvements in infrastructure, including in remote regions. -- Ability and efforts to adhere to/evade the Kimberly Process, and to combat illicit finance.


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H


4) Political Opposition (DEPS)


-- Activities, plans, and intentions of political opposition parties and individuals; sources of funding and support. -- Government attempts to stifle political opposition. -- Alliances or factions, and evidence of links to foreign governments or armed groups. -- Political opposition party leadership, organization, agendas, membership, and level of influence on civil society and military; leadership biographic data. -- Opposition party regional and ethnic support areas, family and financial networks, key patrons and clients, and internal alliances and rivalries -- Opinions of ethnic, religious, and other groups on the government and political opposition.

COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H

B. Military and Security


1) Military Developments (FMCC)


-- Military capabilities, intentions, and actions in support of or against existing political leadership or government activities. -- Progress of or obstacles to the integration of former government, rebel, and militia fighters into a new armed force; loyalty of units integrated from former armed opponents. -- Impact of ethnic, political, regional, or tribal divisions within the military and other security forces on morale, readiness, placement of leaders, and support for the government. -- Indications of military involvement in human rights abuses, recruiting of children, criminal or corrupt activity, or anti-government insurgency. -- Loyalties, cohesion, discord, rivalries, competing agendas or ambitions, and signs of dissension within military leadership, officer corps, and ranks; evidence of corruption/criminal activity in the military or security forces and effects on preparedness. -- Extent and effects of ethnic and political divisions within the military and between the military and political leadership. -- Attitudes toward AFRICOM; willingness to cooperate with AFRICOM. -- Ability and willingness to cooperate with forces from neighboring countries and deployed peacekeeping forces to manage threats. -- Personnel strength levels, force structure, doctrine, modernization plans, training, discipline, professionalism, morale, order of battle, logistics, combat effectiveness, and capabilities of military services. -- Details on military facilities, such as airfields and army camps, and on military equipment, including numbers, operational status, and procurement/refurbishment activity. -- Details about military relations with other countries, especially China, Libya, Sudan, North Korea, Iran, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and other former Soviet bloc countries. -- Details about foreign military assistance and training. -- Attitudes toward and impact of US military training. -- Details on defense budget by function and service. -- Development and implementation of mechanisms for civil control of the military. -- Public attitudes towards the military and other security forces.


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H


2) Weapons Procurement (FMCC)


-- Details of arms acquisitions and arms sales by government or insurgents, including negotiations, contracts, deliveries, terms of sale, quantity and quality of equipment, and price and payment terms. -- Transfer of strategic materials such as uranium. -- Information on insurgent groups' weapons and material entry and transshipment points, routes, and destinations. -- Indications of smuggling and weapons and weapons repair parts trafficking. -- Factory markings and paint/color schemes on all arms/weapon systems and their munitions acquired or produced locally.


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H


3) Police and Paramilitary Forces (CINT)


-- Non-military security force loyalties, leadership, capabilities, organization, size, locations, and ethnic composition. -- Roles and missions of various units. -- Evidence of splits within police and paramilitary forces. -- Evidence of contact and cooperation with rebel groups. -- Ability to maintain local security without intervention or assistance of military forces. -- Reports of misconduct, human rights violations, or involvement in illegal/illicit activities, or the misuse of foreign training funds or equipment. -- Evidence of conflict between security forces and the military.


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H


4) GRPO can provide text of this issue and related requirements.


5) Support to US Military Contingency Planning (HREL)


-- Details on developments that could prompt US contingency planning for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) or humanitarian assistance. -- Host nation support for evacuation or humanitarian assistance by US forces (AFRICOM), including host nation ability and willingness to protect US citizens and/or facilities. -- Government plans and capabilities to cope with emergencies, including civilian and military response, or to request or accept assistance from the US, UN, or others. -- Government or other organizations' plans to work with UN and international donor and NGO groups in relief and reconstruction efforts, resettlement programs, and development assistance. -- Details on obstacles to aid distribution and implementation of humanitarian aid programs. -- Details of emergency infrastructure, including locations, descriptions, and capabilities of military, police, and fire response resources. -- Location and description of third-country diplomatic and aid/NGO facilities, and of leaders' residences and alternate locations. -- Information on the character and severity of existing or potential future humanitarian crises resulting from natural disasters or from internal or regional violence. -- Description and locations of potential evacuation sites, hospitals, hotels, government installations, religious sites and shrines, civilian institutions including schools and stadiums, diplomatic facilities, educational and medical facilities, and culturally significant sites. -- Evacuation routes, including chokepoints and potential impediments. -- Volcanic activity on the Congo (Kinshasa)/Rwanda border.


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H


6) Terrorism (TERR)


-- Individuals and organizations supporting international terrorism, including legitimate businesses and financial transactions, money laundering, drug trafficking, logistical support, cyber crime, and document forgeries. -- Extent to which ethnic, tribal, religious and regional fragmentation could serve to attract international terrorist groups. -- Evidence of transit and safe haven by transnational and regional terrorist groups. -- Vulnerability of populace to Islamic extremism. -- Evidence of domestic terrorist groups. -- Indications of funding from Gulf-based financiers or NGOs.
COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS: HIZBALLAH (LEBANESE)-PRIORITY 1 REGIONAL REBEL GROUPS AND NON-STATE ACTORS WHO CARRY OUT ATROCITIES AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES: ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES (ADF), DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA (FDLR), LORD,S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA)-PRIORITY- 4


C. Societal Challenges


1) Refugees (DEMG)


-- Government plans, policies, and efforts regarding refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). -- Government capability and willingness to absorb, register, assist, and protect refugees and IDPs. -- Government capability and willingness to protect and assist NGO and aid agency personnel. -- Plans and intentions of rebel forces to cooperate, hinder, or manipulate aid for refugees and IDPs. -- Indications of rebel or militia forces infiltrating refugee camps or groups, or using such camps/groups to mask their activities. -- Public attitudes for or against repatriation of IDPs or refugees. -- Information on neighboring country efforts regarding refugees and IDPs. -- Number, location, and size of refugee and IDP areas (to include hospitals, churches, and other de facto IDP areas as well as traditional camps); transit routes used by refugees and IDPs. -- Numbers, age, gender, ethnicity, general health and security conditions, nature and extent of critical needs of refugees and IDPs. -- Factors driving refugee movements; links between refugee movements and political and economic stability. -- Indications that the inability of returning refugees to reclaim their land is contributing to instability. -- Details of cross-border criminal activity, including travel routes and nodes, transshipment sites, communications, and financial facilitators, especially for human smuggling and trafficking. -- Attitudes toward women; women,s legal rights, especially rights to education, work, land ownership, and inheritance. -- Process and effects of migration and demographic shifts within and among regional nations, including movement from rural to urban areas and youth bulge. -- Details about geographic distribution of population and internal migration. -- Information on population density, population growth, age breakdowns, economic and housing characteristics, ethnic and religious affiliations, occupations, literacy, educational attainment, access to electricity, water, and sanitation.


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 3; RWANDA- PRIORITY 3


2) Human Rights and War Crimes (HRWC)


-- Plans, intentions, and actions of rebel and militia groups, federal and state government officials, military, intelligence and other security services, to commit human rights violations, including mass killings, extra judicial killing, forced disappearance, torture, sexually based violence, arbitrary arrest, police brutality, and persecution of minorities and ethnic factions. -- Indications that policies targeting civilians could be perceived as strategically advantageous to a government, rebel, or militia group. -- Indications of leaders, failure to instill discipline within armies, rebel groups, or militias that could lead to human rights violations and abuses. -- Ethnic/regional tensions that might fuel genocidal activity, including scapegoating or calls for violence against noncombatants of a particular ethnic, regional, or political group by government, rebel, or militia groups. -- Indications of mobilization or force posturing directed against civilians. -- Threats against or denial of access to media, foreigners, or NGOs to areas of concern. -- Support for or response to activities of international criminal tribunals, including the International Criminal Court. -- Ability and willingness of all levels of government to promote human rights. -- Details on government policies, procedures, and efforts regarding prevention of human rights abuses, including efforts to marginalize specific groups of people. -- Efforts of the police and military to uphold or violate human rights. -- Government intentions to follow through on investigations and prosecution of human rights abuses. -- Indications that ambiguity between civilians and combatants could lead to violence against civilians. -- Plans and activities of the government to use food, or other government-controlled commodities, as a political tool. -- Evidence of attacks or planned attacks on peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers; limitations on the activities of NGOs. -- Evidence that humanitarian aid agencies are preparing for an increase in the number of civilian casualties or refugees. -- Evidence that truth and reconciliation activities or war crimes trials are increasing or decreasing tension or fostering or alleviating instability. -- Landmine or explosive remnant of war (ERW) casualties and evidence of mine stockpiling; government intentions to clear landmine/ERW areas.


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI- PRIORITY 4; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 3; RWANDA- PRIORITY 4


3) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH)


-- Government plans, policies, and capabilities to prevent, control, and treat existing and emerging disease outbreaks, particularly HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, polio, and avian influenza. -- Details of infectious diseases and general health conditions including number of cases, percentage, fatalities, dates, and areas of occurrence. Also if possible, provide historical data in order to compare recent data collection. -- HIV statistics, including percentage of military, police force, and orphans that are HIV positive. --Information concerning the influence of traditional healers on infectious diseases as well as endemic health issues. -- Details on drug resistant strains, including malaria, HIV/AIDS, avian influenza, and tuberculosis. --Information concerning maternal and child health, in terms of access to prenatal care, statistics on the types of pregnancy-related poor outcomes related to infant and/or maternal morbidity/mortality, and access to well-baby clinics. -- Access to care information, including regions and populations with access to advanced levels of care and those without basic prevention and treatment needs. -- Information on medical professionals, including number of personnel by type (nurse, physician, midwife, etc.), medical specialty, and location (urban or rural). -- Education and training requirements for medical professionals; locations of institutions where training is available. -- Information on medical facilities/hospitals, including capabilities, personnel, training, equipment, etc. Disaster response capability/plan. -- Details about contaminated food, water, air, and soil and the effect on health. Toxic industrial chemical contamination, including types of industrial facilities, chemicals on site, and products being generated. -- Details on water, food, and vector-borne diseases, including location, prevalence, and virulence. -- Government efforts to protect the population from zoonotic (animal to human transmission capable) diseases; details on the stockpile and storage of vaccines. -- Information on drug addiction treatment facilities. -- Information on mental health issues, including the government,s willingness to report, the types and severity of mental health problems, and access to care. -- Chronic disease information, including types and access to treatment, such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease.


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H


4) Food Security and Agriculture (FOOD)


-- Government policies, plans, intentions, and actions regarding food security and food safety, and willingness to cooperate with UN and other donor agencies. -- Nutritional status of population, including refugees. -- Indications that rising food prices are adversely affecting nutritional status and/or contributing to instability; use of subsidies or export/import bans. -- Yields and prospects for cash and subsistence crops; changes in agricultural practices, such as cropping patterns and crop selection; use/availability of seeds and fertilizers. -- Government acceptance of genetically modified food and propagation of genetically modified crops. -- Status of structural adjustments and infrastructure improvements to increase agricultural producer income and reduce migration to urban areas. -- Information on surface and groundwater resources, to include sources, treatment, distribution and storage. -- Indications that deforestation, desertification, erosion and degradation of soils are affecting agricultural output. -- Food contamination affecting population health. -- Indications of invasive species, especially those affecting food security or development. -- Indications of water table degradation, decreases in lake levels below historic norms, or evidence of territorial disputes associated with declining water resources or quality.


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI- PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H


5) Economic Stability (ECFS)


-- Overall economic status, including government plans and will to implement free-market reform, to ensure consistent regulations, and to uphold the rule of law on economic issues. -- Government plans and intentions to address economic effects of war and conflict, such as shortages of fuel, electric power, and food; unemployment; and wage arrears, particularly the inability to pay troops. -- Fiscal policies and investment strategies, financial and commercial links within and outside the region, status of foreign currency reserves, and positions on bilateral and multilateral economic issues and negotiations. -- Details of Chinese trade, aid, and investment activities. -- Public and expert perceptions of the effect on economic performance of corruption among government and business elites and of the competence of economic administrators. -- Policies and actions to attract foreign investment; plans and intentions of foreign nationals or companies to invest or start up new business ventures. -- Government strategy and objectives for engagement with international financial institutions--World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank--for loans, grants, debt management, and restructuring. -- Details on economic assistance needs and requests, including donors, projects, and effectiveness of current or proposed aid. -- Status of raw materials industries, including plans to develop/exploit resource deposits. -- Government plans and objectives regarding land reallocation; effects of land reallocation on indigenous population, commercial farmers, militant interest groups, and its impact on foreign investment. -- Indications of ethnic/regional tensions over resources, such as land and water. -- Details on and public perception of economic growth, including youth employment prospects. -- Statistics on economic indicators, including remittances. -- Details, capabilities, and potentially required repairs and upgrades of infrastructure and lines of communication, such as airfields, landing zones, river ports, rail lines, roads, bridges, medical facilities, and electric power, petroleum, and water facilities.


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H


D. External Relations


1) Regional Relations (SRCC)


-- Policy toward and relations with regional states, particularly with regard to ongoing conflicts, support for foreign dissidents, border incursions, peace negotiations, refugee assistance and repatriation, trade, aid, and security agreements. -- Government views and perceptions about activities and intentions of regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC), and other regional organizations. -- Activities of mercenaries or private security firms in assisting military forces or insurgencies; mercenary or private security firm involvement in trafficking activities.


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 4; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5


2) International Relations (FPOL)


-- Government leader views and policies toward the US, AFRICOM, and international organizations; plans and intentions to support or oppose US positions in international fora. -- Public and private attitudes toward the US, AFRICOM, and US policies. -- Foreign alliances and activities, especially those involving China and Iran. -- Agreements and concessions negotiated with foreign states and non-state actors for military, paramilitary, or economic assistance. -- Government views and perceptions about activities and intentions of non-regional nations and organizations, particularly China, Iran, France, UN, and the European Union (EU). -- Perceptions by the civilian population towards the UN, particularly improvements or failures of UN efforts to address human rights abuses by peacekeeping forces. -- Plans and efforts of countries or organizations to arbitrate or influence conflict resolution. -- Efforts to enforce or circumvent sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and terrorist groups. -- Political will and intentions of governments to participate in or support peacekeeping operations sponsored by regional organizations, such as ECOWAS, or by the UN, US, France, or other. -- Willingness to contribute forces to African Union (AU) Standby Brigade Forces (e.g. EASBRIG) and/or the will to provide meaningful participation in CEEAC - Economic Community of Central African States) -- Government plans, intentions, and capabilities to provide, train, equip, transport, maintain, supply, and fund international peacekeeping forces, including providing command, control, communications, and intelligence. -- Military willingness and capability to train with other nations in programs such as the US Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and Joint Combined Exercise for Training (JCET) programs, and to participate in peacekeeping operations. -- Local population relationship with foreign peacekeeping forces. -- Capabilities, attitudes, and behavior of peacekeepers from or stationed in regional nations, including understanding of and adherence to human rights standards. -- Government cooperation regarding rescue/recovery of US/allied POW/MIAs and detained/kidnapped US/allied citizens.


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H


E. Overarching Issues


1) Media Structure and Availability (INFR)


-- Government, public, and private perceptions of status of press freedom. -- Evidence of media control or manipulation, in particular to incite unrest, by government, opposition groups, non-state actors, and other groups. -- Details on print and broadcast media, including name, content, ownership, target audience, staff, broadcast frequency and power. -- Internet availability and use. -- Extent of, access to, and identity of, foreign television and radio broadcasts, and news publications. -- Changes to the UN commitment to provide media services in the eastern Congolese provinces.


COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H


2) Information Systems and Telecommunications Infrastructure (INFR)


-- Current specifications, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and planned upgrades to, national telecommunications infrastructure and information systems, command and control systems, networks, and technologies used by government, military, and private sector. -- Details about foreign assistance (especially Chinese) for improvements to the national telecommunications grid. -- National leadership use of, and dependencies on, dedicated telecommunications infrastructures and information systems. -- Details about national and regional telecommunications policies, programs, regulations, service providers, vendors, and training. -- Details about internet and intranet use, infrastructure, and government oversight. -- Plans and efforts to acquire U.S. export-controlled telecommunications technology. -- Details about information repositories for Radio Frequency Identification-enabled systems used for passports, government badges, and transportation systems. -- Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.

COUNTRIES: BURUNDI-PRIORITY 5H; CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC- PRIORITY 5H; RWANDA- PRIORITY 5H


II. Country Specific Issues


A. Mineral Resources (ENVR)


-- Details on mining of diamonds, copper, cobalt, uranium, other minerals, and oil extraction: number and location of mines, production statistics and revenue generated, and extent of control given to China and other foreign governments, companies or consortiums; export statistics. -- Details on mineral, oil and other resource exploitation by rebel groups and foreign elements to include type and location of resources exploited, and revenue generated through sales, customs duties, taxation, and access control. -- Government ability/willingness to deal with environmental abuses.


COUNTRIES: CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC-PRIORITY 5H


B. Genocidal Legacy Issues (HRWC)


-- Government attitudes and intentions toward Tutsi survivors, Tutsis operating outside the power elite, Hutus, returning Hutu fighters/refugees, and Twa. -- Indications of increased ethnic tensions that could spark renewed violence. -- Government plans and intentions to counter ethnic violence or genocide; identification of government officials encouraging violence. -- Information on policies concerning human rights, democratization, political inclusion, reconciliation, land ownership and tenancy, and political prisoners. -- Public attitudes toward traditional judicial courts (gacaca) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. -- Information on participation in human rights abuses, including extra judicial killings by Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF); paramilitary, including local defense forces; police, security forces; or Tutsi civilians against Hutus. -- Divisions within President Kagame's inner circle and his party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). -- Public attitudes toward the FDLR and subgroups; links between those groups and supporters outside the Great Lakes Region. -- Information about identification, location and arrest of such leaders.

COUNTRIES: RWANDA- PRIORITY 4

CLINTON

© The Guardian

Posted by ColoredOpinions




Members of the French speaking Reformed Church "Eglise Wallonne" in Leiden have initiated a petition for Victoire Ingabire in Dutch asking the Dutch government to do all that is possible to make sure that Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza's human rights are respected and her life is protected.

SOS! Misses Victoire Ingabire arrested and in danger
*
The Rwandan Victoire Ingabire is imprisoned in Kigali (Rwanda) and is being treated so badly that her life is in danger. We are won't consider ourselves with the circumstances of her arrest, nor with the situation of the country. We want that her fundamental rights are being respected.

Petition

We
Churchmembers and sympathisers for whom human life deserves to be respected in every actual situation, we

note

that Victoire Ingabire (42 years, married and mother of three children) finds herself in a threatening situation in the prison in Kigali. She has, after having lived in the Netherlands for sixteen years, returned to Rwanda in january 2010 to help reconstruct the democracy of her land of birth. But she got arrested there mid october and we request that,

You, the minister of Foreign Affairs, undertake steps that can lead to respect for the rights of misses Ingabire and that her life is protected. 

 The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine

[Since 1994, the world witnesses the horrifying reality : the Tutsi minority (14%) ethnic domination, the Tutsi minority ethnic rule, tyranny and corruption in Rwanda. The current government has been characterized by the total impunity of RPF criminals, the Tutsi economic monopoly, the Tutsi militaristic domination with an iron hand, and the brutal suppression of the rights of the majority of the Rwandan people (85% are Hutus), mass-arrests and mass-murder by the RPF criminal organization.

So long as justice and accountability for RPF past and current crimes are ignored and delayed, Peace and Stability will remain illusive and impossible in Rwanda=>ASIF]





A UN report released last month put into doubt the notion that Kagame alone stopped Rwanda’s Hutu-led genocide. It accuses Kagame’s forces of vengeful massacres against the Hutu population in Eastern Congo in 1996. The report documented 617 of the worst human rights violations by Rwandan and Ugandan troops against those who had fled the genocide. “Many of the attacks were directed against civilians consisting primarily of women and children”.

Rwanda’s Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo called the report “an attempt to rewrite history”, as Kigali tried to paint this as an attempt to promote the double genocide theory. The government was so desperate to get the report quashed, it even threatened to pull out Rwandan troops from delicate U.N. peacekeeping operations in Sudan. However, the report’s sheer thoroughness makes any criticism hard to sustain. More than 1,200 individual witnesses were interviewed and over 1,500 documents were collected and analysed. This report is no matter of opinion, it’s a matter of fact.

Kagame’s government has enjoyed years as the global aid community’s darling in a troubled region for good reason. Average incomes have more than doubled from $242 in 1999 to $520 in 2010. Kagame as also been a champion for gender equality in the region and Rwanda now boasts the highest share of women in government in the world. Even Transparency International, a Berlin-based anti-corruption monitor, applauds its anti-corruption efforts and rates it as the cleanest country in east Africa. The compliments, however, end here.
Killings and arrests were but a few scandals which emerged in the lead up to August’s Presidential elections. Diplomats were dismayed. Why rig an election when you’re set to win? Firstly, years of struggle in the bush as leader of the RPF means Kagame sees himself as a national hero who would find defeat at the polls too humiliating to consider. Furthermore, weak institutions mean power is concentrated in the executive so all those in positions of power stand to lose if an opponent wins office. This means not only the President but the entire state relies on a Kagame victory, so democracy is undermined by everyone from everywhere.

Defenders of the current regime would argue that his recent slide towards dictatorship is necessary pragmatism. The government faces real constant threats from Hutu extremist groups in the Congo. Grenade attacks in Kigali earlier this year were seen as a sign that rebel forces were ready to attack. The recent arrest of FDLR leader Callixte Mbarushimana by the ICC proves that the groups are facing a crackdown by The Hague so the threat has diminished.


Kagame may also fear attacks from within, as the peace he has brokered among Rwanda’s warring tribes after the tragedy of 1994 remains fragile. His strategy for reconciliation involves eliminating tribal identities and replacing them with a new national identity. The government fears Hutu political opponents, such as Victoire Ingabire, could undermine this with inflammatory comments.

Kagame’s fears are more likely to be realized if he carries on oppressing freedom of speech. Violence may return if he maintains his crackdown on the press. Rebellion is probable unless he allows the prosecution of Tutsis as well as Hutus at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The President needs to understand that however noble his aims may be, his methods are misguided.

Britain and America have the power to set things right. Kagame was trained at the US Army College at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas in 1990 and has remained loyal ever since. As Rwanda’s biggest donors, the US and UK provide around $220m of funding each year, which the government budget relies on. Rwanda has also recently joined the commonwealth and switched the country’s entire education system from French to English. Most telling is a recent decision to establish a cricket board. The past 16 years of Kagame’s rule can be seen as an appeasement of Anglo-American desires for the greater benefit of both parties. This year things must change.
Kagame is no longer respecting the ideals he set out to protect in 1994 and in so doing risks all his achievements in reconciling the nation after the genocide. Viable opponents must be found to enable a competitive election to decide Kagame’s successor. Not so many years ago, Mugabe walked down the path to disgrace. We must prevent Kagame from following in his footsteps.


© The Oxford Student

The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine

ICG plots the war in Rwanda and in the Congo as well as repeatedly event in our database. Looking at the rare occasions the ICG intervened to the increasing violence, we found out they have many causal antecedents : The unconditional support of the bloody dictator Paul Kagame and their support of him in serial assassinations and mass-murder. It is nothing new for FDLR who are mired by the ICG. African SurVivors International urges the world community to make clear the political and diplomatic policy towards Paul Kagame and towards Rwanda.


The primary goals of the African SurViVors International organization is to bring back peace in African Great Lakes Region and in Rwanda in particular. African SurViVors International is indebted to various some Human Rights organizations, other charity organizations and individuals around the world that have aided Rwandans to inform the world about the cruelty of the bloody dictator and leader of the Rwandan military junta.

ICG ties with Kagame's backers,  found linked to RPF criminals.

***
An examination of key measures of violence reveals a troublesome correlation between the number of ICG Press releases in favor of violence in Democratic Republic of The Congo and Rwanda and homicides, war crimes, mass-rape and genocide committed by Paul Kagame and his RPF army (RDF) and Kagame proxy armies in Congo. Instead of denouncing RPF crimes, instead of insistsing on the dialogue between Rwandans and restoration for democratic institutions in Rwanda, the International Crisis Group calls on violence and mass-murder of those that refuse it and wants to leave in peace in their country of origin. As aid to RPF and Kagame’s government increases in the name of eradicating AIDS, there is a corresponding increase in the number of assassinations, disappearances, mass-rape, war crimes and genocide in both Rwanda and DRC.
The correlation between ICG statements and or press releases, the fueling of wars in the region by a declaration of war by Paul Kagame using the TCG puppet or backers tell us that the world should insists on the neutrality of NGOS if they are. If necessary, the NGO’s representatives should be brought to justice for such plotting against peace and nations. Looking at the wars crimes statistics make clear that ICG plots violence and its statements cause violence and in many cases ICG’s role is to make sure that violence is not stopped.


The ICG writings, statements and propaganda in favor of Kagame’s jihad do raise a question about whether the flow of such support to the Kagame, RPF and Kagame military junta has helped fuel Kagame violence and hinders efforts to restore peace and justice in Rwanda. Recent assassinations inside Rwanda of journalists and political opponents.


Prior to the Kagame’s jihad in Congo , ICG directed nearly all propaganda to worship and praise Kagame’s action in Congo within Kimya I and II. Kagame’s terror campaign launched against Hutu women and children since 1993 up to 2003, the last date known to be the last press release of ICG during the genocide in Congo against Hutus disrupt the main Kagame backing sources.

To bring back peace in the African Great Region will require making the security Council US and EU community and NGOs players responsible for their actions to the international community, since ICG ties with the RPF criminals doesn’t help to resolve the issue of violence in that region rather to fuel the flames inside and outside Rwanda and in Democratic Rep. of Congo in particular.

Dec 1996 The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Congo (ADFL) controlled most of eastern Congo. It is made up of four political forces with a history of opposition to Mobutu's government as well as the Banyamulenge. It was reported that the Banyamulenge were outnumbered six-to-one by other Congoan ethnic groups in the alliance. Besides being opposed by Congoan government forces, the rebel alliance is also opposed by Congoan militias, the Bangilima and Mai-Mai who have long been opposed to the presence of all Banyarwanda in Congo.


The Rwandan Patriotic Army, which took over Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, and the Ugandan army were reportedly backing the rebels. (Reuters, 12/3/96).





Accurate chronology of reminding mass-slaughters of Hutus in DRC Dec 17, 1996 Mobutu flew home to Congo after undergoing treatment for cancer in France. He appointed a new armed forces chief and reshuffled his cabinet in order to launch a counter-offensive against the rebels.
Jan 20, 1997 The government launched an offensive against Kabila's forces even as they advanced on mineral-rich Shaba region.

Mar 7, 1997 Hundreds of soldiers seized opposition strongholds in Kinshasa after dispersing opposition militias trying to gather for a march against Mobutu. The Secretary-General of UDPS, Adrien Phongo, was beaten and arrested.
Mar 15, 1997 Kisangani, Congo's third largest city, falls to rebel troops.

Mar 23, 1997 Human rights organizations report that Hutu refugees are being massacred in the East by Kabila's forces. Kabila troops are dominated by Tutsis from Rwanda and he is receiving military and other support from Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda.

Apr 2, 1997 Etienne Tshisekedi is named Prime Minister after Kengo wa Dondo is forced out of office. Tshisekedi names his own government and offers to negotiate with Kabila. The offer is refused and Mobutu sacks Tshisekedi after a week.

Apr 5, 1997 The town of Mbuji-Mayi in Kasai Province falls to rebel forces. It is the diamond mining center of Congo and home of opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, a Baluba. Laurent Kabila is also a Baluba, but from neighboring Shaba Province. Both Shaba and Kasai have been operating as de facto autonomous states in recent years.

Apr 8, 1997 Mobutu declares a state of emergency over all of Congo. Tshisekedi's supporters clashed with security forces for two days when it became apparent that he would be dropped as Prime Minister.

Apr 9, 1997 Rebels capture Lubumbashi, the capital of Shaba province. It is the second-largest city in Congo in a region rich in minerals. General Likulia Bolong is named Prime Minister replacing Etienne Tshisekedi.

Apr 14, 1997 Tshisekedi supporters in Kinshasa close down the capital for two days in protest over Tshisekedi's ouster as Prime Minister.

Apr 27, 1997 Kabila gives the United Nations 60 days to repatriate hundreds of thousands of Hutus, many of whose whereabouts are unknown having fled into the interior of Congo with the advance of Kabila's rebels. Relief agencies begin airlifting Hutu refugees back to Rwanda shortly after Kabila makes his announcement.

May 1997 Soldiers put down a peaceful demonstration in Uvira, 90 miles south of Bukavu, South Kivu's capital. Some 20 protesters were killed.



May 13, 1997 A night-time curfew was declared in Kinshasa.

May 16, 1997 After it has become apparent that he has no choice but to give up power, Mobutu left Kinshasa for his northern palace at Gbadolite after which he is expected to leave Congo. South Africa had been attempting to mediate between Kabila and Mobutu, but after several attempts, it was clear that Kabila held the upper hand and Mobutu had no leverage over the take-over of his country.

May 17, 1997 Kabila declared himself president and took office on the 29th. He also changed the name of Congo to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), also known as Congo-Kinshasa.

May 23, 1997 Kabila announced some members of his transitional government. The post of Prime Minister, which opposition leaders had hoped would go to Etienne Tshisekedi who has extensive popular support in Kinshasa and Kasai Province, was abolished. Tshisekedi was excluded from Kabila's government.

Jul 8, 1997 Reports have surfaced that in the first weeks of the rebellion begun in October 1996, more than 9000 people, mostly civilians, were killed. There were systematic killings of Hutu refugees in Mbandaka, Kisingani, Goma, and Bukavu. A Senior Tutsi official in Congo's Interior Ministry said that Rwandan and Congolese Tutsi troops were given a free hand to go after Hutu refugees so long as they also contributed to the overthrow of Mobutu. Rebel officers who opposed this policy were reportedly killed. Western diplomats said Kabila did not participate in much of the planning or execution of the rebellion.

Jul 12, 1997 A United Nations report into the massacres of Rwandan refugees in Congo during the rebellion stated they were so massive and systematic that they can be considered crimes against humanity and possibly genocide. Investigators, who have been hampered in their investigation efforts by Kabila's government, said they received reports on 134 alleged massacres committed by Kabila's ADFL and Banyamulenge militias.

Aug 1997 The Democratic Resistance Alliance was established in eastern DRC with the stated aim of "liberating" the area. The new movement is made up largely of Bembe and is led by Celestin Anzaluni Bemba, a local politician known for his anti-Tutsi sentiments. It is reportedly based in Tanzania. Non-Banyarwandan ethnic groups in eastern Congo have resented the privileged position the Congolese Tutsis played in the rebellion that ousted Mobutu and want all Banyamulenge out of the country. (U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), 9/10/97)

Aug 10 - 20, 1997 A DRC journalist said that troops, either Tutsis from the DRC or Rwanda, raided Masisi and killed up to 200 people in retaliation for an attack on Tutsi soldiers by Mai-Mai guerrillas. Athorities in the area confirmed 48 people were killed, but other sources put the number of dead at up to 200.

Aug 13, 1997 35,000 refugees in Tanzania's Lugufu camp are divided between supporters and opponents of returning to the DRC. The Babembe are the majority in the camp which was set up in February. Most are refusing to return to their homes because they fought against Kabila's rebellion. Ethnic tensions between the Bembe and Banyamulenge continues in eastern Congo.

Aug 27, 1997 The World Food Program has given seeds to farmers in the Kivu regions stating that the food supply situation was still critical in the area. The WFP estimated the remaining Rwandan refugees in Congo at more than 20,000 and added that 190,000 Congolese were internally displaced. The United Nations continued to list 200,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees as missing in the eastern region of Congo.

Sep 5, 1997 The Association for the Defense of Human Rights in the DRC said about 2000 civilians were massacred in July when Kabila's forces and Rwandan troops avenged attacks by Mai-Mai guerrillas. The Mai-Mai had killed 162 troops in the Masisi area. The Mai-Mai are from the Hunde, Nyanga, Tembo and Kumu ethnic groups and have been fighting against the presence of Tutsis in both North and South Kivu.

Kabila's government has set up a commission of inquiry to which aims to end the political and ethnic troubles in the region. The Masisi area has long been the scene of conflict between the Banyarwanda and "autochtones" or "native" Congolese (Congolese). In 1993, approximately 14,000 Banyarwanda were killed in ethnic violence, and after the influx of Rwandan refugees into the region in mid-1994, ethnic Tutsis became the main targets of ethnic violence in Masisi and eastern Congo in general.

(U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), 9/10/97)
Sep 7, 1997 Mobutu Sese Seko died of cancer in exile in Morocco.

Sep 18, 1997 More than 100 people were believed to have been killed in renewed violence in the Masisi area. Congolese Tutsis were the main victims. An organization called MAGRIVI, the Mutual Association of the Agriculturalists of the Virunga, was blamed for the deaths. The alliance, made up of Hutu farmers and Mai-Mai militias targeted Tutsi residents and military personnel.

The human rights organization Azadho said that since July, more than 2000 people have been killed in Kivu. Last week, 7-8000 Tutsi civilians fled Masisi saying that Hutu rebels made daily attacks against them. The Interahamwe have been based in Masisi. In South Kivu, a similar movement has formed within the Babende ethnic group.

It is led by Charles Simba, a one-time ally of Kabila, and has been harassing and ambushing Kabila's Tutsi forces. The Council for National Resistance and Liberation accused Rwandan Tutsis of massacring over 2000 Congolese, mainly Bemba, in the region between Fizi and Kalemia in early September.

Spokesman Henri Njila also stated that many groups in the east, including Babembe, Bafulero, Wanynaga, Bahunde, Bashi and Hutu, have begun to rebel against Kabila. Both Rwandan Hutus and people from other ethnic groups suspected of being sympathetic to Hutus have been killed in massacres in the east.

Sep 22, 1997 Authorities in Kivu said it is now under control of government security forces. Press sources said about 100 Mai-Mai fighters were executed a few kilometers from Goma. Since July, there have been clashes in the area between Mai-Main militiamen and Kabila's forces. Major roads linkind Bukavu to the rest of the world have frequently been ambushed and insecurity in reigned in the area in recent months. The Mai-Mai have been waging a rebellion against what they see is foreign domination by Tutsis.

Sep 23, 1997 Ethnic rivalries flared in the east after the recall of Tutsi soldiers to Rwanda. After their departure, about 7000 ethnic Tutsis in the DRC felt they had lost their protection and fled to Goma. Three thousand fled to the Mudende refugee camp in northwestern Rwanda joining 7500 Masisi Tutsis already there. Non-Tutsi Congolese in the east are increasingly resentful of the improved status of the Tutsis. Tensions are so high in the region that there are rumors of a Rwandan invasion.

Sep 26, 1997 More than 800 former Rwandan army troops and members of the Interahamwe have surrendered to military authorities in the DRC. They had fought alongside governmental troops during the ADFL rebellion. There were no plans to repatriate them to Rwanda.

Oct 3, 1997 About 3000 Mai-Mai militiamen have surrendered to the North Kivu authorities. They will be integrated into the new national armed forces currently undergoing reconstruction. The DRC closed the frontier with Rwanda and said it was expelling all refugees. Interior Minister Mwenze Kongolo confirmed that the UNHCR would suspend its work in the east following the repatriation of all refugees.

Oct 14, 1997 Fighting continued in eastern DRC and neighboring regions of Rwanda and Burundi between Tutsis and Hutus. In the DRC, there is also fighting between Banyamulenge and Bantu groups. Since Kabila's victory, the Banyamulenge have become more and more dominant in local administrations and in the army causing resentment from other ethnic groups.
Fighting in western Rwanda, including an attack mounted against the border town of Gisenyi by 1000 rebels based in the DRC, has increased. More than 4000 people, many of them civilians, have been killed in the past five months. In the Masis area of eastern Congo, Mai-Mai militias continue to fight Kabila's Tutsi soldiers, and in the Fizi area a Babende rebel group led by Charles Simba, a one-time ally of Kabila's, continues to ambush Tutsi soldiers.
Oct 29, 1997 The United Nations team attempting to investigate the alleged massacres of Hutu refugees during the civil war and Kabila's government came to an agreement about how to proceed with the investigations. Details of the agreement included that the government will guarantee to the best of its ability the team's security; the U.N. Mission would cover all areas it deemed necessary to help it conduct its investigation; the report would be limited to "global statements of facts" related to allegations of human rights abuses; the team undertakes not to interfere in the DRC's internal affairs; and the time period of the mandate is 1 March 1993-31 December 1997. The mission is to be completed by 28 February 1997.

Oct 30, 1997 Rwandan Vice President and Defense Minister Paul Kagame has refuted allegations that the Rwandan army took part in the massacre of refugees in the DRC. He stated that all casaulties were a result of the war and not deliberate killing sprees.






The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine

Nederland volgt de rechtszaak tegen de Rwandese oppositieleidster Ingabire op de voet. Dat heeft minister Rosenthal van Buitenlandse Zaken geantwoord op vragen van GroenLinks.



Rosenthal is bezorgd over de toestand in Rwanda. Omdat Ingabire Rwandese is, "kan Nederland niet veel voor haar doen".  

[Haar man en drie kinderen zijn Nederlanders en blijven in Nederland.=> ASIF] 
NOS.nl


'Nederland moet wel opkomen voor Ingabire'

DEN HAAG (ANP) - Nederland moet wel degelijk Rwanda aanspreken op de arrestatie van oppositieleidster Victoire Ingabire, die zestien jaar in Nederland woonde. Dat zei haar advocaat Jan Hofdijk dinsdag.

Ingabire zit sinds 16 oktober in de cel, na een aanklacht dat zij de regering omver zou willen werpen. De Nederlandse ambassade in Rwanda kan officieel niks doen voor de gearresteerde presidentskandidate, zei ambassadeur Frans Makken maandag.

'Nederland helpt Rwanda met het opbouwen van een rechtssysteem en gevangenissen. Dan moeten wij toch zeker Rwanda kunnen aanspreken over deze politieke gevangene', zegt Hofdijk. Volgens hem is de aanklacht compleet verzonnen.
Nederland is de grootste buitenlandse investeerder in Rwanda. Bedrijven als Heineken, Draka en Rabobank zijn er actief. Luchtvaartmaatschappij KLM vliegt sinds zondag vijf keer in de week naar Rwanda.
Voorbeeldfunctie


Advocaat Hofdijk meent dat Nederland daarom een voorbeeldfunctie heeft in Rwanda. 'Veel andere diplomaten kijken er naar de opstelling van Nederland. Maar Nederland speelt er een perfide rol. Het zegt zelfs dat het land veilig genoeg is om mensen naar terug te sturen, wat veel andere regeringen in Europa ontkennen.'

Oppositie
 De etnische Hutu Ingabire (43) was in januari teruggekeerd naar Rwanda om mee te doen aan de presidentsverkiezingen van augustus. Daar kreeg ze echter geen toestemming voor. De zittende Tutsi-president Paul Kagame won zonder noemenswaardige oppositie met 93 procent van de stemmen.
© rnw.nl
Related articleVolgens Hofdijk vreest Victoire Ingabire dat ze vergiftigd wordt in de gevangenis, wat in Rwanda vrij gebruikelijk zou zijn. Hofdijk is vooral uit op een eerlijke rechtsgang. Het gaat hem niet zozeer om terugkeer van Victoire Ingabire naar haar gezin in Zevenhuizen. Zijzelf wil vooral actief blijven in Rwanda.
Genocynisme



The Truth can be buried and stomped into the ground where none can see, yet eventually it will, like a seed, break through the surface once again far more potent than ever, and Nothing can stop it. Truth can be suppressed for a "time", yet It cannot be destroyed. ==> Wolverine